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FEDERAL INCOME TAX DEVELOPMENTS: 1974
MERLIN G. BRINER*
INTRODUCTION
F EDERAL INCOME TAX DEVELOPMENTS: 1974 is the second of an annual
series of articles to be published in the Winter Issue of the AKRON
LAW REVIEW. The thrust of this article is not only to identify the new
developments, but also to trace these concepts through their formative
stages. A synopsis of recent legislation appears before the TABLE OF
CONTENTS, and a TABLE OF CASES, TABLE OF INTERNAL REVENUE CODE
SECTIONS, and TABLE OF RECENT REVENUE RULINGS can be found
following the text of the article.
Research for this article includes cases decided through November
30, 1974. As with any comprehensive publication which attempts to
summarize current events in a field as volatile as taxation, assistance is
required to minimize the lead time between research and publication. For
their substantial contributions and complete dedication, the author is deeply
indebted to the following members of the AKRON LAW REVIEW: Allen M.
Cabral, Donald P. Kepple, Edward P. O'Brien, and Philip D. Shepherd.
Special recognition is extended to Linda M. Siulborski for her efforts.
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* B.B.A., Wichita State University; J.D., University of Akron, School of Law;
Associate Professor of Law, University of Akron; formerly manager, Tax Department,
The Timken Co., Canton, Ohio.
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SUMMARY OF PuB. L. No. 93-625 (January 3, 1975)
Presented below is a brief synopsis intended to familiarize the reader
with basic changes set forth in recent legislation.
INTEREST ON TAX OBLIGATIONS
As of July 1, 1975, the interest rate which taxpayers pay on tax
obligations will be increased from six to nine percent. The nine percent
rate applies to underpayments of income tax, the underpayment of both
individual and corporate estimated income tax, and the personal liability
of taxpayers who do not surrender property which has been levied against
by the government. Even more dramatic is the 125% increase from four
to nine percent for interest on the estate tax attributable to closely held
businesses which may be paid over 10 years. If an extension for the
payment of the estate tax is granted due to undue hardship, the interest
accrues at the nine percent rate. Interest paid by the government to
taxpayers on overpayments not refunded within 45 days is also increased
to nine percent.
The Secretary of the Treasury will annually redetermine the interest
rate to be effective on February 1 of the following year. The rate will
approximate 90% of the average prime interest rate for the month of
September and will be announced on October 15.
POLITICAL CONTRIBUTIONS
Effective January 1, 1975, the political contribution deduction is
increased from $100 to $200 -for joint returns and from $25 to $50 for
single or separate returns. The alternative credit is increased from $25 to
$50 for joint returns and from $12.50 to $25 for single or separate
returns. Also, the deduction or credit can now be claimed for payments
made in the year preceding the date the candidate formally declares his
candidacy. Contributions to a candidate's newsletter will also qualify for
the deduction or credit.
Contributions to political organizations after May 7, 1974, are not
subject to the gift tax.
Political organizations, intended to influence the selection, appoint-
ment, nomination or election of individuals seeking public office will
have tax exempt status after January 1, 1975. Investment income,
however, will be subject to the income tax.
If appreciated property is given to a political organization, the
contribution is measured by the fair market value at the date of transfer.
However the contributor is required to recognize as gain the difference
between basis and fair-market value, as the transfer is treated as a sale. A
loss will not be recognized if the value is less than basis. If the property
transferred is a capital asset, the resulting income is subject to capital
gains treatment, but if the item is held for sale in the normal course of
business, then ordinary income results.
Winter, 1975]
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INJURED VETERANS AND MIA's
Beneficial tax treatment has been legislated for wounded veterans
and for the families of soldiers classified as missing in action. Section 112
previously excluded from pay income a maximum of $500 per month for
officers and the entire pay for enlisted men. Although the exclusion
applied during hospitalization, it was dependent upon the continuation of
hostilities. The new statute provides for a full exclusion for months
commencing not more than two years after hostilities cease.
Section 692 forgives individual income taxes of a serviceman who
dies from wounds, disease or injury incurred while serving in a combat
zone. The forgiveness applies only to the year death occurred. The
benefits of Section 692 are extended through the year in which the
missing-in-action status is changed, not just the year in which a
determination is made that he died.
SIxTY MONTH AMORTIZATION
The five-year amortization provisions, in lieu of depreciation, for
rehabilitation of low and moderate income housing pollution control
facilities, railroad rolling stock, and some coal mine safety equipment
have 'been extended an additional year until January 1, 1976. Also
extended until December 31, 1975, are the older more liberal depreciation
recapture rules for low and moderate income housing construction under
government subsidy programs.
REAL ESTATE EXEMPTED FROM ASSET DEPRECIATION RANGE (ADR)
In 1971 when the ADR system of selecting lives for depreciation
was enacted, Congress stated that real property would also have to be
converted to the ADR system. Since the new regulations have not been
issued by the Treasury, real estate is exempted until such time as new
class lines are established by the Treasury.
VACATION PAY ACCRUAL
Accrual basis taxpayers are permitted to elect to deduct the cost of
accrued vacation pay in the year the employer becomes liable for such
pay, even though the employee does not take the vacation, and actual
payments are not made until a subsequent tax year. This revises the
rules previously set forth in Revenue Ruling 54-604.
FORECLOSED PROPERTY-REAL ESTATE INVESTMENT TRUSTS (R.E.I.T.)
To maintain their favorable tax status, real estate investment trusts
are not permitted to hold property for sale, or to receive income from
leases, where the rentals are based on the profit earned 'by the lessee. The
new law permits real estate investment trusts to acquire property where
there is an actual or anticipated default by the mortgagor on mortgages
held by the real estate investment trust. Property so acquired and
operated must be disposed of within two years after acquisition, although
two one-year extensions are permissible.
[Vol. 8:2
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1.00 Income
1.01 Assignment of Income. Revenue Ruling 74-5811 has authorized
an exception to the all-inclusive definition of gross income under Section
61(a). This ruling permits law school attorney-professors, who have
received compensation under the Criminal Justice Act for representing
indigent defendants through various clinical programs set up by the law
school, to assign the payments received over to the law school without
having to include the amounts in their individual gross income. Under
an interpretation of the Criminal Justice Act, the payments cannot be
made directly to the law schools. Since the attorney-professors are
working solely as agents of the law school and assign any compensation
received to the school, they derive no personal gain and therefore should
not be subjected to any adverse tax consequences.
There have been a few other similar rulings where the Service has
permitted the assignment of income in unique fact situations. Examples
include a legal aid attorney turning over statutory legal fees to his
employer,2 and a medical school physician-professor turning over to
1 Rev. Rul. 74-581, 1974 INT. REV. BULL. No. 49, at 6,
2 Rcv. Rul, 65-282, 1965-2 Clum. BULL. 21,
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his school fees for treating indigent patients.3 Aside from these few
exceptions, the rule against the assignment of income, long ago established
in Lucas v. Earl 4 and Helvering v. Horsts remains solidly entrenched
as a basic principal of tax law.
1.02 Constructive Dividends. The Internal Revenue Service has
announced its disagreement with the 1961 Tax Court ruling in J. Simpson
Dean.6 The court there held that a shareholder's two-million-dollar
interest-free loan from his personal holding company did not constitute
a constructive dividend (valued at the free use of the capital). Despite
numerous cases which found constructive dividends to shareholders in the
areas of bargain rentals from a corporation, 7 or the use of corporate funds
for a shareholder's travel expenses,8 his purchase of stock,9 or payment of
his personal debts and obligations,' the Dean case has never been overruled.
In Roy M. Berger," a 1965 property settlement pursuant to a divorce
decree ordered Mr. Berger to buy out his wife's 40% minority interest in
Evergreen Industries, Inc., in which he owned the remaining 60% interest.
The purchase price was set at $64,896, payable at $400 per month. By
corporate resolution later in 1965, the corporation began paying the $400
per month, and by an additional resolution in 1969, established an
irrevocable trust to redeem the still-outstanding stock. The Commissioner
claimed that Berger had received a constructive dividend under Sections
301 and 316 in the amount of the trust, because his corporation was
discharging his personal obligation. The Tax Court agreed that Mr. Berger
had a "personal and unconditional obligation to purchase"'12 his ex-wife's
stock despite his weak arguments to the contrary. Because Mr. Berger's
closely held corporation had discharged this entire personal obligation
for his economic benefit, the finding that he received a constructive
dividend has unanimous support in the case law.
1.03 Advance Rentals. Revenue Ruling 73-54913 dealt a blow to a
retirement community which sought to defer lump-sum advance rental
payments for an apartment unit and the use of the common facilities over
the actuarially determined life expectancy of its residents. Relying on
Treasury Regulation 1.61-8(b), the Ruling pointed out that advance
3 Rev. Rul. 69-274, 1969-1 CuM. BULL. 36. See also Rev. Rul. 58-220, 1958-1 CuM.
BULL. 26, and Rev. Rul. 58-515, 1958-2 Cum. BULL. 28.
4281 U.S. 111 (1930).
5 311 U.S. 112 (1940).
6 35 T.C. 1083 (1961).
7Johnson v. United States, 25 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 70-355 (D. Mo. 1970).
8 Clarke Fashions, Inc., 30 P-H Tax Ct. Mer. 648 (1961).
9 Robert Dietzsch, 38 T.C. 118 (1962).
10 Moyer P. Hendrix, 41 P-H Tax Ct. Mene. 108 (1962).
143 P-H TAx CT. MEM. % 74, 172 (June 26, 1974).
12 id. at 74-692.
13 Rev. Rul. 73-549, 1973-2 CuM. BULL. 17.
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rentals must be included in gross income in the year of receipt, regardless
of the period covered or the accounting procedures used. The Ruling
indicated, however, that a separate lump-sum payment for services, such
as meals, medical care, laundry and social entertainment, could be
deferred over more than one tax year, because such significant services
are not within the scope of the term "rent" under 1.61-8(b).
1.04 Income Averaging. The income averaging provisions of the
Code, Sections 1301-1305, were enacted "to accord those whose incomes
fluctuate widely from year to year the same treatment accorded those with
relatively stable incomes as in the case of authors, professional artists and
actors."' 4 In William L. Frost15 the issue was whether petitioner could
income-average a $15,000 bonus he received after college in 1966 to play
baseball with the San Francisco Giants. He conceded that he had not
furnished at least one-half of his support during each of the four preceding
base years, 16 but argued that his college baseball career was work during
two of the base period years and that his $15,000 bonus, which was more
than one-half of his adjusted taxable income in 1966, was attributable to
his work in improving his baseball skills during college. 17
The Tax Court did not go along with this argument. Testimony by
an agent for the Giants termed the bonus an inducement for Frost to sign
a player contract, and obviously not for his training and excellent pitching
while in college. This alone was not entirely determinative of whether
work was performed during the base-period years. However, a study of
congressional intent behind Section 1303 (c) (2) (B), and case law decided
under it, implies that the word "work" means gainful employment, for
an employer or one's self, which generates income, and that training
and toil in order to achieve a marketable personal skill does not fit
within the definition. Thus an individual who sells a novel may income
average, because the payment is for the finished work product and not
for the training to produce that finished product.18
Form 4972 has been issued under proposed Treasury Regulation
1.72-19. The new Regulation allows a seven-year forward averaging break
for the ordinary income element of a lump-sum distribution to post-1969
retirees. The form sets up separate tax computations for (1) the ordinary
income element of the lump-sum distribution, and (2) the capital gains
element plus the balance of the taxpayer's income in the distribution
'4H.R. REP. No. 749, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963), reprinted in 1964-1 (Part 2)
CuM. BULL. 125, 234; S. REP. No. 830, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. (1964), reprinted in
1964-1 (Part 2) Cume. BULL. 505, 644.
15 61 T.C. No. 54 (Jan. 28, 1974).
16 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 1303 (c) (1) defines this as the general test for an individ-
ual to be eligible for income averaging.
17 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 1303(c) (2) (b) allows income averaging for an otherwise
non-eligible person if he meets these tests.
18H.R. REp. No. 749, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963), reprinted in 1964-1 (Part 2)
CUM. BULL. 125,422.
Winter, 1975l
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year. The resulting computation may produce a lesser tax than under
the pre-1970 "all capital gain" rule or the standard five-year income
averaging option. A 1971 retiree, for whom Form 4972 will save some
tax, has until April 15, 1975 to file an amended 1971 return for a refund.
1.05 Sale of a Partnership Interest. Regulation 1.721-1(b)(1) implies
that the receipt of an interest in partnership profits in consideration for
services, often called a profit-share, is not a taxable event. Secondary
authorities, 9 and case law dictum 20 provided significant support for this
interpretation. Profit shares thus increasingly became important as a
means of deferred compensation for high-bracket taxpayers who could
render immediate services in return for a share in the future profits of an
enterprise. However, this regulation was apparently not followed in the
case of Diamond v. Commissioner.u Sol Diamond was a mortgage broker
who, in return for arranging the financing on the purchase of a $1,100,000
office building, received a 60% interest in the partnership which took
title to the building. Less than three weeks after the partnership had
acquired title, Diamond sold his 60% interest for $40,000 and reported
this sale as a short-term capital gain under Section 741, which would
offset an unrelated short-term capital loss.
The IRS notice of deficiency had reclassified the $40,000 gain
as ordinary income. The Tax Court ruled that when Diamond received
his partnership interest, it had an ascertainable market value ($40,000),
and this amount was ordinary income under Section 61 (a) at that time.
The court attached no importance to the implication of Regulation
1.721-1(b) (1), and held that Diamond's receipt of the profit-share was
in exchange for services (the financing) worth $40,000.22 The Seventh
Circuit has affirmed the Tax Court ruling. Its decision discussed the
unanimous positions of the commentators upholding Diamond's claim and
criticizing the Tax Court holding,23 as well as previous judicial interpreta-
tion, legislative history and policy considerations on the point, but found
nothing to convince it that the Tax Court ruling was erroneous.24
It is suggested that the courts have reached the right decision under
the circumstances in Diamond, but for the wrong reasons. The near-total
19A. ARONSOHN, PARTNERSHIPS AND INCOME TAXES 57-58 (1970 ed.); A. WILLIS,
WILLIS ON PARTNERSHIP TAXATION 84-85 (1971); Nicholson, Interest in Partnership
Capital Received in Exchange for Services, 19 N.Y.U. 19TH INST. ON FED. TAX (1961).
20 United States v. Frazell, 335 F.2d 487 (5th Cir. 1964), rehearing denied, 339 F.2d
885 (5th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 961 (1965), on remand, 269 F. Supp. 885
(W.D. La. 1967); Herman A. Hale, 24 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 1497, 1502 n.3 (1965).
2156 T.C. 530 (1971), aff'd, 492 F.2d 286 (7th Cir. 1974).
22 56 T.C. at 546.
23 See, e.g., Cowan, The Diamond Case, 27 TAX L. REv. 161, 181 (1972) [hereinafter
cited as Cowan].
24 492 F.2d at 291. "But in the absence of regulation, we think it sound policy to
defer to the expertise of the Commissioner and the Judges of the Tax Court, and to
sustain their decision...."
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disregard for Regulation 1.721-1 (b) (1) in favor of Section 61 (a), whose
applicability to the case is debatable, has been criticized.25 Two other
approaches do lead to the same ultimate result. If Diamond is considered
to have acquired an interest in the capital of the partnership, the
unrealized appreciation is taxable immediately to the service partner.2
Alternatively, the court could have viewed the partnership as a sham.
Since Diamond did not have any management responsibilities, and so
quickly sold his profit-share interest, the transaction could have been
treated as a compensation of $40,000 for services rendered2 In any
event, the Diamond decision renders suspect the tax advantages of a
service partner receiving a profit share. A Supreme Court decision or
new regulations on this matter seems certain.
An attempt to use the Diamond holding for one's advantage failed
in Vestal v. United States.28 Vestal convinced some friends in 1962 to
invest a total of $235,000 in a partnership for oil and gas field
development and, in return, he received a contractual right to one-eighth
of any future profits accruing to the investors. In 1964 when the
partnership was sold, Vestal's one-eighth share was worth $140,000.
Vestal claimed that his 1962 contract rights were worth $29,000, 29 leaving
him a long-term capital gain of $111,000. The Eighth Circuit disagreed,
holding that the $140,000 constituted a payment by the investors for his
services and was ordinary income. The court 'based its decision on the
grounds that: (1) there were no 1962 tax consequences arising out of
the contract due to the speculative nature of the transaction, and (2) no
accurate basis could be established for capital gain purposes in the contract
rights. Diamond was distinguished since its taxable event was the
acquisition of a profit-share which had a determinable market value,
whereas in Vestal, the taxable event was the 1964 sale of the partnership,
and not the 1962 contract with an undeterminable market value.
1.06 Gratuitous Transfers. Aspects of income tax law, estate tax
law and gift tax law often overlap with various tax consequences when
there is a transfer of property, whether it is by inter-vivos gift, by
revocable or irrevocable trust, or by bequest. The Sixth Circuit has
rendered two decisions in this area, both adverse to the taxpayers.
Section 2502(d) requires the donor of a gift to pay the resulting gift
25 Cowan, supra note 23, at 191-192.
2 6 Glenn E. Edgar, 56 T.C. 717 (1971).
27 Treas. Reg. 1.731-1 (c) (3) provides that a tax-free transfer of property to a partner-
ship under Section 721 followed shortly thereafter by a normally tax-free distribution
of other property under Section 731 will be considered a taxable sale or exchange.
28498 F.2d 487 (8th Cir. 1974), rev'g 31 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 73-978 (W.D. Ark.
1973).
29Vestal did not report this $29,000 as part of his 1962 income, but he would not
have to pay any tax on this unreported income since the six-year statute of limitations
had run.
Winter, 1975]
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tax. In the 1969 case of Turner v. Commissioner,3 °0 where a donor
conditioned a gift of appreciated property upon the donee's acceptance of
the gift tax liability, the Sixth Circuit turned down the government's
contention that this constituted a part-gift and part-sale transaction, and
that the proceeds from the donee's sale of part of the property (used to
pay the gift tax) should be taxed as a capital gain to the donor. However,
the same court has apparently changed its position as to net gifts with its
decision in Johnson, Jr. v. Commissioner.3' In 1965, Dr. Johnson obtained
a $200,000 loan, secured by stock with a market value of $500,000 and a
basis of only $10,000. He then transferred the stock into an irrevocable
trust with the trust assuming the $200,000 loan obligation. Dr. Johnson
used $150,000 of the loan to pay the gift tax and ended up with $50,000
in cash and no loan obligation. The government used its part-gift, part-sale
theory,32 and the doctrine found in Crane v. Commissioner33 to assess a
capital gains tax against Dr. Johnson for the amount of the loan
($200,000) less the basis in the transferred stock ($10,000). The
Commissioner, applying the Crane doctrine, stated that the transfer of
Dr. Johnson's stock, encumbered by an obligation in excess of its basis
and the assumption of the obligation by the trust, was the equivalent of a
sale,34 resulting in capital gains liability. Dr. Johnson argued that, under
the Turner decision, $150,000 of the gain which was paid for gift taxes
should not be taxed. Nonetheless, the court weakly distinguished Turner
on the grounds that the loans here should not be equated with the
Turner gift tax liabilities and that this gift was not conditioned on
the payment of the gift tax by the donees. The trust's new 'basis in the
stock became $300,000 (the $200,000 loan obligation paid plus the
$150,000 gift tax, but limited to the gift's fair market value of $300,000).
While the Sixth Circuit did not expressly overrule Turner, the advan-
tageous estate planning aspects of net gifts may now be limited to
those patterned exclusively after Turner.
Property is often transferred into various types of trusts in order
to gain certain tax advantages. In Krause v. Commissioner,5 however,
a transfer of the Krauses' limited partnership interest into six irrevocable
trusts for the benefit of their children and grandchildren in return
for 80% of the trust's income proved highly disadvantageous. The
tax motivation behind the trusts was to transfer the ownership of
income-producing capital to the trusts which would pay a lower income
30410 F.2d 752 (6th Cir. 1969), aff'g per curiam, 49 T.C. 356 (1968). See also
Victor W. Krause, 56 T.C. 1242 (1971).
31495 F.2d 1079 (6th Cir. 1974), afl'g 59 T.C. 791 (1973).
32Treas. Reg. § 1.1001-1(e)(1). "Where a transfer of property is in part a sale and
in part a gift, the transferor has a gain to the extent that the amount realized by him
exceeds his adjusted basis in the property."
33 331 U.S. 1 (1947).
34 495 F.2d at 1085.
P557 T.C. 890 (1972), a'd, 497 F.2d 1109 (6th Cir. 1974).
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tax rate than the grantors. Reliance was placed on Section 704(e)(1),
Family Partnerships-Recognition of interest created by purchase or
gift, to wit: "A person shall be recognized as a partner for purposes
of this subtitle if he owns a capital interest in a partnership in which
capital is a material income-producing factor, whether or not such interest
was derived by purchase or gift from any other person."
Despite Section 704(e) (1), the Commissioner sought to tax the
Krauses on the trust income on the grounds that the trusts were not
bona fide partners because the grantor retained too many incidents of
ownership. The Tax Court agreed, citing the legislative history of Section
704(e) as allowing the courts to inquire into the true ownership of a
partnership interest. The total effect of: (1) the necessity of the grantor's
consent to any assignment or disposal of property; (2) the right of the
grantors to remove the trustee; (3) the right, after 12 years, to require
distribution of the trust's principal, and (4) the fact that Adolph Krause
was president and the family controlled 45% of the stock in Wolverine
Shoe & Tanning Corporation, and thereby could greatly influence the
amount of trust income through the corporation's dividend policy, did
not remove the grantors' incidents of ownership in the property, and
therefore the income was taxable to them.3 6
On appeal, the taxpayers argued that United States v. Byrum,37 a
1972 Supreme Court case, controlled the incidents of ownership issue. The
Sixth Circuit disagreed, citing the difference between Section 2036(a),
the estate tax statute in Byrum, and Section 704(e), and noting the
retention of even greater incidents of ownership here than in Byrum.
It was the court's construction of Section 671, which permits the
grantor-deemed-owner to take any deductions or credits available to
the trust, which had the most destructive effect on the Krauses. The court
did not allow any credit for the income taxes paid by the trust as an offset
against the increased personal tax liability of the grantors, since the trust
and the Krauses constituted separate tax entities. This construction seems to
mean that Internal Revenue Service collects twice on the same income if the
trust's three-year statute of limitations for filing for a refund has expired.
These two decisions are representative of the increased reliance, at
least in the Sixth Circuit, of the substance test. The court discounted the
form, and studied the total effect of the transactions. Thus, Judge
Gardner's 1930 dictum, that a transaction designed solely "to avoid
the burden of taxation, or to lessen that burden, is not for that reason
alone illegal,"38 appears no longer true in 1974.
s6See, e.g., Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(e) (iii). "A donee or purchaser of a capital interestin a partnership is not recognized as a partner under the principles of Section 704(e)(1) ... if the transferor retains such incidents of ownership that the transferee has not
acquired full and complete ownership of the partnership interest."
37408 U.S. 125 (1972).
38 Iowa Bridge Co. v. Comm'r, 39 F,2d 777, 781 (8th Cir. 1930).
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1.07 Testamentary Bequests for Services Previously Rendered.
Section 102 exempts testamentary bequests from inclusion as taxable
income. However, the Second Circuit in the case of Wolder v. Commis-
sioner 9 declared that a testamentary gift of stock made for services
previously rendered and pursuant to a written contract was taxable income
to the recipient. Attorney Wolder and his client, Mrs. Boyce, entered into
a written agreement by which he would perform free legal services during
her life in exchange for her promise to bequeath to him certain stock.
Had Mrs. Boyce not kept her promise, previous case law has held that the
settlement proceeds received from litigation to enforce the contract would
be taxable. 40 The court saw no difference or distinction in the fact that
Mrs. Boyce kept her promise; the bequest was for services previously
rendered and is therefore taxable.
Attorney Wolder had relied on the 1923 Supreme Court decision in
United States v. Merriam,41 which held non-taxable the bequests made
in lieu of compensation to the executors of the estate. The Second
Circuit, after distinguishing Merriam on its facts, questioned the current
validity of the case under a form-versus-substance test.Y
With the government victory in this case, it is not unlikely that the
Service will challenge future bequests made to unrelated lawyers, doctors
or other professionals who served decedents for little or no compensation.
One previous case on point, decided in favor of the taxpayer, held that
the decedent's intent was controlling as to the taxability of the bequest.
43
Backed by the Wolder case, the Service will probably try to expand
the subjective intent requirement to include objective evidentiary standards
in determining the taxability of this type of bequest.
1.08 Property Settlements. Ever since the 1962 case of United
States v. Davis,44 property settlements pursuant to a divorce decree have
been considered a taxable event. In Davis, the husband transferred
appreciated securities to his wife in exchange for her inchoate marital
rights. The Supreme Court ruled that the property settlement was
bargained for in an arm's length transaction and that the husband realized
income for the difference between the basis of the securities and their
present fair market value.
39493 F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1974), aff'g in part and rev'g in part 58 T.C. 974 (1972),
cert. denied 95 S. Ct. 49 (1974).
4
o See Cotnam v. Comm'r, 263 F.2d 119 (5th Cir. 1959).
41263 U.S. 179 (1923).
42493 F.2d at 611-12. An analogy was made to Comm'r v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278
(1960), pointing out that under certain circumstances, gifts are a method of paying
compensation.
43 See Lee S. Jones, 33 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 259 (1964). Here, there was evidence that
Attorney Jones never billed the decedent for services rendered. However, there was
no evidence of a written or oral contract between the parties.
44 370 U.S. 65 (1962).
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In Revenue Ruling 74-347, 45 the Davis rationale was applied to the
following property settlement situation. The husband had title to their
$40,000 house in his name alone. All other property, which primarily
consisted of stock and securities, was owned jointly by husband and
wife. At the time of the divorce, this property had a fair market value of
$70,000 and a basis of $35,000. The property settlement gave the husband
the house and $15,000 worth of securities, while the wife received the
balance of their previously jointly owned property valued at $55,000.
Under these facts, the unequal division of jointly owned property
leads to a taxable gain of $10,000 for the husband, calculated as follows:
Step 1. Determine the excess of jointly owned property received
by wife.
Jointly owned property received by the wife ...... .$55,000
One-half share of all jointly owned property
( h of $70,000) ...................... $35,000
Excess of jointly owned property received by the wife. $20,000
This amount, under Davis, is considered equal to the value of the wife's
inchoate marital rights in the husband's individually owned residence.
Step 2. Determine the adjusted basis of excess jointly owned
property received by the wife.
Net fair market value
of excess jointly
owned property Adjusted basis Adjusted basis of
received by the wife of all jointly excess jointly
X owned property = owned property
Net fair market value received by received by
of all jointly owned the wife the wife
property received
by the wife
These steps, when applied to the present figures, create the following:
$20,000 X $27,500 = $10,000
$55,000
Step 3. The taxable gain is the excess of jointly owned property
received by the wife (Step 1) minus the adjusted basis in said property
(Step 2).
In this situation, $10,000 represents taxable income to the husband.
The wife's new basis in the property she receives is equal to her adjusted
basis in the property ($27,500) plus the taxable gain ($10,000), or
$37,500. Since property settlements are presumed to be made at arm's
length and are, under Davis, a taxable event, the tax consequences
resulting therefrom must always be taken into consideration.
4 5 Rev. Rul. 74-347, 1974 INT. REv. BuLL. No. 29, at 6.
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1.09 Illegal Income. Section 61(a) defines gross income as "all
income from whatever source derived." Under this 'broad definition, money
which has been obtained by such illegal means as gambling, embezzlement
or extortion is taxable to the recipient. 46 In Bull v. Commissioner,47 the
petitioner contested the inclusion of $22,000 in his 1965 gross income
which he had embezzled from his employer in that year. Apprehended
after spending the money, he subsequently confessed and signed a
confession of judgment for the entire amount in favor of his employer.
An 8-7 Tax Court majority, relying on United States v. Merrill,48
found that the embezzled funds should not be included in Buff's 1965 gross
income. The confession of judgment changed the transaction at the end of
the tax year from a taxable embezzlement to the equivalent of a non-taxable
loan, orin the court's language, "a consensual recognition of indebtedness."
49
The Second Circuit reversed on two grounds. First, a cash basis
taxpayer should not be allowed to balance for tax purposes the receipt of
income with a promise, which is not given in connection with the receipt
of the income, to repay it in a later tax period. 50 Merrill can be
distinguished, since it was the lack of Buff's "consensual recognition
of indebtedness" at the time he embezzled the money which triggered
the taxability thereof, and the confession of judgment signed before the
end of the year does not change the tax consequences. Second,
the confession of judgment was "not worth the paper it was written
on."'51 Seven years had passed without any payments being made. The
Tax Court decision relied on the bona fide appearance of the promise
to repay, which subsequently proved to be worthless.
If Buff had made weekly repayments to his ex-employer, he would
have at least been able to deduct these amounts from his income. 52 Since
part of the Buf decision was based on the worthlessness of his
promise to make restitution, evidence of actual repayments might
have made a difference. A "wait and see" test, successfully used in
Merrill, might have been applied.
1.10 Medical Student Loan Cancellation. Revenue Ruling 73-256-a
provides that amounts advanced to a medical student under the State
46 See James v. United States, 366 U.S. 213 (1961); Rutkin v. United States, 343 U.S.
130 (1952).
47 496 F.2d 847 (2d Cir. 1974), rev'g 58 T.C. 224 (1972).
48211 F.2d 297 (9th Cir. 1954). This case held that income is not realized where
taxpayer acknowledges the mistake, renounces any claim to the funds, and in the year
of receipt agrees to repay the rightful owner, and repayment is actually made in a
subsequent year.
49 58 T.C. at 232.
50 496 F.2d at 848.
-5158 T.C. at 235 (Hoyt, J., dissenting).
52 Rev. Rul. 65-254, 1965-2 CuM. BULL. 50 would preclude Buff from using § 1341 to
subsequently offset the tax effect of including the embezzled funds in his gross income.
53 Rev. Rul. 73-256, 1973-1 CuM. BULL. 56.
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Medical Education Loan Scholarship Program, which are cancelled
upon fulfillment of a condition to practice in a rural area of the
state, are includable in gross income under Section 61 of the Code
in each taxable year to the extent that repayment of a portion of
the loan is no longer required.
Under the authority of 7805(b), the Service by way of Revenue
Ruling 74-54 054 has made the provisions of 73-256 applicable only to
loans of the type described made after June 11, 1973. Thus, cancelled loan
repayments under a State's Medical Education Loan Scholarship Program
made prior to June 11, 1973 need not be included in gross income.
2.00 Exclusions from Income
2.01 Food and Lodging. The lodging and meals exclusion from
gross income, embodied in Section 119, has been an area where very fine
distinctions have been drawn in a series of cases. Treasury Regulation
1.119-1(a) permits the value of employer-supplied meals to be excluded
if certain tests are met, to wit: the meals are furnished by the employer,
for its convenience, and furnished on the business premises.
Most of the previous cases under this section dealt with interpretations
of "employer convenience" or "business premises."- 55 However, in Jacob
v. United States,M the issue was whether employer-supplied groceries were
the equivalent of meals for exclusion purposes. A mental institute, where
Dr. Jacob was the director, provided housing for the Jacobs on its business
premises and also furnished free groceries for their consumption. The
Service challenged Dr. Jacob when he excluded the value of the groceries
on his 1964-1966 income tax returns. The Third Circuit affirmed a
decision for the taxpayer, but emphasized that the decision was limited to
the particular facts of the case. It would not be expanded to a situation
where employer-supplied groceries were prepared off the business prem-
ises. The court also allowed the exclusion for the value of the napkins,
toilet paper, soap and other miscellaneous items supplied by the Institute,
calling them integrally related to the meals and lodging furnished.
Since Section 119 continues to be an oft-litigated area, with
conflicting views between the Tax Court and some of the circuits, it
is the author's opinion that a definitive statement is needed from the
Supreme Court for clarification.
2.02 Sick Pay. Section 105(d) of the Code allows employees who
are absent from work on account of personal injuries or sickness to
exclude from gross income amounts received in lieu of wages, but not in
excess of $100 per week. To be excludable, the amounts must be paid
54 Rev. Rul. 74-540, 1974 INT. REv. BULL. No. 44, at 6.55For an overview of the 1973 decisions in this area, see Briner, Federal Income Tax
Developments: 1973, 7 AKRON L. REv. 188, 199 (1974).
56493 F.2d 1294 (3d Cir. 1974), aff'g 31 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 73-789 (D. N.J. 1973).
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under an accident or health insurance plan and must either be paid by the
employer or attributable to contributions by him to such plans which were
not includable in the employee's gross income. The Commissioner's
position concerning the issue of when an employee's excludable sick pay
income ended and his taxable pension and retirement benefits began, as
expressed in Treasury Regulation 1.105-4(a)(3)(i)(b), was that the
exclusion ended at the employee's minimum retirement age. It was asserted
that this was appropriate even if this age is several years less than the age
the employee would have faced mandatory retirement. Recently, several
courts have found this regulation invalid and inapplicable on the grounds
that it was unreasonable to deny the sick pay exclusion to employees
who, although having reached a minimum retirement, would have
continued working but for a sickness or disease.57 The Service has now
changed its position, announcing that it would no longer follow the
regulation imposing the earlier exclusion cut-off date, and would allow
employees the sick pay exclusion until mandatory retirement age.
58
Revised regulations as to this position should be forthcoming sometime
this year. Amended returns (Form 1040X) or claims for refund (Form
843) for 1971 must be filed by April 15, 1975.
Under Revenue Ruling 74-542,59 alcoholism has been formally
recognized as a "sickness" as that term is used in Section 105(d). Thus,
the sick pay exclusion is applicable to amounts received under a qualified
health insurance plan on account of the employee's alcoholism.
2.03 Foreign Income. Income, up to a maximum of $35,000, which
is earned by a citizen of the United States who is a bona fide resident of
a foreign country is generally exempt from taxation under Section 911. To
obtain the exemption, the taxpayer must prove his resident status to the
Internal Revenue Service or be present in a foreign country for 510 days
out of an 18-month period.
In Carpenter, Jr. v. United States,60 the plaintiff, who had previously
established a bona fide foreign residence, tried to exclude income earned
in a newly formed oil partnership in the Middle East from January
through August, 1964. The Commissioner objected to the exclusion under
the theory that Carpenter had spent a 10-month vacation in the United
States during 1962-1963 before the partnership began, and that this
extended vacation terminated Carpenter's status as a bona fide foreign
resident. The district court held that, as a matter of law, Carpenter's
10-month vacation did not terminate his foreign residence status for he
57 Reardon v. United States, 491 F.2d 822 (10th Cir. 1974); Jovick v. United States,
32 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 73-5196 (Ct. C1. 1973); Bigley v. United States, 252 F. Supp.
757 (E.D. Mo. 1966); Comm'r v. Winter, 303 F.2d 150 (3d Cir. 1962), af'g 36 T.C.
14 (1962).
58 T.I.R. 1283, 6 P.H. 1974 FED. TAXEs 55,068.
59 Rev. Rul. 74-542, 1974 INTn. REv. BULL. No. 45, at 7.
60 495 F.2d 175 (5th Cir. 1974), rev'g 348 F. Supp. 179 (N.D. Tex. 1972).
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had retained the intention of returning to the Middle East when his
partner had successfully handled the preliminaries so that their partnership
business could begin.
In reversing the district court determination, the Fifth Circuit laid
down a strict two-step test to cover situations involving taxpayers who
return to the United States between jobs in a foreign country. First, the
taxpayer's return to a foreign residency must be reasonably definite as to
fact and time. Second, the taxpayer's stay in the United States cannot be
unreasonably long. The court held that Carpenter failed the first test, since
his return to the Middle East was conditioned on the success of his
partner initiating the business venture. Consequently, the date of the
taxpayer's ultimate return was largely beyond his control. Interestingly,
the court did not discuss how long a stay in the United States would
be permitted under the second test.
The Treasury Department has adopted final Regulations giving
American citizens residing abroad and married to nonresident aliens
a limited right to elect out of foreign community property laws for
United States tax purposes in post-1966 tax years.6 1 To be eligible,
the United States citizen must be (1) a bona fide resident of a foreign
country for the entire tax year, and (2) married to a nonresident alien
during the entire year. In general, the Regulations permit the spouse
to waive community property rights, as defined under foreign law, to
one-half of the taxpayer spouse's earned income without subjecting it
to United States taxation. Unearned income of the taxpayer, such as
dividends and interest, is treated differently. The spouse must include
one-half of the taxpayer's unearned income in the federal tax return.
3.00 Exemptions
3.01 Dependency Exemption. A prerequisite to claiming dependency
exemptions under Section 151(e) is that the person claiming the exemption
must furnish one-half the support of the dependent. At issue in Helen
M. Lutter62 was whether aid to dependent children (ADC) and State of
Illinois medical assistance grants, which were paid to Mrs. Lutter for
the benefit of her two children and the amount of which exceeded
Mrs. Lutter's income, constituted support provided by the mother, thus
entitling her to claim the dependency exemptions.
In ruling against the mother, the Tax Court separated the enforceable
economic right Mrs. Lutter had to the state assistance grants from
the fact that the support payments were for the direct benefit of her
children. The Tax Court concluded that it was the State of Illinois
which contributed over one-half of the support for the children, and
caused Mrs. Lutter to lose two dependency exemptions.
61 T.D. 7330, 1974 INT. REv. BULL. No. 48, at 8.
62 61 T.C. No. 72 (Feb. 27, 1974).
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Two new Revenue Rulings are analogous. Revenue Ruling 74-15363
states that payments made to adoptive parents from a state agency for
the support and maintenance of their adopted child must be taken into
account in determining who provided the principal support of the child.
Similarly, under Revenue Ruling 74-543, 64 Social Security benefit
payments made to the child of a disabled parent are deemed to be
the child's contribution toward his own support, and must be considered
in determining the parent's dependency exemption.
4.00 Deductions
4.01 Research and Development Expense. The Supreme Court
provided an economic incentive for investors in new businesses by
permitting current research and development deductions when it
unanimously reversed the Sixth Circuit and Tax Court decisions in Snow
v. Commissioner.65 Mr. Snow, a vice president of Procter & Gamble,
invested $10,000 in a new partnership, headed by an investor who
planned to make, patent, and market commercially a trash-burning device.
The partnership's first year of operation consisted solely of experimental
research and development expenses. Mr. Snow deducted his prorata share
of the research and development expenses on his personal income tax
return relying on Section 174(a).6
The Commissioner challenged the legitimacy of the deduction on the
grounds that the pre-operating expense was incurred before the partnership
was actively engaged in a trade or business, and therefore Section 174(a)
did not apply. The Tax Court and the Sixth Circuit agreed with the
Commissioner, and added that under the doctrine of Whipple v. Com-
missioner67 a mere investor is not deemed to be in a trade or business.
68
In reversing, the Supreme Court relied on the congressional intent
behind Section 174: "This provision will greatly stimulate the search for
new products and the new inventions upon which the future economic
and military strength of a nation depends. It will be particularly valuable
to small and growing businesses." 69 Furthermore, the deduction applies
even if there is not an ongoing business or the product is not at the
marketable stages, as long as the research and development expenditures
are simply connected with the taxpayer's trade or business. This
63 Rev. Rul. 74-153, 1974 INT. REv. BULL. No. 14, at 8.
64 Rev. Rul. 74-543, 1974 INT. RaV. BULL. No. 45, at 7.
6594 S. Ct. 1876 (1974), revg 482 F.2d 1029 (6th Cir. 1973).
6Section 174(a)(1) allows deduction of "research or experimental expenditures
which are paid or incurred by him during the taxable year in connection with his
trade or business."
67 373 U.S. 193 (1963).
68 482 F.2d at 1033. For an analysis and commentary on the Sixth Circuit decision,
see Briner, Federal Income Tax Developments: 1973, 7 AKRON L. REv. 188, 228(1974).
69 100 CoNe. REc. 3425 (1954).
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deductibility test will be easier for taxpayers to meet than the "ordinary
and necessary" test under Section 162.
The economic effect of Snow is to place new businesses on equal
footing with established corporations as far as deducting research and
development expenses for a new product during the preparation stage.
New partnerships and Subchapter S corporations should find it easier
to raise risk capital since the expected losses in the first years can
now be deducted by the investors. All the taxpayer must show is a
profit motive and that the research and development expense was in
connection with the development of a new product or service.
4.02 Bond Discount Amortization. Section 163(a) allows a deduction
of all interest paid or accrued within the taxable year on indebtedness. In
Helvering v. United Pacific R.R. Co. 70 the Supreme Court recognized a
debt discount 7' as an additional cost incurred in borrowing money. The
described bond discount was classified not only as a loss to be prorated
over the life of the bonds sold, but also as interest paid for the use of
capital received under the bond issued. This loss-interest approach was
clarified in United States v. Midland Ross Corp.,72 where the court stated
the original issue discount serves the same function as interest, 73 and
that the court has treated the economic function of discount as interest. 74
Thus the law is established that a debt discount may be amortized
over the life of the obligation when a corporate debt obligation is issued
at a discount price. Does it necessarily follow that a debt discount results
when debt obligations are issued for property other than cash? The
Supreme Court in Commissioner v. National Al/al/a Dehydrating and
Milling Co.75 held that it did not where a corporate taxpayer issues the
obligation for its own outstanding preferred stock. The Court held that
this was not a cost or expense of acquiring the use of capital.
Pursuant to a recapitalization plan the corporate taxpayer had issued
$50 face value 5% sinking fund debentures in exchange for its outstand-
ing, unlisted $50 par 5% cumulative preferred shares. The preferred
shares had an over-the-counter market price of about $33. The corpora-
tion claimed an interest deduction in the amount of the difference
between the face value of the debentures and the claimed value of the
preferred stock. The taxpayer's contention was that had it actually issued
$50 debentures for $33 in cash and then used the money to retire its out-
standing preferred stock, an interest deduction would have been allowed.76
70 293 U.S. 282 (1934).
71 The difference between the issue price and the stated redemption price at maturity.
72381 U.S. 54 (1965).
73 Id. at 57.
74 Id. at 66.
75 94 S. Ct. 2129 (1974).
7 6 Accepted by the Tenth Circuit in Comm'r v. Nat'l Alfalfa Dehydrating and Milling
Co., 472 F.2d 796 (10th Cir. 1973).
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The court rejected taxpayer's contention. To accept the interest
deduction, the court stated that it would have to disregard the principle
that a transaction is to be given its tax effect in accordance with what
actually happened, and not in accordance with what might have occurred.
In addition, the court stated that recognizing the deduction would require
speculation about the market price and the value of the debentures to
the corporation had the debentures been sold on the open market. This
would prove to be impossible because of the private nature of the
transaction. The court held that where a corporation issues new debt
obligations to its preferred shareholders for the corporation's outstanding
preferred, the claimed fair market value of both securities is artificial.
4.03 Moving Expenses. Section 217(a) provides that moving expenses
incurred during a taxable year in connection with the commencement of
work by an employee are deductible. However, the taxpayer may not be
allowed a moving expense deduction if he maintains an inconsistent
position by claiming a deduction for meals and lodging while away from
home (incurred in the general location of a new principal place of work)
under Section 162. If the taxpayer claims both a moving expense deduction
and the expense of meals and lodging it will be a question of facts and
circumstances whether the taxpayer's new place of work will be
considered a principal place of work, and accordingly, under which
Code section the deductions will be allowed. 77
In Goldman v. Commissioner,78 the taxpayer moved himself, his
family and their household goods from Kentucky to Washington, D.C. In
Kentucky, he was employed as a professor of law. His move to
Washington occurred during a one-year leave of absence. While
in Washington he was to be employed by the National Labor Relations
Board for a period not exceeding one year. After this period, the
taxpayer returned to Kentucky and resumed his teaching profession. He
claimed as deductions both his travel and moving expenses; the travel
expenses under Section 162(a) (2) while he was temporarily away from
home, and the moving expenses under Section 217 because he was involved
in the commencement of employment at a new principal place of work.
The Tax Court allowed only the travel expense deductions, relying
on Robert J. Schweighardt.79 The court was quick to note the taxpayer's
inconsistent position. The taxpayer's employment at the new location must
be permanent or of an indefinite time period to qualify as the new
principal place of work under Section 217.80 Therefore, if the taxpayer
l77Treas. Reg. § 1.217-3(c)(3)(iii) (applicable to taxable years after Dec. 31, 1969).
78497 F.2d 382 (6th Cir. 1974), afl'g 42 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 557 (1973).
79 54 T.C. 1273 (1970).
80 See generally Treas. Reg. § 1.217-1(c) (3) (iii) (applicable to years before Jan. 1,
1970); Treas. Reg. § 1.217-2(c) (3)(iii) (applicable to years after Dec. 31, 1969);
H.R. REP. No. 749, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 60 (1963). See also Rev. Rul. 60-189, 1960-1
Cum. BULL. 60 which provides that the Service will normally raise no questions con-
[Vol. 8:2
21
et al.: Federal Income Tax Developments
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 1975
FEnERAL INCOME TAX DEVELOPMENTS: 1974
claimed moving expenses he could not claim travel expenses because while
in Washington, he would have to be at home. In the alternative,
inconsistencies would exist if the taxpayer was allowed to deduct moving
expenses to a new principal place of business, because when he has
claimed travel expenses, he would be returning to his previous home.
The court also decided that unreimbursed moving expenses are
not ordinary and necessary business expenses 81 or travel expenses while
away from home. If the taxpayer could prove the cost of moving expenses
to be ordinary and necessary business expenses then his deductions
under Section 162 would be precluded.8 2
The Internal Revenue Service has recently arrived at the same
conclusion in Revenue Ruling 74-242.83 On approximately the same set
of facts as in Goldman, the Service, relying on the Schweighardt case,
denied the taxpayer simultaneous deductions under both Sections 162
and 217. However, the Service did allow him deductions for his travel
expenses, which were one and one-half times greater than his moving
expense. The taxpayer's allowable deductions in both instances were
greater than the disallowed deductions and thus he did not suffer a total
loss. However, in many instances the opposite may be true; the moving
expenses may exceed the travel expenses. If the taxpayer fails to meet the
39-week requirement of Section 217(c) (2), the moving expenses will be
disallowed and the taxpayer will thus be left on the losing side. However,
if the taxpayer meets the 39-week requirement, it is possible that he will
be allowed to claim deductions under either Section 162 or 217,
whichever will give the greater deduction.
4.04 Sale or Exchange of Residence. Section 1034(a) provides for
the nonrecognition of gain realized from the sale of a taxpayer's residence
if a replacement residence is purchased within one year of that sale at a
cost in excess of the adjusted sale price of the old residence. The Treasury
Department, in addressing itself to this section, has held in Revenue
Ruling 74-41184 that Section 1034(a) does not provide for an extension
of the time limitation for replacing a principal residence due to an
absence from the United States. Thus where a taxpayer sells his
American residence pursuant to a tour of duty abroad, he must purchase
and use a replacement residence abroad within one year after the sale of
his old residence, and not within a year of his return to the United
States, to qualify for the nonrecognition provisions of 1034(a).
cerning temporary nature of employment at one location, if anticipated actual durationis less than one year, for the purposes of deducting travel expenses under Section 162.
81 See Wilson v. Comm'r, 412 F.2d 314 (6th Cir. 1969); Comm'r v. Dodd, 410 F.2d
132 (5th Cir. 1969).
82 Id.
83 Rev. Rul. 74-242, 1974 INT. REv. BULL. No. 21, at 10.
84 Rev. Rul. 74-411, 1974 INT. REv. BULL. No. 34, at 9.
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4.05 Travel Expenses. In Charles G. Gustafson,85 the Tax Court
allowed Gustafson, a traveling salesman from Des Moines, Iowa, a
deduction for the entire amount of his traveling expenses. He traveled
52 weeks a year, but voted and paid state income taxes in Iowa. Also, his
sister had a home in Iowa where he kept his personal belongings, which
he did not carry on his trips, and to where he returned periodically on
weekends. The court held this was enough to establish his home at his
sister's house and thus allow deduction of his traveling expense.88
In order to qualify for a deduction of traveling expenses, an
individual must incur the expenses while away from home.87 Gustafson
was just one in a long series of cases defining what is a "home" and
where it is located. It has long been recognized that a taxpayer may not
have a home to be away from for the purposes of calculating traveling
expenses for tax purposes. 88 The Revenue Service defines home as the
taxpayer's principal place of business, employment or post of duty,
regardless of where his family residence is located.8 However, some
courts have rejected this definition and construed home to be the
taxpayer's family residence.9
Throughout a long period of judicial indecision 9 the Service has agreed
to go along with Gustafson, thereby making a determination of the word
"home" difficult if not impossible. However, in Revenue Ruling 73-529,92
the Service has withdrawn its acquiescence of Gustafson and has developed
a new three-part test for traveling salesmen. This new test establishes
whether a salesman has a regular place of abode in a real and substantial
sense and may settle the problem existing between the courts and the Service
on the meaning of home. The new test consists of three objective factors:
(1) Whether the taxpayer performs a portion of his business in the
vicinity of his claimed home and uses the abode while he
performs business in the vicinity;
(2) Whether the taxpayer's living expenses are duplicated because
his business requires him to be away; and
(3) Whether the taxpayer still lives in the area where his historical
place of lodging and claimed residence are located, or does a
member of his lineal or marital family live there, or does the
taxpayer use the claimed home frequently.
85 3T.C. 998 (1944).
88 Relying on Chester D. Griesemer, 10 B.T.A. 386 (1928).
87r INT. REv. CODE OF 1954 § 162(a) (2).
88 Joseph W. Powell, 34 B.T.A. 655 (1936); Charles E. Duncan, 17 B.T.A. 1088 (1929).
89 Rev. Rul. 71-247, 1971-1 CUM. BULL. 54; Rev. Rul. 60-189, 1960-1 CuM. BULL. 60.
90 Six v. United States, 450 F.2d 66 (2d Cir. 1971), remanding 322 F. Supp. 547
(S.D.N.Y. 1971); Wallace v. Comm'r, 144 F.2d 407 (2d Cir. 1943).
91 See, e.g., Comm'r v. Stidger, 386 U.S. 287 (1967); Peurifoy v. Conm'r, 358 U.S.
59 (1958); Conun'r v. Flowers, 326 U.S. 465 (1946); Rosenspan v. United States,
438 F.2d 905 (2d Cir. 1971).
92 Rev. Rul. 73-529, 1973-2 Cum. BULL. 37.
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The Service states that a yes answer to all of the above factors means
deductions are allowable, and that two out of three-yes answers means a
good chance for deductions.
4.06 Mileage Allowances. Advanced Revenue Procedure 74-23 93
has increased the automatic mileage deduction from 12 cents to 15 cents
for the first 15,000 business miles traveled and from 9 cents to 10
cents for mileage thereafter. Under the provision, an employee or a
self-employed person may deduct the operating cost of his automobile
used in trade or business. When such operating costs are in conformance
with the new mileage allowances and substantiated as to time, place and
business purpose, the substantiation requirements of Section 274 are met.
This allowance includes gas (including all taxes), oil repairs, license
tags, insurance, and depreciation. But it does not include interest
deductions allowable under Section 163, local taxes (except those included
in the cost of gas) allowable under Section 164, parking fees, and tolls. If
the standard mileage rate is used, straight-line depreciation must be used
and the basis of the automobile reduced by this amount. Taxpayers using
other types of depreciation or who have taken additional first-year
depreciation may not use the standard rate.
Advanced Revenue Procedure 74-24 94 has increased automatic
allowances for medical and charitable travel from 6 cents to 7 cents per
mile,95 while Advanced Revenue Procedure 74-2596 has increased the
automatic allowance for travel connected with a job-related move the same
amount.97 Parking fees and tolls are not included in this mileage allowance;
and, again, interest under Section 163 and taxes under 164 (except those
included in the gasoline costs) are not included. As depreciation is not
allowed for travel related to medical, charitable or moving, no reduction
in basis is required for those who use these rates.
Advance Revenue Ruling 74-43398 has increased the amount of
reasonable employer reimbursement for business meals and lodging from
$36 to $44. This increase will also apply to the entire year of 1974. If an
employer reimburses his employee for subsistence, or as a per diem
allowance and the amount does not exceed $44 or the maximum per
diem rate authorized to be paid by the Federal Government, the
requirements of 1.274-5(c) 99 substantiation are sustained if the employer
93 Rev. Proc. 74-23, 1974 INT. REV. BULL. No. 36, at 17, superseding Rev. Proc. 70-25,
1970-2 CuM. BULL. 506.
94 Rev. Proc. 74-24, 1974 INT. REv. BULL. No. 36, at 18, superseding Rev. Proc. 70-24,
1970-2 CuM. BULL. 505.
95 See INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 170, 213.
96 Rev. Proc. 74-25, 1974 INT. REV. BULL. No. 36, at 18, superseding Rev. Proc. 71-2,
1971-1 Cum. BuLL. 659.
97 See INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 217.
98 Rev. Rul. 74-433, 1974 INT. REv. BULL. No. 36, at 6, updating Rev. Rul. 71-412,
1971-2 Cum. BULL. 170, as modified, Rev. Rul. 72-508, 1972-2 Cum. BULL. 200.
99 Treas. Reg. § 1.274-5(c).
Winter, 1975]
24
Akron Law Review, Vol. 8 [1975], Iss. 2, Art. 2
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol8/iss2/2
AKRON LAw REv Ew
reasonably limits travel expenses to ordinary and necessary business
expenses and if the time, place and business purpose of the travel
are recorded. Items included in the allowance include meals, lodging,
laundry, fees for services and tips. It does not include taxi fares or
costs of telephone calls or telegrams.
The per diem allowance is not available to employer and employee if
they are related. This exists where the employee owns more than 10%
of the employer. Mileage allowances are specifically excepted.
When the employee feels he will lose on the per diem or mileage
allowances, he can write the Commissioner with full facts of any special
circumstances which account for the variation and the special rates. The
employee has the burden of convincing the Internal Revenue Service that
special circumstances exist, and if he does, he will be accorded the same
treatment as the taxpayers taking advantage of the fixed rates and allowances.
4.07 Medical Expenses-Special Education. Section 213 provides
for deductions of medical care expenses, which are described by Section
213(3) as the diagnosis, cure treatment, or the prevention of disease.10
These include the cost of attending a "special" school for mentally or
physically handicapped, if the alleviation of such handicaps is the
principal purpose for being there.1°1 This includes "the cost of
ordinary education furnished which is incidental to the special services
furnished by the school.110 2
Lawrence D. Greisdor'0 3 was allowed to deduct educational
expenses under Section 213 when he showed that the school attended
by his child had been established for children having an emotionally
caused learning disability. In Greisdorj, the evidence showed the
educational aspects of the school were secondary. Helping the emotional
causes of its students were its principal goal, and children were sent to
the school for this reason. However, in C. Fink Fischer,10 4 the court stated
that where the school served a dual purpose, providing normal education
and solving mental problems, only that portion of the tuition which could
be allocated to medical services was deductible.
In Jack W. Reiff,105 the taxpayer's daughter attended a school
concentrating primarily on academic training. Although the school she
attended accepted youngsters with learning disabilities, the court did not
classify it "special" because none of the staff had special training in the
1o See generally Treas. Reg. § 1.213-1.
101 Treas. Reg. § 1.213-1 (e) (1) (V) (a).
102 Id.
103 54 T.C. 1684 (1970).
104 50 T.C. 164 (1968), the court not finding the school a "special" school, but allowing
deductions of medical expenses related proximately to the prevention of the child's
emotional problems (in the form of fees to psychiatrists).
10 43 P-H TAx Cr. MEM. 74,020 (Jan. 1, 1974).
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handling of emotionally disturbed children and no psychiatrists were
employed by the school. The fact that her therapist sent her to the school
because it might have a positive effect on her problems did not sway the
court. Also, although the classes were small and tutoring of individual
students a standard practice, the court noted there was nothing more
involved here than at many other good academic schools. Perhaps the
most influential factor was that the school considered the student's
problem incidental to his academic training. The court found the
school neither a "special" school nor one serving a dual purpose, and
denied any medical deductions.
The Tax Court has by this case divided the medical care deductions
for special education into three distinct classes: one where the educational
facility is termed a "special school" and all tuition is deductible; the
second being a school serving a dual purpose where those expenses
allocated to medical care can be deducted, and the final classification being
the type treating the student's emotional problems incidental to academic
learning, where no medical care deductions are allowed.
4.08 Medical Expenses-Capital 
-Expenditure. Treasury Regulation
1.213-1(e) (iii) authorizes a medical expense deduction for a capital
expenditure to the extent the expenditure exceeds the increase in the value
of the property. Treasury Decision 7317106 has amended the regulation.
Expenditures made for the operation and maintenance of the capital asset
are now deductible as medical expenses if their primary purpose is that of
medical care. Thus, if a capital expenditure qualifies as a medical expense,
costs of its maintenance or operation qualify as medical expenses if the
medical reason for the expenditure still exists.
4.09 Medical Expense-Contact Lens Insurance. Section 213(e)(1)(c)
allows deductions for insurance covering medical care. By way of Revenue
Ruling 74-429,107 the Internal Revenue Service has extended this deduction
to insurance for contact lenses. As amounts paid for the contact lenses to
correct vision are a medical expense within Section 213 (e) (1) (A), the
insurance payments to protect against loss or damage to contact lenses
are also deductible. It appears from the ruling that the insurance payments
qualify as medical insurance deductions and can be combined with other
medical insurance payments. The taxpayer can deduct one-half of them
up to $150, the remainder going into the 3% pool.
4.10 Theft Losses. Section 162(a) allows deductions for all ordinary
and necessary expenses paid during the taxable year in carrying on a trade
or business. However, Section 162(c) disallows deductions for illegal
bribes and kickbacks, and Section 162(f) disallows fines and penalties
paid for violation of a law. Nevertheless, since the income tax was
106 Treas. Dec. 7317, 1974 INT. REv. BULL. No. 30, at 9.
107 t.ev. RuL 74429,1974 INT. REv. BULL. No. 36., at 6,
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to tax net income, 08 it is generally held that ordinary and necessary
business expenses of an illegal business are deductible. 109 But where
the allowance of such a deduction would frustrate a sharply defined
public policy, a deduction may be disallowed.' 0
Section 165(c) (2) allows deductions to individuals for "losses
incurred in any transaction entered into for profit, though not connected
with a trade or business." Section 165(c)(3) provides that theft
losses are deductible.
In Jerry Rossman Corp. v. Commissioner,"' the court put forth
public policy reasons for disallowing certain penalty payments as expense
deductions.us The Supreme Court has recognized that a business
expense deduction may be disallowed if its allowance would contravene
a sharply defined state or federal statute.us However, the general law has
been to disallow deductions only where a taxpayer deliberately and
intentionally patronized an illegal business and by participation there was
a severe and immediate frustration of state law.1 14 These principles have
been applied to claimed losses as well as expenses.
115
The decision in all cases is dependent on the particular fact
situation-' 6 Although depending on the facts, the deductibility of both
losses under Section 165 and expenses under 162 must be treated equally
and with some uniformity. But the Tax Court has expanded on the theory
of what constitutes public policy and what is a severe frustration of
statutory law in Raymond Mazzii.117 Mazzii suffered a $20,000 loss in a
counterfeiting scheme with the facts as outlined below.
After some prior negotiations, Mazzii was told by two men to bring
$20,000 in one hundred dollar denominations to a hotel room for
reproduction. The reproduction was to be done in a small black box.
After a small amount of time and a buzzing noise, two bills, the original
and a counterfeit copy, were emitted. Actually, the box was not capable
of reproducing the money. While at the hotel room two strangers
108 See, e.g., McDonald v. Comm'r, 323 U.S. 57, 66-67 (1944); Higgins v. Smith, 308
U.S. 473, 477 (1940).
109 Comm'r v. Sullivan, 356 U.S. 27 (1968).
310 See, e.g., Comm'r v. Heiningen, 320 U.S. 467, 473 (1943), which disallowed tax
deductions where a taxpayer violated a state statute and incurred a fine or penalty.
1 175 F.2d 711 (2d Cir. 1949).
12 Id. at 713, where Judge Learned Hand stated the "Revenue Act does not declare
that penalties may not be deducted; the doctrine is a judicial gloss" and that when
acts are condemned by law and punishable by fines or penalties, allowing business
expense deductions defeats, in part, the punishment.
Us See, e.g., Tank Truck Rentals, Inc. v. Comm'r, 356 U.S. 30 (1958).
114 United States v. Winters, 261 F.2d 675, 680 (10th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359
U.S. 943 (1958).
-t5 See, e.g., Fuller v. Comm'r, 213 F.2d 102 (10th Cir. 1954), aff'g G. E. Fuller, 20
T.C. 308, 317 (1953).
16 Tank Truck Rentals, Inc. v. Comm'r, 356 U.S. 30 (1958).
117 61 T.C. No. 55 (Jan. 28, 1974).
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entered, impersonating policemen; they left with the money and -their.
two partners, leaving petitioner without any money or any black box. - i
Petitioner deducted $19,900 from his tax claiming the money lost
was a theft loss. In the Tax Court the government alleged no loss was
proved and if proved, allowing the deduction was contrary to public
policy,"18 as there had been actual involvement by petitioner. The court
admitted no limitation is imposed by Section 165 on deductibility of such
a loss, but disallowed a deduction using Luther M. Richey'"z as their
basis. In Richey, the taxpayer was involved in an actual counterfeiting
scheme and the process had begun with taxpayer helping in the operation.
In Mazii the taxpayer attempted to distinguish Richey by stating there was
no real plan to counterfeit, as there was no device which could do the
job. Also, petitioner noted he knew nothing about the process and had
not participated. The majority of the court was not swayed by these
arguments and held petitioner's conduct no less violative of public
policy. It is this public policy argument which caused the split in
the court and raised questions for discussion.
The dissent in Mazzii expounds on the fact that Congress has set
forth categories of expenditures under Section 162 to be denied
deductions on grounds of public policy.120 These areas were to be
all inclusive, and determination of what is deductible is to be determined
by Congress.' 2 ' In its opinion in Commissioner v. Tellier- 22 the Supreme
Court seemed to agree with this policy.
It is submitted that perhaps whether the facts vary or not, the
decision of this type case should not rest on fact distinction. A more
consistent judicial interpretation of Sections 165 ,and 162 and/or a clearer
rule by the Congress 'is needed to settle the point of argument.
It is felt that congressional intent in disallowing certain deductions is
to be all inclusive' 23 and should not rely to any great extent on judicial
interpretation. Congress has set forth categories of expenditures under
Section 162 to be denied a deduction on the grounds of public policy, and
Congress should be the power to alter, amend or add to these
non-deductible expenditures. Of course, in similar cases, the public
policy argument may be avoided entirely, since a theft does not involve
payments voluntarily made and a theft loss can be said never to occur.
This may ,be the best avenue, as it will prevent the Tax Court from
118 18 U.S.C. § 471 (1966) (prohibiting counterfeiting United States money).
119 33 T.C. 272 (1959).
120 Raymond Mazzii, 61 T.C. No. 55 (Jan. 28, 1974).
m Id.
M2 383 U.S. 687, 692 (1966) (upheld deductions for legal fees).
IM See, e.g., S. REp. No. 552, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 274 (1969); S. REP. No. 437, 92d
Cong., 1st Sess. 72 (1971).
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grading criminal activity and from determining tax liability in terms
of the seriousness of the crime.
4.11 Casualty Losses. Section 165(c)(3) allows deductions for
casualty losses. The amount deductible is the lesser of (1) the actual
loss-the difference between the value of the property just before the loss
and that immediately thereafter, or (2) the adjusted basis of the property
for determining loss on a sale.124 A casualty is defined as an event due to
some sudden, unexpected, or unusual cause and not due to the deliberate
or willful action of persons claiming the loss. 25 Generally, this means an
accident or a sudden invasion by a hostile force and not the progressive
deterioration of property through a steady and constant action.
In Cox v. United States,"6 the petitioners were denied casualty loss
deductions even though the loss sustained met the criteria outlined
above. The petitioners had bought certain property as a long-term
investment and when oil was subsequently discovered on the land,
increasing its value, a lease was given by an oil company to drill and
develop any oil on the property. One well began producing at the rate
of 250 barrels a day, but after only one month of operation, a massive
intrusion of underground salt water invaded the oil-producing zone. This
intrusion could not be controlled. Petitioner claimed a casualty loss
deduction on the decrease in land value caused by this intrusion. He
argued that the decline represented a portion of the appreciation over the
original purchase price and should, therefore, be an allowable casualty loss.
The government relied on Jones v. Smith127 and Squirt Co. v.
Commissioner"28 in its arguments to deny a casualty loss deduction. The
court noted that the facts of Cox were unique and that there was no
controlling authority. 29 Hence, the court sought the congressional intent.
The plain and literal meaning was analyzed initially to determine the
legislative purpose. When this offered no assistance the court looked
beyond the meaning of the words to the purpose of the legislation. The
Cox court took the position that the casualty loss deductions were
allowed because Congress recognized that some purely fortuitous events
124 Treas. Reg. § 1.165-7(b).
125 Compare John P. White, 48 T.C. 430 (1967), with Aaron F. Vance, 36 T.C. 547
(1961); Keenan v. Bowers, 91 F. Supp. 771 (E.D.S.C. 1950); William J. Powers, 36
T.C. 1191 (1961).
126 371 F. Supp. 1257 (N.D. Cal. 1973).
12N 193 F.2d 381 (10th Cir. 1951).
1m 423 F.2d 710 (gth Cir. 1969).
M2 The court distinguished Jones (oil well cave-in) on the grounds that that decision
was based on the interpretation of a contract and taxpayer's accounting practices, and
that the drilling expense loss there was not sudden, unusual, and wholly unexpected. It
distinguished Squirt Company (freeze of citrus land) because it held only that the
threat of a future injury to land (future freezes), which causes a present decline in
land values, is not a casualty loss.
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might impair the taxpayer's financial position so as to make it difficult
for him to pay current income taxes.130
In Cox, however, the taxpayer's ability to pay his income tax was not
impaired in any way because there was no loss affecting his cash flow.
The most the petitioner had lost was unexpected and unrealized
appreciation collateral to his original investment. No financial hardship
had been experienced. If the taxpayer had been permitted to succeed, he
would have converted his ordinary income into capital gains and thereby
obtained lower tax rates on such gains.
Construing the casualty loss provision against these factors, the court
denied the taxpayer a deduction. It appears that a taxpayer will need to
show at least one of the following circumstances to claim casualty loss
deductions: (1) injury to the surface of the land; (2) impairment to
potential surface uses; (3) inability to pay federal income taxes; or (4)
out-of-pocket expenditures by taxpayer. If the taxpayer can show any of
the above this court infers that a casualty loss deduction may be allowed.
Another recent case involving a casualty loss deduction involved a
property loss of a child of majority age while she lived in the home of her
parents. In Howard Scharf,131 the court denied casualty loss deductions
claimed by the parents for the loss of property belonging to their
21-year-old son. The loss was caused by a fire which practically destroyed
the petitioner's home. The fire caused loss of property to the husband
and wife and two children; one aged 20, the other 21. At the time
of the fire, the age of majority was 21 in Maryland-the state where
the loss occurred. Under Maryland law, once a child reaches 21 years
of age the parents no longer have a duty to support them.
The court relied on Thomas J. Draper132 to disallow the casualty loss
deduction for the property of Scharf's 21-year-old son. In Draper, the
court stated that the adult daughter could not legally compel her parents
to make replacements for her casualty loss. As to Scharf's 20-year-old
child, the petitioners were allowed to claim the casualty loss deductions,
since the petitioner had a legal obligation to support this child and thus, to
replace possessions destroyed by the fire. The deductibility of a loss does
not hinge on whether the parents actually support their children, but
whether they have a legal obligation to do so. This is of particular
interest in these times as many states have reduced the age of majority
from 21 to '18 years of age.
Husband and wife may incur the same problem with property owned
separately or as tenants by the entireties. With property owned separately,
the husband will be denied casualty loss deductions on losses to the wife's
l3OSee H.R. REP. No. 749, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963); S. REP. No. 830, 88th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1964).
31 42 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 1231 (1973).
32 Thomas 3. Draper, 15 T.C. 135 (1950).
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property. 33 In property owned by the entireties the loss will be divided
equally between the owners."3 Therefore, when claiming casualty loss
deductions in family situations, the legal owner of the property-must be
determined before the loss can be claimed.
4.12 Prepaid Feed Expenses. In Cattle Feeders Tax Committee v.
Schultz, 3 5 the district court enjoined the Internal Revenue Service from
enforcing its three-part test' 36 concerning a cash basis taxpayer's deductions
of prepaid feed expenses.'3 Cattle Feeders was an unincorporated
association whose members sponsored investment programs for farmers,
which programs included the prepaying for feed that was to 'be delivered
in the next year. The court found Cattle Farmers would suffer irreparable
economic injury if the ruling 13 was published and enforced. The court
held that the ruling was substantive rather than an interpretative rule or
general statement of policy. As such, it was subject to the notice
requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act.1 39 In addition, the
court found the Service had extended its statutory authority beyond its
limits and usurped legislative authority contrary to the Constitution.
Cattle Feeders' victory in the district court was short-lived, as the Tenth
Circuit reversed the lower court's holding1 4° The Tenth Circuit found
Section 7421 to be a bar to the taxpayer's injunction suit. Citing Enochs
v. Williams Packing & Navigation Co., Inc.,14' the court stated that the
taxpayers had not met the two-part test put forth in that case. The circuit
court held that to obtain an injunction the taxpayer must show (1) that
the government would not prevail under any circumstances because the
Service's actions were clearly without a legal basis and (2) that a basis
for equity jurisdiction exists.
Relying on these factors, the Tenth Circuit found that the ruling was
not without legal basis because Sections 461 and 466 implicitly give the
Commissioner the right to require the taxpayer to compute his taxable
income on a basis which clearly reflects income.
33 Robert M. Lowenstein, 37 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 1222 (1968).
'34 See George E. Reynolds, 26 T.C. 1225 (1965); Walter G. Morley, 8 T.C. 904
(1947); J. H. Anderson, 17 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 721 (1948). But see I.T. 3304,
1939-2 CuM. BuLL. 158.
35 33 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 74-428 (W.D. Okla. 1973).
L5 Proposed Rev. RuL 73-530, T.I.R. 6 P-H 1973 Fao. TAXES % 55,628 requires the
taxpayer to show (1) the expenditure is a payment for purchase of feed rather thanjust a deposit; (2) the payment is for a business purpose and not just for the
avoidance, and (3) the deduction does not distort income to deduct the amount
paid for the feed.
13733 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 74-428, 431 (W.D. Okla. 1973), where the court held the
ruling "null, void, of no force and effect and unenforceable."
'38 Proposed Rev. Rul. 73-530, T.I.R. 1260, 6 P-H 1973 FED. TAxEs S 55,628.
5 U.S.C. § 553 (1966).
140 Cattle Feeders Tax Committee v. Shultz, 34 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 74-5945 (10th
Cir. 1974).
141370 U.S. 1 (1962).
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I This, although the ruling may destroy Cattle Feeders' business the
association has no remedy through the courts.14 However, any investor
in Cattle Feeders' business may litigate the validity of the ruling in a
suit for refund -in the Tax Court.
4.13 Convention Advertising. Section 276(c) allows a deduction for
expenses incurred for advertising in a convention program of a national
political party if the proceeds are used solely to defray convention costs
and if the amounts paid or incurred for advertising are reasonable in light
of the business the taxpayer may expect to receive as a result of the
advertising. Recently, however, the President has signed the Campaign
Reform Law' 43 eliminating any tax deduction for amounts paid for
advertising in a convention program, regardless of the business benefit or
the use of the advertising fund. Section 406(d) of the new law repeals
Section 276(c), effective January 1, 1975.
4.14 Premature Deposit Withdrawal Penalties. Although Revised
Ruling 73-511144 treated premature withdrawal interest penalties as
deductible from gross income, the taxpayer obtained no benefit unless he
itemized his deductions. However, Congress has now seen fit to allow
these losses as deductions in arriving at adjusted gross income.145 This new
law is retroactively effective for taxable years beginning after 1972. Thus,
the change allows taxpayer to deduct the interest forfeited while using the
standard deduction or low-income allowance in arriving at taxable income.
4.15 Unreasonable Compensation. Corporate taxpayers are allowed
a deduction under Section 162(a)(1) for wage and salary payments
which do not exceed a "reasonable allowance for personal services actually
rendered." Corporations will normally want to claim as large an amount
as possible for reasonable salaries and bonuses, since the deduction of
these items will reduce gross income. For closely held corporations, this
area has 'been highly litigated.
The Regulations view percentage or contingent compensation
employment contracts with great care. The two leading cases in this area
are Robert Rogers, Inc. v. United States,146 and Harolds Club v. Commis-
sioner.147 In Rogers, Inc., the Court of Claims upheld as reasonable a
1939 contract with a non-shareholder employee for a base salary plus 1%
of the net profits, which led to a salary of $175,000 when the company
prospered during World War II, because the agreement was reasonable
when entered into. In Harolds Club, a non-shareholder father was
employed by his sons as manager of a Nevada casino for a base salary
142 See Bob Jones Univ. v. Simon, 416 U.S. 725 (1974).
143 Pub. L. No. 93-433, § 406(d) (Oct. 15, 1974).
144 Rev. Rul. 73-511, 1973-2 Cum. BULL. 402.
145 Pub. L. No. 93-483, § 6 (Oct. 26, 1974).
146 93 F. Supp. 1014 (Ct. C1. 1950).
147 340 F.2d 861 (9th Cir. 1965),
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plus 20% of the net profits. The court of appeals upheld the principle of
the contingent contract, but reduced the salary deduction to 15% on the
grounds that the original contract was not the result of a "free bargain"
between the father and his sons as required by the regulations.
In Miller Box, Inc. v. United States,148 a company president
contracted with his brother to manage two companies, which were created
the following year, for a base salary plus 20% of its net profits. The
formula resulted in a total annual salary in excess of $500,000, due to
the expected further escalation of the Vietnam War. The Fifth Circuit
ruled that nearly 90% of the salary was unreasonable compensation
because (1) the contracts were between related parties, (2) the reason-
ableness of contracts should 'be viewed at the time they were adopted
(1966) by the corporation, and (3) this salary was four or five times
higher than that paid to managers of competing companies. In Pepsi-Cola
of Salina, Inc.,1' a 65-year-old woman was the president and sole
shareholder of the corporation. She received a base amount plus a fixed
percentage of the net profits as her salary, which exceeded $100,000 after
1968. The Tax Court, noting that the company had never paid any
dividends and that the woman did not testify as to any active duties she
performed as president, held that about 40% of her salary was
unreasonable compensation and represented dividends.
A related case (and a taxpayer victory) is Tulia Feedlot, Inc. v.
United States. 50 The shareholders charged the corporation a 3% fee for
guaranteeing a bank loan made to the corporation. The court rejected the
Service's argument that the 3% fee was really a dividend, and agreed
with the taxpayer that it was a deductible business expense since the
individual shareholders were personally liable on the loan in the event
of a corporate failure. A notice of appeal by the Service to the Fifth
Circuit has been filed.
4.16 Charitable Contribution. In Haverly v. United States, 5' the
principal of a Chicago elementary school received free samples of school
books from local publishing firms who hoped to convince the principal to
purchase their books for the school. Haverly gave the books, which had a
fair market value of $400, to -the school's library and claimed a charitable
deduction for the donation. The Commissioner conceded that the taxpayer
was entitled to a charitable contribution deduction under Section 170 for
the fair market value of the books as of the date of gift.
However, the Commissioner contended that when the recipient of
unsolicited samples manifests an intent to accept the property, it
148 488 F.2d 695 (5th Cir. 1974).
149 61 T.C. No. 61 (Jan. 29, 1974).
150 366 F. Supp. 1089 (D. Tex. 1974).
151 374 F. Supp. 1041 (N.D. IMI. 1974),
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becomes income and that deducting the contribution was evidence
of the necessary intent.
The court distinguished Commissioner v. Duberstein,5 2 wherein the
taxpayer realized income upon receipt of an automobile given to him as
compensation for services previously rendered. Here taxpayer could not
be forced to realize income by receiving unsolicited samples. In granting
taxpayer's motion for summary judgment, the court determined that
unsolicited samples did not fit within the categories of income as set
forth in Section 61(a). 15
5.00 Tax Credits
5.01 Investment Credit. In 1966, the Internal Revenue Service
ruled that a building structure used as a hog-raising facility did not qualify
as Section 38 property for the purposes of investment credit.154 In effect,
the Service ruled that the structure was not tangible personal property.
Tangible personal property is defined as any tangible property, except
land and improvements thereto, such as buildings or other inherently
permanent structures and their structural components. Included in this
classification of tangible property is all property contained in or
attached to the building. 55
In Melvin Satrum,156 the Tax Court refused to follow the 1966 ruling
in allowing an investment credit for amounts expended on the units to
house chickens. In so doing, the court relied on the fact that the
henhouse was used as an integral part of the activity and would have to be
expected to be replaced when the property it houses is replaced. In
addition, the court referred to the amount of working space and the
utilization of space.15 7 Believing the work done in taxpayer's henhouse to
be for the maintenance and collection of eggs, the house was analogized
to a storage area or processing chamber.158 Finally, the court relied on a
Senate Finance Committee Report 59 which used the hog-raising structure
as an example of property eligible for an investment credit.
The decision was not unanimous, four judges dissenting. The dissent
emphasizes that the activity in the house which was relied on by the majority
was indistinguishable from prior cases' 60 disallowing investment credits.
152 363 U.S. 278 (1960).
183374 F. Supp. at 1044.
Rev. Rul. 66-329, 1966-2 Cum. BULL. 16.
Treas. Reg. § 1.48-1 (c).
,8 62 T.C. No. 47 (June 27, 1974).
157 See generally Sunnyside Nurseries, 59 T.C. 113 (1972); Central Citrers Co., 58
T.C. 365 (1972); Robert E. Catron, 50 T.C. 306 (1968), discussing amount of
working space and its uses.
1 88 Sunnyside Nurseries, 59 T.C. 113, 121 (1972); Central Citrers Co., 58 T.C. 365
(1972).
159 S. REP. No. 92, 437, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1974), 1972-1 CUM. BULL. 575.
16OArnie Therrip, 59 T.C. 122 (1972); Sunnyside Nurseries 59 T.C. 113 (1972),holding greenhouses were buildings and disallowing an investment credit on them.
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Although both dissent and majority state a building is to be given
its commonly accepted meaning,161 there seems to be much more to
the determination of what is or is not a building under Sections 38 and
48. Subsequent cases will have to determine when a structure is entitled
to an investment credit. Whether Satrum will set a precedent for future
cases in this area must be pure speculation.
5.02 Investment Credit Recapture. Under Section 38, taxpayers are
entitled to a tax credit for investment in certain types of property
(generally depreciable tangible personal property other than buildings
and their structural components) in the year such property is placed in
service. The credit is 7% of the qualified investment, except for certain
public utilities where only 4% is allowed. 16 2 The credit does not reduce the
property's basis and is in addition to any depreciation deductions.'
x
The amount of the qualified investment depends on the useful life of
the property. If the property's life is less than three years there is no tax
credit; if the useful life is from three to five years, then only one-third of
the investment qualifies; for a five- to seven-year life, two-thirds qualifies.
If the useful life is longer than seven years the entire amount of the
investment qualifies for the tax credit.164
However, if the qualified property is disposed of or ceases to be
qualified before its useful life ends, Section 47(a) requires part or all
of the credit to be recaptured. The difference between the credit taken and
credit allowed for the period of actual use is added to the tax due in the
year of disposition. However, Section 47(b) provides that property will
not cease to 'be Section 38 property where there is a "mere change in form
of conducting the trade or business so long as the property is retained in
such trade or business as Section 38 property and the taxpayer retains
a substantial interest in such trade or business." Thus, where property is
transferred from a partnership to a newly formed corporation doing
identical business, and taxpayer retains substantial interest in the property,
recapture is not triggered. 6 5
In W. Frank Blevins,166 taxpayer retained the same interest in a
newly formed corporation as he had in the partnership (45%). However,
before the useful life of the property had ceased, taxpayer reduced his
interest in the corporation by 53% (retaining 21% total interest in the
16 H.R1 REP. No. 1447, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. (1962); S. REP. No. 1881, 87th Cong.,
2d Sess. (1962); cf. Joseph Henry Moore, 58 T.C. 1045, 1052-1053 (1972).
162 INT. REv. CODE Op 1954, §§ 46(a) (1), 46(c) (3); Treas. Reg. § 1.46-1.
163 INT. REv. CODE OP 1954, § 46(c) (2); Treas. Reg. § 1.46-3 (b).
164 INT. REv. CODE Op 1954, § 46 (c); Treas. Reg. § 1.46-3.
165 See James Soares, 50 T.C. 909 (1968), when taxpayer had 48% interest in the
partnership and only 7.6% interest in the newly formed corporation, the court held
he had not retained substantial interest on the exchange of partnership interest for
stock interest.
166 61 T.C. No. 59 (Jan. 29, 1974).
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corporation) by making a gift to his sons. As noted, recapture was not
triggered by the partnership's Section 38 property being transferred to the
corporation. 167 Instead, the question for the court was whether the gift
would trigger a recapture of the credit earned.
Without finding it necessary to determine whether 21% was a sub-
stantial interest under Section 47(h), the court held that 53.3% (the amount
of the gift) of the investment credit shall be the amount of recapture.
To determine the amount of recapture, the court states since the
taxpayer obtained his investment credit as a partner, petitioner's interest
must be traced from the time he received the credit as a partner through
the incorporation. Thus, the court first applied Treasury Regulation
1.47-3(f) (5) (iv) and then Treasury Regulation 1.47-6(a)(2) to
determine if the reduction of taxpayer's interest warranted recapture.
Treasury Regulation 1.47-3 (f) (5) (iv) provided that in the case of a mere
change in the form of a trade or business, if the interest of the taxpayer
in the trade or business is reduced but the taxpayer retains a substantial
interest, the reduction in interest must be tested under Section 1.47-6(a)(2)
(relating to partnerships) to determine if recapture is warranted.
Although taxpayer argued that 1.47-3(f) (5) (iv) applies only at the
change of form, the court disagreed. Section 1.47-3(f) is applicable to
the time of change as well as the period thereafter. Applying the
percentage test of 1.47-6(a) (2) the court found recapture was warranted.
In so doing, the court noted Section 47(b) provides that property does
not cease to be Section 38 property with respect to the taxpayer by reason
of a mere change in form of conducting the trade as long as taxpayer
retains a substantial interest, but this does not preclude recapture upon
the occurrence of a reduction in the interest. They noted where a
reduction of interest is involved, 1.47-3(f) (5) (iv) is controlling. Thus,
they rejected taxpayer's argument that this section applies only during
the change in form by holding it applicable to any reduction in
interest occurring thereafter.
6.00 Depreciation
6.01 Public Utility-Construction Equipment. The Supreme Court
firmly established the validity of Revenue Ruling 59-380168 by reversing
the Ninth Circuit's decision in Commissioner v. Idaho Power Co.169 The
taxpayer was a public utility which used its own equipment and employees
in the construction of improvements and additions to its capital facilities.
167 See generally Treas. Reg. § 1.47-3 (f) (1) (ii).
168 Rev. Rul. 59-380. 1959-2 CUM. BuLL. 87. Depreciation sustained on construction
equipment owned by a taxpayer and used in the erection of capital improvements for
its own use is not an allowable deduction, but shall be added to and made a part
of the cost of the capital improvements. So much thereof as is applicable to the
cost of depreciable capital improvements is recoverable through deductions for
depreciation over the useful life of such capital improvements.
16994 S. Ct. 2757 (1974), rev'g 477 F.2d 688 (9th Cir. 1973).
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In 1962 and 1963 the taxpayer claimed a deduction from gross income
for all of the year's depreciation on such equipment, including that portion
related to its use in constructing the company's capital facilities. The
construction-related depreciation was therefore based on the shorter life
of the equipment (10 years) instead of the longer life of the capital
facilities constructed (30 years). The Commissioner did not question the
deduction of that portion of the transportation equipment's depreciation
allocable to the operation and maintenance of the taxpayer's facilities,
however, the Commissioner contended that Section 263(a) 170 precluded
any deduction for depreciation on the equipment which was attributable
to the construction of the company's capital facilities.
Section 167171 allows a depreciation deduction on property used in
a taxpayer's trade or business or for the production of income. Revenue
Ruling 59-380 provides that where the taxpayer is not in the construction
business any equipment it owns and uses in the construction of its capital
facilities is not "property used in the trade or business" of the taxpayer
and thus is not depreciable property under Section 167. Instead, such
portion constitutes a cost of construction and should be added to the basis
of the asset constructed as a capital expenditure. 7 2 This revenue ruling
was also followed by the Court of Claims in Southern Natural Gas Co. v.
United States, 7 3 holding that the portion of depreciation on automotive
equipment used in the construction of a corporation's new facilities was
a cost giving such asset value and should therefore be included in that
asset's depreciable basis. 174 The court rejected the "a trade or business"
approach in favor of the analysis that equipment, to the extent used by
the taxpayer in constructing new facilities, was not used in "the trade or
business" of the natural gas company.
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the equipment used in
the construction of the taxpayer's own capital improvements was used
in the trade or business of the Idaho Power Co. The court reasoned that:
The continuity and regularity of the taxpayer's construction activities,
the number of employees engaged in construction and the amounts
expended on construction all point to the conclusion that construction
of facilities is a major aspect of the taxpayer's trade or business."
170 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 263. Capital Expenditures. "(a) General Rule. No
deduction shall be allowed for-(l) any amount paid out for new buildings or for
permanent improvements or betterments made to increase the value of any property
or estate."
171 INT. RLy. CODE OF 1954, § 167(a). "General Rule. There shall be allowed as a
depreciation deduction a reasonable allowance for the exhaustion, wear and tear
(including a reasonable allowance for obsolescence). (1) of property used in the
trade or business .. "
172 Treas. Reg. § 1.263(a) (2) -"Examples of capital expenditures (a) The cost of
acquisition, construction, or erection of buildings....
'73 412 F.2d 1222 (Ct. Cl. 1969).
174 Id. at 1265.
175 477 F.2d at 696.
(Vol. 8:2
37
et al.: Federal Income Tax Developments
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 1975
Winter, 1975] Fa.u .AL INCOME TAX DEVELOPMENTS: 1974
The court believed that the activities involved fell within the meaning of
Section 167 and that therefore Revenue Ruling 59-380 was an improper
and incorrect interpretation of the 'law.1 7 The Ninth Circuit also agreed
with the taxpayer's second contention that Section 263 did not preclude
a deduction for depreciation since that section only applied to amounts
"paid out" for new buildings or for permanent improvements. The court
concluded that depreciation is a "decrease in value"' 77 not a "payment, or
expenditure, or an out-of-pocket expense."' 178
The Supreme Court, however, overruled the Ninth Circuit's decision
in Commissioner v. Idaho Power.179 As to the taxpayer's first contention,
the Court did not have to reach the issue whether the Court of Appeals
had given the phrase "used in the trade or business" a proper construction.
Because the Commissioner had appeared to have conceded that point, the
Supreme Court assumed, without deciding, that Section 167 has a "literal
application to the depreciation of the taxpayer's transportation equipment
used in the construction of its capital improvements."'' 80 Nevertheless, the
Court agreed with the Commissioner's contention that Section 263 takes
precedence over Section 167 and any deduction for an amount "paid out
for new buildings or for permanent improvements" is therefore disallowed.
Section 263 takes precedence over Section 167 by virtue of the priority-
ordering terms contained in Section 161. That section provides that
deductions specified in Part VI of Subchapter B of the Income Tax
Subtitle of the Code are subject to the exceptions provided in Part IX.
Part VI includes Section 167 and Part IX includes Section 263. Since
Section 263 barred the deduction, it was immaterial to the decision
whether the deduction qualified under Section 167 as "used in the
taxpayer's trade or business."
The Court also disagreed with the taxpayer's contention that the
depreciation of construction equipment represents merely a decrease in
value and not an amount "paid out" within the meaning of Section
263(a). The Court saw no reason to treat construction related depreciation
differently than the cost of the transportation equipment itself and held
that: "Depreciation-inasmuch as it represents a using up of capital-is
as much an 'expenditure' as the using up of labor or other items of direct
cost." The Court also looked to accepted accounting practices18 2 and
established tax principles requiring the capitalization of the cost of
acquiring a capital asset to add further reasoning for the conclusion that
176 A revenue ruling does not have the force of law and to the extent it conflicts with
a statute it is ineffective.
177 Massey Motors, Inc. v. United States, 364 U.S. 92 (1959).
178 Clinton H. Mitchell, 42 T.C. 953, 973 (1964).
179 94 S. Ct. 2757 (1974).
180 94 S. Ct. at 2762 n.5.
s1 Brooks v. Comm'r, 50 T.C. 927, 935 (1968), rev'd, 424 F.2d 116 (5th Cir. 1970).
182 94 S. CL at 2764 n.8.
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depreciation of the equipment should be capitalized as a cost of the
self-constructed asset. The Court also noted that the non-capitalization of
construction-related depreciation could lead to disparate treatment among
taxpayers. Such treatment would allow firms which constructed their own
facilities to obtain a current deduction but require those without sufficient
resources to capitalize their entire cost of construction, including the
depreciation charged to it by the contractor.
The Supreme Court's decision in Idaho Power obviously strengthens
the Commissioner's position regarding other expenditures that might also
be capitalized. Areas which could be affected are legal and accounting
work on mergers and acquisitions, 8 3 evaluation studies in connection with
the acquisition, renovation, and sale of residential properties,184 and the
expansion of sales outlets and change in methods of distribution.' 7
6.02 Land Improvements. Section 167(a) allows a depreciation
deduction for the exhaustion and wear and tear of property used in the
taxpayer's trade or business and for property held for the production of
income. Depreciation is not allowed on land -because land is incapable
of wearing out or becoming obsolete. 86 But what about depreciation on
certain expenditures for land improvements? The question arose in
Tunnell v. United States L87 in which the district court distinguished those
improvements which become an integral part of the land and those which
only relate to the taxpayer's specific trade or business project. In Tunnell,
the plaintiffs claimed depreciation on all their land improvement expenses
in developing a waterfront mobile home park. These improvements included
not only the landscaping and grading of the land but also dredging and
bulkheading of lagoons which were to provide waterways for potential
tenant-boatowners. The plaintiffs based their claims on the ground that
these improvements were features of a total complex and thus they derived
their useful life expectancy from the limited life of the whole project.
The government contended that since the useful life of the lagoons
would continue whether or not the project itself might become obsolete,
no depreciation could be allowed for their dredging and bulkheading
because their useful life was indeterminate. The court felt that this
interpretation was inconsistent with the regulations. Treasury Regulation
1.167 (a) -1 (b) provides that an asset's useful life should be measured over
the period the asset is useful to the taxpayer in his trade or business or
in the production of his income. Therefore, another use which the lagoons
might serve after the taxpayer's original project becomes obsolete was
irrelevant. Furthermore, the court compared the lagoons to private roads
3a Rev. Rul. 73-580, 1973-2 CuM. BuLi. 86.
184 Rev. Rul. 74-104, 1974 INr. REv. BULL. No. 10, at 8.
150 Briarcliff Candy Corp. v. Comm'r, 475 F.2d 775 (2d Cir. 1973).
186 Leroy B. Williams, 24 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 1064 (1955).
187 367 F. Supp. 557 (D. Del. 1973).
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which are depreciable when their useful lives are peculiarly tied to that
of the entire project to which they provide access.188
The court also allowed a recovery on the clearing, thinning and
landscaping expenses because of their integral relationship to the park.
Such improvements formed a unique design which could only be used
for the mobile home project. However, except for the grading of
roads, general grading expenses could not be recovered. In Trailmont
Park, Inc.,18 depreciation deductions on such grading expenses were
allowed because the several levels of terraces on a mountainside which
were specifically landscaped to hold trailer pads were only usable for
a mobile home park. On the other hand, the graded marshland in
Tunnell could easily be adapted to uses other than the taxpayer's and
therefore increased the value of the land.
The plaintiffs also argued that the government was estopped from
asserting non-depreciability of the expenditures because the Guidelines
for Depreciation 9" had led them to believe that the expenditures were
depreciable. The court disagreed with the plaintiff's rationale. The
Guidelines had no relevance to whether a particular expenditure could be
recoverable through depreciation.191 They simply provided advance
assurance of the useful lives of assets which could initially be depreciated,
not assurance that the assets listed would be depreciable in every instance.
6.03 Customer Lists. Although Section 165(a) provides for a
deduction on losses sustained during the taxable year not compensated by
insurance or otherwise, there is no specific provision in the law that
permits a deduction for partial loss of an intangible capital investment. To
claim a loss deduction, the loss must be evidenced by closed and completed
transactions, fixed by identifiable events actually sustained during the
taxable year. In addition, only a bona fide loss is allowable.192
Proving a bona fide loss has been a problem to taxpayers who have
lost customers after purchasing customer lists. For example, in Anchor
Cleaning Service, Inc.,193 the Tax Court held that the customer accounts
acquired by the cleaning service were a single capital asset composed of
a list of customers and were not a composite of separate individual capital
assets. Thus, the court disallowed loss deductions when some customers
discontinued the service. The reasons behind this decision included:
(1) the cleaning service acquired the list, along with the goodwill,
furniture and office goods, and accounts receivable for one purchase
price; (2) no valuation was placed on any particular contract, and
188 Rev. Rul. 65-265, 1965-2 CUM. BULL. 52. Accord, Aurora Village Shopping Center,
Inc., 39 P-H Tax Ct. Mer. 146 (1970).
1M 40 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 871 (1971).
19o Rev. Proc. 62-21, 1962-2 Cum. BuLL. 418.
191 367 F. Supp. at 565.
192 Treas. Reg. § 1.165-1 (b).
193 22 T.C. 1029 (1958).
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(3) the cleaning service allocated part of the purchase price to the
entire customer list.
In Revenue Ruling 69-311,194 the Service reaffirmed this position
where the taxpayer purchased the accounting practice of a deceased
accountant and the clients of the deceased were recommended to go
to the taxpayer for all work formerly handled by the decedent. In denying
the loss, the Service advanced what is called the single unitary assets
doctrine or indivisible asset doctrine. As the lost contracts were constantly
being replaced by new ones, the indivisible asset was not exhausted by
the passage of time or the loss of a contract.
However, where a taxpayer purchased only an account of a single
customer, a loss deduction was allowed when the client died.1 95 The
Service ruled that when a sole account transferred in a single transaction
does not lead to other accounts, and the time of its loss of usefulness can
be established, the loss is deductible. In addition, the Seventh Circuit
allowed a loss deduction in Super Food Service, Inc. v. United States,
19 6
after the purchaser of a customer list had assigned a value to each
individual contract by a specified formula. The court stated the indivisible
asset doctrine did not apply when a specific value is given to each contract.
In Sunset Fuel Co. v. United States,197 the taxpayer obtained certain
assets of the seller (Dwyer), the single biggest asset being Dwyer's
customers. The price paid for Dwyer's customer list was computed on an
individual basis by use of a specific formula. As in Anchor and Super
Foods the government argued that the customer list was a mass, indivisible
asset and could not be separated for a loss deduction. Furthermore, the
government argued the purchaser had acquired the "customer structure"
of the business; that is, they acquired a new level of operation and an
opportunity to make inroads into markets already opened by the acquired
business, in addition to the income from the particular customer who
dealt with the previous owner. The court held that since the taxpayer had
a going business and was operating in the same area as Dwyer, they did
not assume Dwyer's customer structure. All that was acquired was an
additional flow of capital from Dwyer's customers, not a new level of
operation. Since the taxpayer had valued each customer as a capital asset,
taxpayer was able to deduct its unrecovered basis on the loss or death of
one of the customers. Each customer was held to constitute a single
unitary asset, not the entire contract as in Anchor Cleaning.
However, in future cases of this nature, the taxpayer may not always
prevail. In the Oregon District,198 at least, the question of whether a
194 Rev. Rul. 69-311, 1969-1 CuM. BULL. 62.
195 Rev. Rul. 71-418, 1971-2 Cum. BULL. 125.
196 416F.2d 1236 (7th Cir. 1969).
M 375 F.Supp. 1011 (D. Ore. 1974).
198 See Skilken v. Comm'r, 420 F.2d 266, 269 (6th Cir. 1969).
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purchaser of a customer list purchased a single mass asset or a group of
single unitary assets will be a factual question depending on the method
of treating the acquired list. It appears that when the purchaser places a
valuation on an individual contract, a reasonable method of reaching
this valuation figure, and a reasonable method of establishing the
remaining value, he will be able to claim a loss deduction.
7.00 Capital Gains
7.01 Non-Recognition of Gain. Does the death of a taxpayer
terminate the availability of the non-recognition of gain provisions under
Section 1033? Both the Third and Fourth Circuits have agreed that the
requirements of Section 1033 are met if the testamentary trustee of
the taxpayer's estate reinvests the proceeds in other property similar or
related in use to that taken. 199 In Estate of George W. Jayne,202 however,
the Tax Court did not permit the wife of the taxpayer to defer the gain
which the taxpayer could have received from the sale of property under
threat of condemnation. The reason was not the subsequent death of the
wife, but that the wife used her own money when buying suitable
replacement property. Had she merely acted as executrix of the taxpayer's
estate and used estate funds to purchase the similar property, Section
1033 would then have been available to her. The Internal Revenue Service
is still at odds with such an interpretation of Section 1033. Revenue
Ruling 64-16 1201 specifically refused to follow the decision in In re
Goodman's Estate v. Commissioner,2 2 where the deceased taxpayer's
representatives were allowed to qualify under the replacement require-
ments. The ruling interprets Section 1033 to require the taxpayer to put
himself in the same investment position as he was in before the involuntary
conversion in order to receive the nonrecognition benefit. If the taxpayer
dies before procuring the replacement property, the continuation of his
investment cannot be completed. However, the refusal of both the Tax
Court and the Fourth Circuit to follow Revenue Ruling 64-161 puts that
ruling's interpretation of Section 1033 in doubt.
7.02 Transfer of Patent Rights. Section 1235 provides that a
transfer of all substantial rights to a patent constitutes the sale or exchange
of a capital asset held for more than six months. However, Treasury
Regulation 1.1235-2(b)(1)(iii) denies this treatment for those patent
transfers "in fields of use within trades or industries, which are less than
all the rights covered by the patent, which exist and have value at
the time of the grant." In Mros v. Commissioner,2 3 the Tax Court agreed
with the plaintiff's contention that Treasury Regulation 1.1235-2(b)(1)(iii)
'" Estate of John E. Morris, 454 F.2d 208 (4th Cir. 1972); In re Goodman's Estate
v. Comm'r, 199 F.2d 895 (3d Cir. 1952).
200 61 T.C. No. 80 (March 14, 1974).
201 Rev. Rul. 64-161, 1964-1 CuM. BULL. 298.
202 199 F.2d 895 (3d Cir. 1952).
203 493 F.2d 813 (9th Cir. 1974), revg, 40 P-H Tax CL Mem. 540 (1971).
Winter, 1975]
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was too narrow an interpretation of the law. In that case the taxpayer had
granted exclusive rights in his gear reduction device patent to another
party but the agreement restricted their use to certain specified areas of
manufacture. The Commissioner argued that any advance payments to
Mros which arose from this limited field of use agreement were royalties
and thus not entitled to capital gain treatment. The Tax Court disagreed
and stated that as long as the transfer was a grant of the exclusive right
to a patented invention in a particular field of use, it would therefore
qualify as a transfer of "all substantial rights" under Section 1235. The
Ninth Circuit, on the other hand, reversed and held that such a limited
field of use patent transfer did not qualify for capital gains treatment
if it was restricted to a geographic or industrial use area.
In holding the regulation a valid interpretation of Section 1235, the
court applied a twofold test which the Sixth Circuit had outlined in
Fawick v. Commissioner.2°4 In Fawick, the taxpayer had granted exclusive
rights to another person of his patent relating to assemblies suitable
for use in driving clutches. This grant limited the patent's field of use
to the marine service industry. In order to determine whether Fawick
was entitled to Section 1235 benefits, the Sixth Circuit outlined two
requirements that any grant must satisfy to qualify for capital gain
treatment. First, there must be an actual transfer of the monopoly rights in
a patent. Second, the taxpayer must not retain any substantial rights
after the transfer has taken place.20 5 Since the Fawick patents had known
value outside the marine service industry at the time of the grant,
that value constituted a substantial right causing the transaction to
fail to qualify under Section 1235.
In applying this test to the present case, the Ninth Circuit disallowed
capital gain treatment because the Mros patent had potential value in
areas other than the limited field of use for which it was sold. Therefore
Treasury Regulation 1.1235-2(b) (1) (iii) was applied and any advance
payments made to Mros constituted royalties under Section 1235.
7.03 Lessee's Payment to Update Restoration Clause. Payment to
a lessor to relieve the lessee of a contractual duty to restore the premises
to its original condition upon termination of the lease constitutes
additional rent and therefore ordinary income.206 In Sirbo Holding, Inc.,2°7
the taxpayer-lessor had leased the property for use as a theater or
broadcast studio on the condition that the lessee restore the property
to its original condition. The liability of the lessee encompassed both the
replacement of the curtains and seats as well as the removal of walls,
partitions, and other installations which the lessee had made to convert
204 436 F.2d 655 (6th Cir. 1971).
205 436 F.2d at 662.
206 Sirbo Holdings, Inc., 61 T.C. 723 (1974), on remand, 476 F.2d 981 (2d Cir. 1973).
2=7 57 T.C. 530 (1972).
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the property to its intended use. In the negotiations for a new lease,
however, the lessee paid an amount to "update" the restoration clause.
This updating thereby relieved the lessee of its liability to account for the
damages which had occurred during the period covered in the original lease.
The taxpayer claimed that this payment should be considered as a
capital gain under Section 1231. That section provides that gains on sales
or exchanges of property, plus gains from the compulsory or involuntary
conversion of property, used in the trade or business shall be treated as
gains from sales or exchanges of capital assets held more than six
months. The Tax Court disagreed with the taxpayer's contention and held
that the payment was ordinary income. Where a payment represents
compensation for damages, the amount received is first charged to the
taxpayer's basis and only the amount received in excess of basis is
taxable. 208 To the extent that the obligation to restore related to the seats
and curtains which had been removed by the lessee, that cost had long
since been recovered by the taxpayer through the composite depreciation
claimed on the property as a whole. Furthermore, Sirbo Holdings offered
no proof of damages or economic loss due to the cost of removal of
the walls and other installations made by the lessee. If anything, the
value of the property had been enhanced.
On appeal, however, the Second Circuit remanded the case for
reconsideration of the decision that the payment did not constitute an
amount realized from the sale or exchange of property under Section
1231. The circuit court was concerned over the decision, which went
unchallenged by the Commissioner, in Boston Fish Market Corp.,=
where, in a similar situation, the landlord received capital gains treatment.
On remand, the Tax Court reaffirmed its position that consideration
received in the updating of a restoration clause did not constitute an
amount realized from the sale or exchange of property or from the
compulsory or involuntary conversion of property within the meaning of
Section 1231. The words "sale" and "exchange" must be given their
ordinary meaning and the payment for updating the restoration clause
related to new terms upon which the lessee would continue to occupy the
property. Nothing was sold and nothing was exchanged, the lessee was
merely released from a contract obligation. The Commissioner, upon
request by the Second Circuit to justify its inconsistent position in
Boston Fish Market and Sirbo Holdings, stated that its concession in
the former case was an error.
7.04 Covenant Not to Compete. If a payment on a contract for the
sale of a business is designated for goodwill, it is considered capital gain
to the seller and is nondeductible by the buyer.210 If, on the other hand, the
208 Pioneer Real Estate Co., 47 B.T.A. 886 (1942).
2 57 T.C. 884 (1972).
210 Commissioner v, Killian, 314 F.2d 852 (5th Cir. 1963).
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payment is for a covenant not to compete, it is ordinary income to the seller
but is deductible by the buyer over the term of the covenant.' Where the
contract does not specifically allocate these payments the court will deter-
mine how much of the consideration received is for each. 212 Furthermore,
if there has been an allocation agreed upon in the contract for sale, the
taxpayer will be precluded from treating it differently for tax purposes. m"
In Servicemaster of Memphis, Inc. v. United States,"'4 the parties
contracted for the sale of a business for $45,000 and allocated $30,000 to
a covenant not to compete and $3,000 to goodwill. The court refused
to accept such a distribution and noted that a covenant's value rarely
exceeds 50% of the purchase price. Accordingly, the court reduced the
covenant's value to $22,500. While it is unusual for a court to upset a
specific allocation without strong proof that the true substance of the
agreement is not reflected, if it is clearly beyond the economic realities
of the transaction, a court will not hesitate to adjust it."' 5
7.05 Severance Damages. When land or other property is involun-
tarily converted into money, Section 1033 provides that no gain will be
recognized if that money is used in acquiring other property which is
similar or related in service or use to the property so converted. There
seems to be little difficulty when applying Section 1033 to compensation
received for condemnation which has been reinvested into suitable
replacement property."' 6 The Service, however, has been reluctant to grant
the same treatment to compensation for severance damages relating to the
lessening of value of the property which is retained by the taxpayer. Just
such a situation arose in McKitrick v. United States.""7 There the Service
disallowed Section 1033 treatment on a taxpayer's severance damages after
part of his property was taken for highway purposes and after the
taxpayer had reinvested all of the compensation and severance damages
into similar property.
The Service based its position on two Revenue Rulings"' 8 which
allow the deferral of severance damages only where the taxpayer
purchases property adjacent to his remaining land or where the gain is
used to restore the usability of the retained land. The court disagreed with
this narrow interpretation and noted the inconsistency of the Service's
position since Revenue Ruling 72-433 29 did not limit the availability of
211 Nelson Weaver Realty Co. v. Comm'r, 307 F.2d 897 (5th Cir. 1962).
= Karan v. Comm'r, 319 F.2d 303 (7th Cir. 1963).
213 Dock B. Bennett, 39 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 273 (1970).
214 34 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 74-5557 (W.D. Tenn. 1974).
n
15 Schultz v. Comm'r, 294 F.2d 52 (9th Cir. 1961); Allison v. United States, 25 Am.
Fed. Tax R.2d 70-1107 (E.D. Cal. 1970).
218 Rev. Rul. 58-396, 1958-2 CUM. BULL. 403.
217 373 F. Supp. 471 (E.D. Ohio 1974).
218 Rev. Rul. 69-240, 1969-1 CUM. BULL. 199; Rev. Rul. 53-271, 1953-2 Cm.. BULL. 36.
219 Rev. Rul. 72-433, 1972-3 CuM. BYLL. 35,
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Section 1033 treatment to the two exceptions delineated. That ruling noted
the similarity between severance damages and condemnation proceeds
received for an involuntary grant of flowage easement rights on a farm.
The ruling made no mention that the proceeds had to be reinvested in
adjacent farmland in order to qualify under Section 1033.
The court also commented on the fact that no other statutory
language or treasury regulation had been shown to support the Service's
position. Furthermore, the only case on point specifically held that
severance damages are deferrable under Section 10 3 3 .22o Section 1033
was designed to give relief to taxpayers who have involuntarily realized
gain through condemnation n and has therefore been liberally construed
to accomplish that purpose.Y2 Since that section makes no distinction
for the character of the condemnation award, the relief provisions of
that section are available even though part of an award may be
attributable to severance damages.
7.06 Sale of Rental Equipment. Section 1231(b)(1)(B) precludes
capital gains treatment on the sale of property which a taxpayer holds
"primarily for sale to customers in the ordinary course of his trade or
business." A problem arises, however, in determining when certain
property is "primarily held" for such use. In International Shoe Machine
Corp. v. United States,2Z3 the plaintiff was in the business of leasing shoe
machines to its customers. International did not solicit any sales but still
found it necessary to sell a number of the machines upon request in order
to maintain a competitive position. Even though International had
set up procedures for such transactions, it reported long-term capital
gain on the sales contending that the machines were not held primarily
for sale. The Internal Revenue Service disagreed and taxed the gain
on the sales as ordinary income.
In the suit for a refund, International argued that since its policy had
consistently been to lease, and not to sell its machines, any machines
which were sold could not have been held primarily for sale in the
ordinary course of business within the meaning of Section 1231. The
district court disagreed and pointed out that the test as to whether an asset
was primarily held for sale was not a comparison between rental and sales
activity but rather a determination as to whether such sales formed a
predictable part of the corporation's business activity. 2 4 Thus, as soon as
International decided to sell its machines and set up procedures to
accommodate such sales, the plaintiff operated a business in which selling
220 Conran v. United States, 322 F. Supp. 1055 (E.D. Mo. 1971).
221 Id. at 1057.
2=2 Filippini v. United States, 318 F.2d 841 (9th Cir. 1963); United Development Co.
v. United States, 212 F. Supp. 664 (E.D. Mo. 1962); Wala Garage, Inc. v. United
States, 163 F. Supp. 379 (Ct. Cl. 1958).
23 491 F.2d 157 (Ist Cir. 1974).
4 Ild. at 160.
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was an accepted and predictable part. Even though the sales did not
constitute a major portion of the plaintiff's business, the machines were
held and sold in the ordinary course of business under Section 1231.
The court also struck down the plaintiff's final contention that the
transactions fell within the scope of the "rental obsolescence" cases.22
Those decisions allowed capital gains treatment on sales of rental
equipment which had become obsolete for rental purposes since the sales
represented a liquidation of an investment. In International's case, however,
while all the machines had been rented out for several years before their
sale, their useful rental lives had not yet terminated. Any sale price would
have then had to include the present value of the machine's potential ordi-
nary rental income which could not then 'be transformed into capital gain.
7.07 Insider's Profits. Once again a Circuit Court has found the
Tax Court's construction of transactions involving the treatment of
repayments of funds previously taxed at capital gains rates unpersuasive.
The taxpayer in Cummings v. Commissioner226 was a member of the
board of directors of a movie company who sold a portion of his stock at
a gain, and within six months repurchased the same stock. Since Section
16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 19342 7 requires that any profit
made under the above circumstances must inure to the corporation, the
taxpayer remitted his profit from the transaction to the corporation in
order to protect his position against possible liability for insider's profits.
However, while the taxpayer had originally treated his profits as long-term
capital gains, he deducted his repayments as ordinary business losses and
thereby realized a tax gain on the overall transaction.
The basis of the Second Circuit's decision to disallow just such a tax
gain was Arrowsmith v. Commissioner.228 In that case, the Supreme Court
held that an expenditure made for a business purpose could not be
deducted as an ordinary business expense if it is sufficiently related to an
earlier capital gains transaction. The Tax Court, however, has consistently
refused to find that relationship in situations concerning Section 16(b)
violations. In previous cases,2 as in Cummings, the taxpayer had claimed
that the repayments were made to protect his business reputation. Because
= Hillard v. Comrnm'r, 281 F.2d 279 (5th Cir. 1960); Philber Equipment Corp. v.
Comm'r, 237 F.2d 129 (3d Cir. 1956); Davidson v. Tomlinson, 165 F. Supp. 455
(S.D. Fla. 1958).
=6 34 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 74-6153 (2d Cir. 1974).
15 U.S.C. § 78 (1934). Section 16(b) of the Act provides:
(b) For the purpose of preventing the unfair use of information which may have
been obtained by such beneficial owner, director, or officer by reasons of his
relationship to the issuer, any profit realized by him from any purchase and
sale, or any sale and purchase, of any equity security of such issuer (other than
an exempted security) within any period of less than six months, unless such
security was acquired in good faith in connection with a debt previously
contracted, shall inure to and be recoverable by the issuer...
28 344 U.S. 6 (1952).
22 Anderson v. Comm'r, 56 T.C. 1370 (1971), rev'd, 480 F.2d 1304 (7th Cir. 1973);
William E. Mitchell, 52 T.C. 21 (1969), rev'd, 428 F.2d 259 (6th Cir. 1970).
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the -taxpayer had realized capital gains in the capacity of a shareholder
while paying the alleged insider's profits as an officer of the corporation,
the Tax Court has found no connection and has -therefore refused to
follow the Arrowsmith rule in those situations.
In Cummings, however, the Second Circuit joined two other circuit
courts in reversing the Tax Court's construction of such transactions.230
The court reasoned that the nexus between the repayment and the earlier
capital gains was obvious since the repayment was made solely because of
the earlier sale, itself a prerequisite for liability under Section 16(b);
Thus, with no distinction between the status of the taxpayer in the two
transactions, the Arrowsmith rule controlled and Cummings was limited
to a capital loss. To decide otherwise would be to defeat the policy of
Section 16(b) in removing the incentive for short-term trading by
corporate insiders. The court held that: "Without good reason, we are
unwilling to interpret the Internal Revenue Code so as to allow this
anomalous result which severely and directly frustrates the purpose of
Section 16(b)."231 In view of the Second Circuit's decision in Cummings,
as well as the holdings of the Sixth and Seventh Circuits, it seems unlikely
that the remaining circuits will follow the Tax Court's adamant position. 3 2
7.08 Hedging. Section 1233(b)(1) treats any gain upon the closing
of a short sale as short-term capital gain to the extent property substantially
identical to that sold short is acquired after the short sale and on or before
the date the sale is closed. However, under Section 1233 (g) this rule does
not apply to hedges in commodity futures and, therefore, gains and losses
arising out of hedging transactions result in ordinary gains and losses. In
International Flavors & Fragrances, Inc.,233 the corporation, fearing a
possible currency devaluation, sold British pounds short in order to protect
its interest in a British subsidiary. When the currency was subsequently
devalued, the corporation upon closing contract realized a large profit
which would have resulted in short-term capital gain under Section
1233(b) (I). However, International Flavors decided to sell its currency
contract to a bank in order to report the gain on the sale of the contract
as long-term capital gain. The Commissioner argued that the sale of the
contract was either a sham resulting in a short-term capital gain under
Section 1233(b)(1) or that the contract itself was a hedge resulting in
ordinary income under the Corn Products234 doctrine.
The majority of the Tax Court agreed with the Commissioner's
230 Id.
231480 F.2d 1304, 1308 (7th Cir. 1973).
232 Briner, Federal Income Tax Developments: 1973, 7 AxRoN L. REv. 188, 270 (1974).
233 62 T.C. No. 26 (May 16, 1974).
234 Corn Products Refining Co. v. Comm'r, 350 U.S. 46 (1955). The Supreme Court
held that where the purchase'and sale of futures is related to the operation of the
taxpayer's business, a hedge occurs and ordinary income rather than capital gain or
loss is incurred.
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contention that the gain resulted in ordinary income. The court felt that
the short sale of British pounds was not an investment but rather a hedge
against the risk of future losses of income. Since such protection
constitutes an integral part of a multi-national corporation's business,
235
the short sale contract of currency could not then be considered a capital
asset under the Corn Products rationale. It should be noted, however, that
even though the taxpayer in this case had to treat its currency gains as
ordinary income, had the results been a loss they would have been
given ordinary business loss treatment.m
7.09 Collapsible Corporation Sale of Stock. Section 341(b)(1) sets
forth a definition of a collapsible corporation which may be summarized
as a corporation which is formed or availed of for the construction of
property with a view towards selling its stock before it realizes a
substantial part of the taxable income to be derived from the constructed
property. 237 If a corporation is collapsible, Section 341 (a) (3) precludes
its shareholders from taking capital gains on a sale of stock which takes
place within three years from the date of completion of the property if the
corporation has not yet realized a substantial part of the income to be
derived from such property. One of the key aspects in determining
whether Section 341 applies is the extent to which the stockholder has the
proscribed view towards selling out his stock interest prematurely.
238
In Joseph M. Crowe,239 the petitioner sold his stock in a land
development corporation before the corporation realized a substantial part
of the income expected from the property. Even though Crowe owned
50% of the stock,240 the Tax Court found that his sale was a capital gains
transaction. The court's decision rested on the fact that Crowe lacked the
235 350 U.S. at 51.
2W Chemplast, Inc., 60 T.C. 623 (1973). (An appeal by the Commissioner to the
Third Circuit is pending.)
237 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 341 (b) (1):
For purposes of this section, the term "collapsible corporation" means a
corporation formed or availed of principally for the manufacture, construction,
or production of property, for the purchase of property which (in the hands of
the corporation) is property described in paragraph (3), or for the holding
of stock in a corporation so formed or availed of, with a view to-
(A) the sale or exchange of stock by its shareholders (whether in liquidation
or otherwise), or a distribution to its shareholders, before the realization
by the corporation manufacturing, constructing, producing, or purchasing
the property of a substantial part of the taxable income to be derived from
such property, and
(B) the realization by such shareholders of gain attributable to such property.
238 There is some dispute as to whether it is necessary that there be the requisite view
at the time the corporation is formed. See Sidney v. Comm'r, 273 F.2d 928 (2d Cir.
1960); Burge v. Comm'r, 253 F.2d 765 (4th Cir. 1958). But see Jacobson v. Comm'r,
281 F.2d 703 (3d Cir. 1960).
239 62 T.C. 121 (1974).
240 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 341(3) provides relief from collapsible treatment when
the sale is by a non-professional stockholder and there are no professional stock-
holders owning more than 20% of the stock.
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necessary tainted "view" under Section 341.241 Time, Inc., the other 50%
stockholder, had demanded an option to buy back Crowe's interest within
a five-year period as a necessary prerequisite to the formation of the
corporation. After a year, Crowe ran into disputes over policy and asked
Time, Inc., to give him discretion over policy matters, let him buy
out Time's interest, or exercise its option to buy him out. Because Crowe
intended his initial purchase of the stock to be a long-term investment
and was only compelled to sell his interest by circumstances beyond his
control, m the court felt that the proscribed "view" under Section 341
was missing. Time, Inc., also lacked the proscribed "view" even though
the possibility existed at the time of formation that Time, Inc., might
eventually exercise the option. Since neither party intended nor wanted the
option possibility to be realized, Time, Inc., therefore, lacked a purpose
and the tainted "view" to buy out Crowe. Time's subsequent exercise
of the option was thus only a remote possibility which could not have
been expected to materialize.
7.10 Bootstrap Sales to Tax-Exempt Organizations. There were two
cases decided in 1974 involving the bootstrap sale of a business to a
Section 501 tax-exempt religious organization. Both transactions were
patterned after the successful bootstrap sale achieved in Commissioner
v. Brown.243 The Supreme Court there found a bona fide sale and allowed
the seller capital gain treatment for the $1,300,000 sale of his company's
stock where the proceeds were to be paid out of the company's earnings
over the next 10 years. The Court rejected the Service's argument that
the transaction was not a sale or exchange of a capital asset, within the
meaning of Section 1222(3), and that the proceeds should be considered
ordinary income since the purchasing charity assumed no business risks
and the individual sellers retained their management positions.
In Aaron Kraut,244 the only variation from Brown was that there was
a flexible purchase price for the company between $500,000 and
$3,500,000, payable primarily out of 75% of the business' net income for
the ensuing 10 years. In denying capital gains treatment for the $600,000
payment made in 1967, the Tax Court emphasized the excessive and
flexible sales price which prevented the transaction from being a bona fide
sale within the meaning of Section 1222(3). Brown was distinguished
since the fixed purchase price "had a reasonable relationship to the subject
matter of the sale, '245 and that the "transaction had effected a real change
241 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 341 (b) (1) (A), (B).
242 Commissioner v. Lowery, 335 F.2d 680 (3d Cir. 1964). The court determined that
in order to have the requisite view, freedom of choice is necessary in reaching a
decision to sell the stock, and that when a sale is compelled by circumstances beyond
the control of the stockholder, that view does not exist.
243 380 U.S. 563 (1965).
244 62 T.C. 420 (1974). The tax-exempt purchaser in this case was the Reverend Rex
T. Humbard's Cathedral of Tomorrow, Akron, Ohio.
245 Id. at 426.
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of economic benefit" 246 for the tax-exempt purchaser, since it would obtain
outright control over the business after the purchase price was paid.
A similar situation occurred in Berenson v. Commissioner,24 but
with a slightly different result. The taxpayers had sold their business, which
had a fair market value of $3,000,000, to a Section 501 tax-exempt
religious organization for $6,000,000 with the money to be paid out of
the company's earnings over the next 13 years. The Second Circuit
partially reversed the Tax Court but did not distinguish this transaction
from the transaction in Brown as far as $3,000,000 of the sales price was
involved (the company's fair market value), and allowed the capital
gains treatment for this amount. To this extent there was a bona fide
sale within the meaning of Section 1222(3). The balance of the
purchase price was deemed to be excessive, making it distinguishable
from Brown, and the court ruled that this excess amount had to be
treated as an ordinary income payment.
Section 514, enacted in the 1969 Tax Reform Act, repealed the
preferred tax-exempt status of religious organizations for their unrelated
business income. Thus, the effects of, and tests imposed by, Brown, Kraut
and Berenson on debt-financed purchases have been mooted. Since all
Section 501 organizations are now subject to tax on their unrelated
business income, the tax advantages of this type of bootstrap sale
have been minimized.
8.00 Procedure
8.01 Withdrawal of Tax-Exempt Status. The Anti-Injunction Act,
Section 7421 (a-), reads in part: "... . no suit for the purpose of restraining
the assessment or collection of any tax shall be maintained in any court
by any person, whether or not such person is the person against whom
such tax was assessed." 2 8
Determination of this Act's purpose and applicability has not been
consistent and only recently has the Supreme Court decided to abandon
an uncertain pattern of interpretation of the Act in favor of looking to its
plain meaning. In Bob Jones University v. Simon,24 the Court refused to
grant an injunction to prevent the withdrawal of the university's
tax-exempt status under Section 501(c) (3). The Court reasoned that
since the injunction would restrain the collection of taxes, Section 7421(a)
was a clear 'bar to the action.
Until the early 1920's, the courts had applied literal force to the Act
246 Id. at 425.
247 59 T.C. 412 (1972), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 34 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 74-6181
(2d Cir. 1974).
2" Irr. Rnv. CODE OF 1954, § 7421(a). This portion of the Act is identical to § 10
of the Act of March 2, 1867, but for the first "any" which was added to the Revised
Statutes version in 1878.
W494 S. Ct. 2038 (1974).
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implying that only unspecified extraordinary and exceptional circumstances
would justify a pre-enforcement injunction suit.2 0 In 1922, the Supreme
Court found just such a circumstance and allowed a pre-enforcement
injunction action against tax statutes that were really penalties in
disguise. 51 However, the court was soon to note that such an interpretation
had no application to truly revenue-raising tax statutes. 252 The first major
deviation came in Miller v. Standard Nut Margarine Co.,2n3 in which the
court applied a new definition to the "extraordinary and exceptional
circumstances" test. The decision equated the test with the traditional
equitable requirements for issuance of an injunction. Thus if literally
applied, the test would require nothing more than what equity had
demanded before the Act's passage.
This interpretation was rejected in Enochs v. Williams Packing and
Navigation Co.254 involving a taxpayer-corporation that furnished its own
boats to various captains of its own choice. These captains then hired the
crews and later sold back the catch to the corporation. The government
contended that the corporation was an employer of fishermen and,
therefore, was liable for social security and unemployment taxes. The
Court held that in order to avoid the literal terms of Section 7421(a),
the taxpayer must satisfy a two-part test. The injunction would be refused
unless (1) it was clear that under no circumstances could the government
ultimately prevail and (2) equity jurisdiction was also found to exist.2n5
Since the Court felt that the government's claim was not without founda-
tion, the Court refused to enjoin the collection of the disputed taxes.
The question presented in Bob Jones University v. Simon was
whether, prior to the assessment or collection of any tax, a court may
grant an injunction prohibiting the Service from revoking a letter ruling2
declaring the petitioner qualified for tax-exempt status under Section
501 (c) (3). Bob Jones University is devoted to a religious belief that God
intended segregation of the races and, as a result, does not allow blacks as
students. In 1970 the Service announced that it would no longer allow
tax-exempt status for private schools maintaining racially discriminatory
250Bailey v. George, 259 U.S. 16, 20 (1922); Dodge v. Osborn, 240 U.S. 118, 122(1916).
251 Regal Drug Corp. v. Wardell, 260 U.S. 386 (1922); Lipke v. Lederer, 259 U.S.
557 (1922); Hill v. Wallace, 259 U.S. 44 (1922).
252 Graham v. DuPont, 262 U.S. 234 (1923).
23 284 U.S. 498 (1932).
2370 U.S. 1 (1962).
2 Id. at 7. This decision switched the focus of the "extraordinary and exceptional
circumstances" test from merely equitable considerations to a requirement that the
action called for by the Service be totally without legal merit.
2W Rev. Proc. 72-39, 1972-2 CuM. BULL. 818. Such a letter ruling leads to inclusion
in the Service's Cumulative List of tax-exempt organizations and assures potentialdonors in advance that contributions to such an organization will quality as charitabledeductions under the Code. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 170(c) (2).
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admissions policies.25 7 Upon request, the university advised the Service
that it did not admit blacks and further stated that it had no intention of
altering this policy. The Commissioner then instructed the District
Director to revoke the letter ruling affecting Bob Jones University's
Section 501(c)(3) status. The university filed suit for preliminary and
permanent injunctive relief in order to prevent the Service from revoking
the university's tax-exempt status. While the district court granted the
preliminary injunction requested, the Fourth Circuit reversed on
the ground that the university's action was barred by Section 7421(a)
as interpreted in Williams Packing.25s
The university contended that Section 7421(a) was inapplicable
because the suit was not one "for restraining the assessment or collection
of any tax.. ." but was for the purpose of compelling the Service to
refrain from withdrawing its tax-exempt status under Section 501(c) (3).
The Court, however, looked to the underlying purpose of the suit and
reasoned that since the revocation of the university's letter ruling would
result in substantial tax liability, the case fell within the scope and purpose
of Section 7421(a). That purpose is the protection of the Service's need to
assess and collect taxes as expeditiously as possible with a minimum of
pre-enforcement judicial interference, "and to require that the legal right
to the disputed funds be determined in a suit for a refund."25
9
In the companion case to Bob Jones, the Supreme Court refused to
distinguish Alexander v. "Americans United" Inc. 60 from Williams Packing
for purposes of Section 7421 (a) or to exempt that suit from the two-part
test. Americans United is a non-profit educational institution whose
purpose is to defend and maintain religious liberty through the dissemina-
tion of knowledge concerning the separation of church and State. In 1969
the Service issued a letter ruling revoking the organization's tax-exempt
status on the ground that it had violated Sections 501(c) (3) and
170(c) (2) (D) by devoting a substantial part of its activities to attempts
to influence legislation. Although revocation of Americans United's
tax-exempt status did not result in any tax liability,
261 the '1969 letter ruling
caused a decrease in its contributions because it destroyed the taxpayer's
eligibility for tax-deductible contributions under Section 170.
The court of appeals reversed the district court and held that the
taxpayer's suit was not within the scope of Section 7421(a) and rested its
decision on three factors. 262 First, the proscriptions against efforts to
257 Rev. Rul. 71-447, 1971-2 CuM. BULL. 230.
258 Bob Jones University v. Connally, 341 F. Supp. 277 (1971), rev'd, 472 F.2d 903
(1973).
259 370 U.S. at 7.
2694 S. Ct. 2053 (1974).
261 Although the corporation's § 501(c)(3) tax-exempt status was revoked, it still
qualified for tax-exempt status under § 501(c) (4).
262 "Americans United" Inc. v. Walters, 477 F.2d 1169 (1973),
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influence legislation found in Section 501 (c) (3) were unconstitutional.
Second, the suit was not brought to enjoin the assessment or collection of
the taxpayer's own taxes, and third, any restraint on the assessment
or collection of the taxes of its contributors was only a "collateral
effect" of the suit.263
The Supreme Court disagreed with the court of appeals' interpretation
stating that under the two-part test in Williams Packing, "the constitutional
nature of a taxpayer's claim, as distinct from its probability of success, is
of no consequence under the Anti-Injunction Act." 264 Since the Court felt
that the government's action was not without foundation, the suit was
barred. Furthermore, even though the suit would not affect Americans
United's own tax liability, that fact made little difference, since Section
7421(a) speaks of a suit restraining the collection or assessment of "any
tax" and "'by any person, whether or not such person is the person against
whom such tax was assessed." Thus a suit to enjoin any tax collection or
assessment of the taxpayer's contributors triggered the literal terms
of Section 7421 (a). Finally, the Court dismissed the claim that the tax
question was at best a "collateral effect" and refused to grant an injunction
requiring the reinstatement of the taxpayer's Section 501(c) (3) letter
ruling. Because the primary objective of the suit was to restore advance
assurance that donations to the corporation would qualify as charitable
deductions, the Court held that Section 7421(a) precluded relief since
the injunction would never have been requested unless it also effectively
restrained taxation of its contributors.
8.02 Anti-Injunction Act. While Section 7421(a)265 precludes a
taxpayer's suit that seeks to restrain the collection of taxes, is that section
broad enough to cover actions which challenge only the method of
collection and not the collection itself? In reversing a Pennsylvania
district court decision, the Supreme Court held in United States v.
American Friends Service Committee266 that the anti-injunction provision
posed an absolute bar to the taxpayer's claim for injunctive relief. The
controversy arose when two practicing Quakers asked their employer,
American Friends, not to withhold 51.6% 267 of their wage withholding
taxes. 26 Since both taxpayers were conscientiously opposed to participation
in war in any form, they argued that to contribute their portion of taxes
used for war or defense without bearing witness to their religious beliefs
263 Id. at 1177-79.
" 94 S. Ct. at 2058.
US Anti-Injunction Act, 26 U.S.C. § 7421 (a) (1966).
266 95 S. Ct. 13 (1974) revg 368 F. Supp. 1176 (E.D. Pa. 1973).2 67 This figure represents the taxpayers' estimate of the percentage of the federal
budget which is allocated for defense.
268 26 U.S.C. § 3042 (1966), which states in part: ... every employer making payment
of wages shall deduct and withhold upon such wages (except as otherwise provided in
this section) a tax determined in accordance with the following tables..."
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would violate their right to exercise freely their religion as guaranteed by
the first amendment. The district court agreed with the taxpayer's
contention and enjoined the United States from enforcing Section 3402 as
against American Friends with respect to the disputed portion of the tax.
Even though the government was able to show that the interest and
penalties on the tax deficiencies would not offset the cost to the Service of
collecting the disputed taxes through the levy process, the court found that
the minor additional cost and inconvenience which would result was not a
sufficient reason to overcome the taxpayers' first amendment privilege.M
In reversing this decision, the Supreme Court relied on the test
espoused in Enochs v. Williams Packing & Navigation CoY 0 There the
Court held that the assessment or collection of taxes could be enjoined
only if it was clear that the government could in no circumstances
ultimately prevail on the merits.m Since the taxpayers both conceded that
they did not fall within the Williams Packing exception, the injunctive
relief granted by the district court was plainly at odds with the objectives
of the section: "efficient and expeditious collection of taxes with 'a
minimum of preenforcement judicial interference,' and protection of the
Collector from litigation pending a refund suit."272
The dissent distinguished the taxpayers' position from that in Williams
Packing where there was an adequate legal remedy in a suit for a refund.
In the instant case, however, the withholding method itself was attacked
on the grounds that it violated their right to exercise their religion. The
relief sought did not restrain the collection of taxes but merely required
that a different method of collection be used.
8.03 Joint Return Liability. Section 6013(d)(3) provides for joint
tax liability between a husband and wife if they file joint returns.
However the Treasury has issued new regulations which will relieve an
innocent spouse from liability where there has been a significant under-
payment in the joint return by the other spouse.273 In order for the new
Treasury Regulation 1.6013-5 to apply, the spouse must show that:
(1) he or she filed a joint return with the other spouse; (2) the amount
improperly omitted exceeded 25% of the gross income stated in the
return; (3) he or she did not know or have any reason to know of
the omission, and, (4) it would be inequitable to hold the innocent spouse
liable for the deficiency attributable to the other spouse's omission.Y4 In
determining whether it would be inequitable to hold the innocent spouse
269 Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963). The Supreme Court held that only the
gravest abuse which would endanger a paramount interest of the state could allow
a limitation in this highly sensitive constitutional area.
270 370 U.S. 1 (1962).
2See text accompanying notes 249 to 264, supra.
V2 95 S. Ct. at 16.
273 T.D. 7320, 1974 INT. REv. BULL. No. 35, at 15.
274Treas. Reg. § 1.6013-5(a).
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liable, the new regulations require that all relevant facts and circumstances
must be considered, especially the degree to which the innocent spouse
has benefitted from the items omitted.275
Similar relief has also been given to protect the innocent spouse from
fraud penalties imposed for the underpayment of taxes under Section
6653. Now a spouse filing a joint return is not held liable for a fraud
penalty unless it is due to his own personal fraudulent conduct. Therefore,
an innocent spouse will not be assessed for a fraud penalty solely because
he has filed a joint return with a defrauding spouse.276
8.04 Determination of State Law. Is a federal court conclusively
bound by a state trial court adjudication of property rights where the
United States is not made a party to the action? This question was
answered in the negative by the Supreme Court in Commissioner v. Estate
of Bosch.277 However, while a federal court may not be conclusively
bound, absent a judgment by the state's highest court, proper regard must
still be given to relevant rulings of other courts of the state in order to
adequately determine the applicable state law.278 In Pirrie v. United
States,279 the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed a district court's
ruling which had disallowed a marital deduction on a bequest left to the
plaintiff. The district court read the bequest as passing a terminable
interest to the plaintiff and barred the deduction under Section 2056(b).
The court reasoned that under the Bosch rule, even though a state probate
court had construed the bequest as passing a nonterminable interest, it was
not bound by the decree absent a judgment by the state's highest court.
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals interpreted the holding in Bosch
differently. That court has held that it is only when there is persuasive
data showing that the state's highest court would decide otherwise could
a federal court disregard a state court's determination of state law. 28 0
8.05 Standing-Injury in Fact. In Tax Analysts and Advocates v.
Schultz, 281 the district court for the District of Columbia held that a
non-profit corporation organized for the purpose of promoting tax reform
had sufficient standing to challenge the validity of Revenue Ruling
72-355.28 This ruling declared that gifts of up to $3,000 to multiple
finance committees organized to receive contributions for the campaign
of one political candidate are to be treated as gifts to the individual
27 Treas. Reg. § 1.6013-5(b).
278 Treas. Reg. § 301.6653-1 ().
27 387 U.S. 456 (1967).
278 Id. at 465.
279 33 Am. Fed. Tax R12d 74-1360 (9th Cir. 1973).
280 Id. at 74-1361.
281 376 F. Supp. 889 (D. D.C. 1974), modified, 34 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 74-5731 (D.C.
Cir. 1974).
282 Rev. Rul. 72-355, 1972-2 CuM. BULL. 532, amplified by Rev. Rul. 74-199, 1974
INT. REv. BULL. No. 18, at 15.
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committees and not to the candidate. Contributors were thus allowed to
take a $3,000 exclusion under Section 2503(b) for each such donation,
even though the separate contributions would simply be funneled to the
central finance committee of the candidate. Individual donors contributing
more than $3,000 to a candidate's campaign could thereby escape the
gift tax which would have been imposed had all the contributions been
made directly to the candidate's central campaign committee.
The Service argued that Tax Analysts and Advocates lacked standing
because they failed to show any "injury in fact" or that they were within
the "zone of interest" which was sought to be protected. 283 The court
disagreed with the government's contention and stated that the two-pronged
test for standing had come under considerable criticism 284 and that the
decisions in Sierra Club v. Morton,285 and United States v. SCRAP, 286
were controlling on the issue of standing. Accordingly, the "zone of
interest" test is now only a "collateral area of inquiry.1
287
In United States v. SCRAP, the plaintiff was a group of law students
formed for the purpose of enhancing the quality of the environment for
its members and all citizens. The organization brought suit to enjoin the
enforcement of a general railroad freight increase which would have
applied to both recyclable and non-recyclable goods. SCRAP argued that
since the government had not prepared a detailed environmental impact
statement, the rate increase was therefore illegal. SCRAP's alleged injury,
for standing purposes, was that the increased use of non-recyclable goods
caused by the modified rates meant a drain on the Washington area's
natural resources as well as more refuse, all of which adversely affected
the area's national parks which SCRAP members used. The Supreme
Court accepted this line of causation between the allegedly illegal conduct
and the complained-of injury even though the plaintiffs had only a "small
stake" in the outcome of the litigation.
283
In Tax Analysts, a member of the organization alleged that Revenue
Ruling 72-355 injured him by "dismissing his ability to affect the electoral
process and to persuade elected officials to adopt policies and programs he
favors." 89 Because the ruling allowed contributions of more than $3,000
to the same candidate to escape the gift tax, the influence of persons
making large contributions would be increased while diminishing the
impact of those persons making smaller contributions. The district court
concluded that: (1) The alleged dilution of the taxpayer's ability to affect
283 Association of Data Processing Serv. Organization v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970).
See also Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159 (1970).
2S4 376 F. Supp. at 897.
285405 U.S. 727 (1972).
28 412 U.S. 669 (1973).
287 376 F. Supp. at 897.
288 412 U.S. 669 (1973).
289 376 F. Supp. at 898.
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the electoral process was a judicially recognizable wrong; (2) even though
others are similarly injured, that fact did not preclude standing; (3) the
causal link between Revenue Ruling 72-355 and the alleged injury while
strained, was more persuasive than that upheld in SCRAP, and, (4) the
alleged harm gave the taxpayer a sufficient stake in the outcome of
the case in order to qualify as a case or controversy under article III
of the United States Constitution.290
The court also dismissed the government's contention that Section
7421(a) barred the suit as a restraint on the collection of taxes. That
section had no application to the present suit because Tax Analysts was
not seeking to restrain the Commissioner from collecting taxes, but rather
was seeking to require him to collect additional taxes required by law.
The district court awarded summary judgment to Tax Analysts on
the basis of Helvering v. Hutchings,291 in which the Supreme Court held
that the beneficiary of a trust and not the trust itself is the person to whom
the gift is made and therefore for which the deduction will be allowed.
Otherwise the donor could avoid the limitation upon allowed exemptions
by creating a number of trusts for the benefit of a single beneficiary. The
district court found that the Hutchings "benefit theory" was broad enough
to cover the situation in Tax Analysts and that Revenue Ruling 72-355
was, therefore, not a lawful interpretation of Section 2503 (b).
8.06 Disclosure of Tax Information. A recent Treasury Decision 292
has clarified the circumstances under which it is permissible for tax return
preparers to disclose or use the tax return information of their customers
under Section 7216. Treasury Regulation 301.7216-2 permits disclosure
by a tax return preparer when it is done pursuant to other provisions of
the Code, to court orders, or in order to prepare state and local tax
returns. 293 In cases involving related taxpayers whose interest is not
adverse to each other and in those cases concerning disclosure to a
taxpayer's fiduciary, the tax return preparer may give return information
without the formal consent of the taxpayer.m
Treasury Regulation 301.7216-3 prohibits disclosure or use of
such information in other situations unless it is done with the formal
consent of the taxpayer. Thus, these regulations preclude a tax return
preparer from selling his customers' names and information to those
interested in forming mailing lists.
8.07 Access to Private Rulings. Can the Internal Revenue Service
290 Id. at 899.
291 312 U.S. 393, 398 (1941).
29 T.D. 7310, 1974 INT. REv. BULL. No. 17, at 15.
2 93 Treas. Reg. §§ 301.726-2(a), (c) and (h).
2
" Treas. Reg. §§ 301.7216-2(b) and (g).
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be compelled to release private letter rulings? 2 5 Generally, such disclosure
is prohibited without the Commissioner's approval, however the Treasury
has established a procedure which must be followed by the Service when
such disclosure is requested or demanded.m In Queen's-Way To Fashion,
Inc. v. United States297 the Service notified the plaintiff that its distributors
were to be considered as employees and therefore the corporation was
required to withhold taxes as well as make employer contributions.
Queen's-Way alleged discrimination and in order to prove that the Service's
national position was to treat such distributors as independent contractors,
it demanded access to all private rulings issued individuals engaged in the
business of direct selling on a commission basis. The Service contended
that the private rulings were tax returns and, therefore, Section 7213(a)(1)
restricted their disclosure. Relying on Tax Analysts and Advocates v.
Internal Revenue Service,28 the court disagreed and stated that except for
certain information furnished by the individual taxpayers, 299 the release of
the rulings is not barred by the restriction on disclosure of tax returns. In
Tax Analysts the Court held that such rulings were not returns submitted
by the taxpayers, but rather documents generated by the agency.3 °0
In a similar case, Fruehauf Corp. v. Internal Revenue Service,30' the
Service again tried to bar the access to private rulings requested by
taxpayers. The plaintiffs there alleged that the rulings were essential for
their defense of a conspiracy charge. The Service resisted disclosure under
the Freedom of Information Act 30 2 by pointing to one of its exceptions.
Section 552(b) (3) of the act provides that: "This section does not apply
to matters that are-(3) specifically exempted from disclosure by
statute." 30 3 The statute relied on by the Service was Section 6103 of the
Code which provides for the confidentiality of tax returns. However,
the district court held that the Code section had no application to the
private rulings sought by Fruehauf, and, to the extent any material
included might constitute an invasion of privacy, safeguards could be
taken to prevent its disclosure.
The Service itself is having second thoughts on the rules regarding
the availability of private tax rulings. The Service has announced a plan
295 A "private" or "letter" ruling is a written statement issued to a taxpayer by the
Office of Assistant Commissioner (Technical) in which interpretations of the tax laws
are made and applied to a specific set of facts. The function of a "letter" or "private"
ruling is to advise the taxpayer in advance of the tax treatment that he can expect
from the Service under the specified circumstances. Treas. Reg. § 601.201(a) (2).
26 Treas. Reg. § 301.9000-1.
297 33 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 74-554 (CL Cl. 1974).
298 362 F. Supp. 1298 (D.D.C. 1973).
2"99 33 Ar. Fed. Tax R.2d at 74-557.
300 362 F. Supp. at 1308.
301 369 F. Supp. 108 (E.D. Mich. 1974).
302 Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1967).
3 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (3) (1967).
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which would open up private rulings for public inspection.304 The
plan would require taxpayers to submit waivers of confidentiality when
seeking a private ruling on their special facts. Such a plan, however,
would not affect previous rulings and until the Service resolves certain
problems involving the disclosure of trade secrets, it will resist disclosure
unless forced to do otherwise.
8.08 Self-Incrimination-Attorney-Client Privilege. A taxpayer may
not invoke the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination to prevent
the production of his tax records unless they are in his possession.3 5
Furthermore, a taxpayer's privilege does not extend to his accountant's
work papers which the accountant has transferred directly to the
taxpayer's attorney.306 The issue arises as to whether this privilege extends
to a taxpayer's tax records which he has received from his accountant and
personally transfers to his attorney. This question was decided in the
affirmative in United States v. Kasmir,307 in which the Fifth Circuit stated
that since the taxpayer could have asserted his fifth amendment rights had
he held on to the papers, the subsequent transfer to his attorney did not
affect his right to raise the fifth amendment privilege.
In Kasmir, a taxpayer was visited by two special agents of the
Internal Revenue Service who were investigating the taxpayer's previous
tax returns and had asked to see the taxpayer's personal books and
records. Before complying with the request, the taxpayer called his
accountant who then advised him not to produce any of the requested
material. The next day, the accountant delivered an assortment of records
and documents to the taxpayer which had up to that time been in the
accountant's possession. The taxpayer immediately turned the documents
over to Kasmir as his attorney. Kasmir refused to comply with a subpoena
ordering him to give up the material. The district court then granted
the government's petition for enforcement on the grounds that the
records had been owned by the accountant. On appeal, Kasmir contended
that enforcement of the subpoena for the production of the records would
violate the taxpayer's self-incrimination privilege.
The Fifth Circuit agreed with Kasmir and cited Couch v. United
States318 as controlling. In Couch, the taxpayer had instructed her
accountant to deliver her financial records directly to her attorney after a
subpoena had been issued and served upon that accountant to produce the
material. The Supreme Court held that the taxpayer had no fifth
amendment privilege in the documents. Since the documents had been in
continuous possession of the accountant for over 10 years, the taxpayer
304 Press Release, INT. REv. 1409 (Aug. 9, 1974).
305 Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322 (1973).
306 United States v. White, 487 F.2d 1335 (5th Cir. 1974).
307 499 F.2d 444 (5th Cir. 1974).
308 409 U.S. 322 (1973).
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could not show any legitimate expectation of privacy. This is so since the
accountant's own need for self-protection would often require the right to
disclose the information given him. The Court in Couch held that actual
possession, rather than ownership, was determinative for fifth amendment
purposes. The Court, however, did note that actual possession was
not necessarily the sine qua non for successful assertion of the self-
incrimination privilege: ". .. situations may well arise where constructive
possession is so clear or the relinquishment of possession is so temporary
and insignificant as to leave the personal compulsions upon the accused
substantially intact .... ,,309
The court focused on two factors: first, the party in possession of the
evidence and second, in situations where the actual possessor is not
the taxpayer, the taxpayer's legitimate expectation of privacy with regard
to that evidence.310
In Kasmir, however, the Fifth Circuit reasoned that since the
taxpayer had first received the records back from his accountant his
possession then came within his "private enclave" and therefore was
covered by fifth amendment rights. In transferring these papers to his
attorney the taxpayer retained an expectation of privacy through the
attorney-client relationship. The Fifth Circuit also rebuked the govern-
ment's contention that the attorney lacked standing to assert the taxpayer's
claim of privilege, because "the realities of tax litigation require that
the attorney be allowed to press his client's claim," and here his client
could have successfuly done so.3 1 '
8.09 Failure to File Return. An attempted extension of the privilege
against self-incrimination 3 2 was reversed by the Fourth Circuit in Higgin-
botham v. United States.313 Assessments were made for federal wagering
excise taxes3 14 against the taxpayer after the three-year limitations period
had expired. The Service contended that since the taxpayer had failed to
file a return the applicable statute of limitations did not apply.31 5 The
taxpayer successfully asserted at the district court level that since he could
not file a return without incriminating himself, denial of the advantages
of the limitations period constituted an impermissible punishment.
The Fourth Circuit refused to accept the taxpayer's interpretation
and reversed the district court's decision. According to the rule set forth
309 Id. at 336.
310 499 F.2d at 449.
311 id. at 452-453.
312 Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39 (1968); Grosso v. United States, 390 U.S.
62 (1968).
313 491 F.2d 432 (4th Cir. 1974).
314 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 4401, as amended, PuB. L. No. 93-499, § 3 (Oct. 15, 1974).
315 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 6501 (c). "Exceptions.-(3) No return.-In case of fail-
ure to file a return, the tax may be assessed, or a proceeding in a court for the
collection of such tax may be begun without assessment, at any time."
[Vol. 8:2
61
et al.: Federal Income Tax Developments
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 1975
Winter, 1975] FEDERAL INCOME TAX DEVELOPMENTS: 1974
in United States v. United States Coin & Currency,318 the self-incrimination
privilege merely precludes the government from punishing the taxpayer
for his failure to file a return, however, the government is still free to
collect any taxes which are proved to be due. 17 In the instant case, the
taxpayer was not being prosecuted for either his failure to pay the occupa-
tional tax or his failure to file a return. Since the statute of limitations
makes no distinction between those owing gambling taxes and those owing
ordinary taxes, a denial to toll the statute of limitations for the taxpayer
was not an unconstitutional fetter upon the exercise of his fifth amend-
ment right. To decide otherwise would give Higginbotham an advantage
over other taxpayers who are required to file a return in order to take
advantage of the limitation period.
8.10 Notice of Disallowance of Refund Claim. Section 6532(a)(3)
provides that a taxpayer who waives the requirement that he be mailed a
notice of disallowance of a refund claim has two years from the execution
of waiver in which to sue for a refund. Otherwise, under Section
6532(a) (1), the statute of limitations begins to run when the Service
mails its formal notice of disallowance. In Miller v. United States,31 8
however, the Service sent the taxpayers a formal notice of disallowance
18 months after the Millers had executed a waiver of such notice. Since
the taxpayers waited more than two years from execution of their waiver
before filing suit, the court had to decide whether the formal notice
extended the original two-year statute of limitations period. The govern-
ment contended that the earlier date should control and based its
argument on Section 6532(a) (4). That section provides that any
reconsideration after a notice of disallowance or waiver has been mailed
or executed shall not extend the period for bringing suit.319 Since the
Service itself was unable to produce the original waiver of notice,
the Millers' reliance on the formal notice of disallowance to extend the
statute of limitations was found to be justified.
8.11 Notice of Tax Sale and Adjournment. While it is clear that the
Service must give a taxpayer notice of the date his property is to be sold
at a tax sale,3 20 both the Code and the regulations are silent as to whether
notice of adjournment and a new sale date are required. In United States
v. Conry,321 a California district court held that such notice must be
given. In that case, the date of sale was twice postponed before the sale
was finally held. Because the taxpayer failed to exercise his right of
redemption within the allotted time,322 a quitclaim deed was recorded in
316 401 U.S. 715 (1971).
317 Id. at 717.
318 500 F.2d 1007 (2d Cir. 1974).
319 Treas. Reg. § 301.6532-1 (d).
320 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 6335(b).
32133 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 74-593 (N.D. Cal. 1973).
322 INT. Rv. CODE OF 1954, § 6337(b) (1).
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favor of the United States.32 The government then 'brought an action
to acquire possession of the property still occupied by the taxpayer.
The taxpayer contended that since Section 6335(b) requires that
notice of a tax sale be given to the property owner, notice of the
adjournments must also be given. In the absence of such notice, the sale
could not operate to convey title. The court agreed with the taxpayer.
Since Section 6335(b) demonstrated congressional concern to protect the
rights and interest of the property owner through the notice requirement,
the grant of authority to adjourn, under Section 6335(e) (2) (F), must be
read as "subject to an implied restriction that any regulations concerning
the adjournment of tax sales must provide -for reasonable notice of
adjournment to the property owner. ' ' 324 Treasury Regulation 301.6335-1
(c) (2) 32 fails in this respect, and therefore, the court held that it was
deficient in that it did not comply with the statutory grant of authority.
Nevertheless, the government still maintained that the court had no
jurisdiction over the case because Section 7421 (a) disallows a suit brought
for the purpose of restraining the assessment or collection of any tax.
Since a court action voiding the tax sale would constitute such a restraint
of collection or assessment of taxes, the government argued that the court
must dismiss the suit as prohibited by Section 7421 (a). The court did not
accept this argument, reasoning that a taxpayer must have the right to
challenge the government's failure to comply with the notice requirement.
Several cases have allowed such challenges to the validity of title to
property acquired from the government by third-party purchasers.
326
However, the government and Section 7421 (a) were not directly involved
because the government's collection of taxes, already realized through the
tax sale, was not disturbed. In Conry, however, the taxpayer's only
recourse would have been to permit the government to sell the property
and then seek to reacquire it from the subsequent purchaser. Such a
prospect would cast a serious cloud over the title of any property conveyed
by the government in this way, since an innocent third-party purchaser
might eventually be required to reconvey title back to the taxpayer. To
preclude just such a situation the court held that, where "the suit is
initiated by the government and the taxpayer seeks to raise the notice
issue simply as a defense to the government's action, Section 7421 should
not be read to bar assertion of that defense.
' ' 32
8.12 Notice of Tax Lien. In United States v. Peoples Bank of
323 Irr. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 6335(e) (1). Since there were no bids, the property
passed to the United States for the minimum price.
324 33 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d at 74-594.
32 Treas. Reg. § 301.6335-1 (c) (2).
326 Johnson v. Gartlan, 470 F.2d 1104 (4th Cir. 1973); Margiotta v. Dist. Director,
214 F.2d 518 (2d Cir. 1954); Bartell v. Riddell, 202 F. Supp. 70 (S.D. Cal. 1962).
M 33 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d at 74-594.
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Staflord, 8 an Internal Revenue Service agent served the bank with notice
of levy 3 29 upon a taxpayer's bank account the day after he had telephoned
the bank inquiring as to the existence of the account. The bank, suspecting
that a tax lien 33° would be placed upon the taxpayer's account, set off a
loan of the taxpayer against his account immediately after receiving the
telephone call. The Service brought suit to compel the bank to pay over
the amount which it had charged against the taxpayer's account. The
Service contended that the telephone call to the bank was sufficient notice
under Section 6323(f) to impose the tax lien upon the account. In the
resulting litigation, the court dismissed the government's suit, holding that
something more than a telephone call was needed to file notice of a tax
lien with a holder of a security interest in the subject property.33
8.13 Deficiency Notice-Jeopardy Assessment. The Sixth Circuit
held in Rambo v. United States,3 3 2 that the Internal Revenue Service must
send a taxpayer a deficiency notice before assessing and collecting any tax
due as part of a short-year jeopardy assessment under Section 6851. This
section provides for the termination of the taxpayer's tax period, and
authorizes the Secretary to demand payment of the tax due for the short
year when the possibility exists that the taxpayer may do something to
render the collection of the tax ineffectual. Both the Second and the
Seventh Circuits agree that notice is not needed.333 In Rambo, the taxpayer
was found with a supply of drugs whereupon the Service, pursuant to
Section 6851, terminated his tax year and determined the amount of
income tax due for the short tax period. Upon assessment of the tax, the
Service filed a tax lien3 3 4 and served notices of levy upon the taxpayer's
bank and property. Rambo contended that since the Service had failed
to send him a deficiency notice within 60 days after the jeopardy
assessment, he was denied the procedural safeguards mandated under the
law.328 The Sixth Circuit agreed with the district court which had ordered
the Internal Revenue Service to return all of the seized property and to
remove its liens from Rambo's property.33 6
The Service contended that the government's assessment authority
328 375 F. Supp. 342 (D. Va. 1974).
s29 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 6323(a)-(f).
330 INT. Rzv. CODE OF 1954, § 6321.
331 375 F. Supp. at 344.
3M 492 F.2d 1060 (6th Cir. 1974); petition for cert. filed 43 U.S.L.W. 3017 (U.SL
July 10, 1974).
333 Laing v. United States, 496 F.2d 853 (2d Cir. 1974); Williamson v. United States,
31 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 800 (7th Cir. 1971).
334 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 6321, §6323 (a)-(f).
335 Such a deficiency notice is a jurisdictional prerequisite to the right to petition the
Tax Court for a redetermination of the tax. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 6213(a).
Otherwise, the taxpayer must pay the full tax and then bring suit in a federal district
court for a refund. Flora v. United States, 362 U.S. 63 (1958).
336 Rambo v. United States, 353 F, Supp. 1021 (W.D. Ky. 1972).
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under Section 6851 came from the general assessment power under
Section 6201 which does not require notice of deficiency. The Sixth
Circuit disagreed with this contention, stating that the statutory authority
for assessing the short-year tax is conferred 'by Section 6861. This section
immediately follows Section 6851 and appears in the Code under the
heading "Jeopardy Assessment. ' 337 Section 6861(b) requires that such
notice of deficiency be made within 60 days after the making of the
assessment, and if the Service fails to issue the notice, then pursuant to
Section 6213(a), the tax collection may be enjoined.
Recently, however, the Second Circuit in Laing v. United States,338
rejected the Sixth Circuit's interpretation, and reaffirmed its prior position
denying the deficiency notice requirement in Section 685-1 situations.33 9 In
Irving v. Gray,3 40 the Second Circuit had agreed with the Seventh Circuit
which held that the deficiency notice requirement cannot be read into
Section 6851 because the assessment is not a deficiency as defined
under Section 6211. 341 Since a deficiency is defined as the amount by
which the tax imposed exceeds that shown on the tax return342 when no
return has been filed, a deficiency could not, therefore, be determined. The
Sixth Circuit disagreed with this distinction and concluded that the
short-year tax assessment was in fact a deficiency.343 The court noted
that the regulations provide that where no return is filed or if a return
is filed which lists no tax, "the deficiency is the amount of tax imposed
by Subtitle A, Chapter 11, or Chapter 12." 344 Therefore, the tax imposed
by the Service became a deficiency when Rambo refused to pay the
imposed tax or file a return. 345
Both the government in Rambo and the taxpayer in Laing have
sought Supreme Court review to clarify this issue. Unless this conflict
is resolved by the Supreme Court the procedural safeguards in the
jeopardy assessment area will be greater in the Sixth Circuit than in
either the Second or Seventh Circuits.
8.14 Head of Household. The head of a household, under Section
2(b)(1)(B), must pay over 50% of the household expenses. In an opinion
which sought out substance over form, the Tax Court ruled, in Estate of
Jean Foster Fleming,346 that there could be a household within a household.
337 492 F.2d at 1062.
338496 F.2d 853 (2d Cir. 1974).
339 Irving v. Gray, 479 F.2d 20 (2d Cir. 1973).
340 Id. at 24.
4 31 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 73-800.
342 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 6211 (a).
343 492 F.2d at 1064.
344 Treas. Reg. § 301.6211-1(a).
345 492 F.2d at 1064.
34 43 P-H TAx CT. MEM. 74437 (May 29, 1974),
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Mrs. Fleming, her unmarried daughter, her married daughter and
son-in-law built their own house. One floor of the house was for the
exclusive use of Mrs. Fleming and her unmarried daughter, another floor
was exclusively for married daughter's family, and the remainder was
used by all. Mrs. Fleming paid over 50% of the expenses related to the
floor used by herself and her daughter, but less than 50% of the entire
household expenses. The court rejected the "one house, therefore one
household" argument used by the Commissioner. The floor for the
exclusive use of Mrs. Fleming and her daughter operated independently
from the remainder of the house in many matters, thereby qualifying
as a separate household for tax purposes.
8.15 Bankruptcy-Income Tax Refund. Section 70(a)(5) of the
Bankruptcy Act 347 vests title in the trustee of the estate of a bankrupt to
all alienable property which the bankrupt may possess at the time he files
his petition. Because the thrust of Section 70(a) (5) is to secure for the
creditors everything of value that the bankrupt owns, the Supreme Court
has given the term "property" a broad definition. 34 This interpretation
is tempered, however, by the fact that the bankrupt is then free to make
a fresh start, unencumbered by his past debts.349
In Kokszka v. Belord,350 the petitioner filed a voluntary petition
in bankruptcy out of which the sole asset claimed by the trustee in
bankruptcy was an income tax refund check for $250.00. The Referee
in Bankruptcy directed the petitioner to turn the check over to the
trustee upon receipt. The petitioner complied with the order but filed
a petition for review contending that the tax refund was not "property"
under Section 70(a) (5).
The term "property" has never been given a precise or universal
definition. 351 In Lines v. Frederick,352 the Supreme Court held that
vacation pay which had accrued prior to the time of filing for bankruptcy
was not "property" within the meaning of Section 70(a) (5). The Court
reasoned that vacation pay was a substitute for wages and that to deprive
the petitioner of this income would hamper his ability to make a fresh
start. Wages pose "distinct problems in our economic system," since they
provide the basic means for the economic survival of the debtor, and
therefore should not be included within Section 70(a) (5) property. 53
Relying on the Lines decision, the petitioner in Kokoszka contended
that since his tax refund was solely derived from wages it should also be
347 Bankruptcy Act § 70(a) (5), 11 U.S.C. § 110(a) (5) (1952).
34s Segal v. Rochelle, 382 U.S. 375, 379 (1965).
349 Id. at 380. See also Burlingham v. Crouse, 228 U.S. 459, 473 (1913).
350 94 S. Ct. 2431 (1974).
351 Id. at 2433.
s52 400 U.S. 18,20 (1970).
353 Id.
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exempt from Section 70(a) (5). The Supreme Court disagreed with
petitioner's contention stating that while both the vacation pay and
petitioner's tax refund were wage based, the vacation pay was substituted
for future weekly income which would be necessary for the debtor's basic
support.354 . The tax refund, on the other hand, was sufficiently rooted in
the bankrupt's past and therefore related to those debts which brought
on the bankruptcy. To allow the refund to pass to the trustee would not
hinder a fresh start -for the petitioner but would supply more incentive
to begin anew.3
In the alternative, the petitioner argued that even if the tax refund
was Section 70(a) (5) property, 75% of the refund should still be exempt
under the provisions of the Consumer Credit Protection Act.
356 The Act
provides that 25% of a person's aggregate disposable earnings for any pay
period may -be subject to garnishment. The petitioner contended that his
tax refund, being solely derived from wages, was "disposable earnings"
and that the vesting of the same in the trustee was a "garnishment" under
Section 1672(a) (b) and (c). The Court, however, held that the Consumer
Credit Protection Act must be read in light of and in connection with the
Bankruptcy Act. Since the Consumer Credit Protection Act was passed
in. part to prevent personal bankruptcies, if despite its protection a
bankruptcy did occur, any protection or remedy must then fall within
the scope of the Bankruptcy Act.
3 57
9.00 Inventory
9.01 Unit Livestock Price Method. Treasury Regulations 1.471-6(e)
authorizes the use of a "unit livestock price method" when valuing the
inventories of livestock raisers and other farmers. The regulation provides
that if animals purchased are not mature at the time of purchase, the
cost must be increased at the end of each tax year in accordance with
established unit prices. However, no increase has to be made on animals
purchased in the last half of the year.358
In Auburn Packing Co.,359 the Tax Court determined the unit-
livestock price method of valuing inventory was not limited to taxpayers
who breed herds but could also be used for cattle held for fattening and
slaughter. Auburn Packing Co. purchased feeder cattle, fed them grain
feed for 60 to 120 days and then either sold or transferred them to their
slaughter plant. The Tax Court held the Service could not upset Auburn
Packing's consistent use of the unit-pricing method. The Service was
&m 94 S. Ct. at 2435.
$55 382 U.S. at 380.
356 Consumer Credit Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1673 (1970).
357 94 S. Ct. at 2436.
358 Treas. Reg. § 1.471-6(g).
359 60 T.C. 794 (1973).
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found to have no power to make taxpayer switch to the lower of cost
or market inventory -valuation method.
By way of Revenue Ruling 74-505,36 0 the Service has agreed to follow
the taxpayer's victory in Auburn Packing. However, the Service stated
that the decision in the Tax Court was correct only because the inventory
method in dispute was one authorized by the regulations and had
been consistently used by the taxpayer. But if the method has not been
used consistently, the Service has the authority under Section 446 to
deny the use of the unit-price method.
9.02 LIFO Inventory Valuation. The year 1974 saw a tax develop-
ment which is not attributable to any court decision, statutory enactment
or Internal Revenue Service pronouncement. This is the unprecedented
number of firms that have converted to the LIFO method of accounting
for inventory. A review of the financial pages at times makes it appear
that the Commissioner is virtually being inundated by Forms 970 (the
form which must accompany the tax return for the year in which LIFO
is first used). The recent changes will probably result in future litigation
and official pronouncements, but currently the phenomenon has not had
such an effect. In this section we wish to briefly review LIFO, the reasons
for its adoption and why we haven't seen greater adoption in the past.
Section 471 requires the use of inventories whenever they are
necessary to determine income, stating only that the method employed
must as nearly as possible conform with the best practice in the trade or
business and clearly reflect income. The inventory is costed either under
specific identification or using a flow assumption. Keep in mind that
regardless of the method employed the physical quantity is the same. The
most popular flow assumption is FIFO, which stands for first-in, first-out.
FIFO assumes that the ending inventory is comprised of the items which
were most recently acquired. LIFO, which is specifically allowed by
Section 472, is an abbreviation of last-in, first-out. Under the latter flow
assumption, the ending inventory is considered to consist of items with
the earliest costs of the period.
To illustrate, assume a company does not have a beginning inventory
and during 1974 makes the following purchases:
DATE QUANTITY UNIT PRICE TOTAL COST
January ............ 2,000 $10.00 $ 20,000
March ... ......... 8,000 12.00 96,000
May ............... 7,000 15.00 105,000
August ............ 5,000 16.00 80,000
October ............ 4,000 18.00 72,000
December ... ....... 4,000 20.00 80,000
$453,000
30 Rev. Rul. 74-505, 1974 INT. RLV. BULL. No. 42, at 10.
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If the units on hand at year's end are 6,000, the value of such an ending
inventory under FIFO would be $116,000 calculated as follows: 4,000
units at $20.00 each from the December purchase ($80,000) and 2,000
units at $18.00 from the October purchase ($36,000). The same quantity
under a LIFO flow assumption would result in an ending inventory value
of $68,000 consisting of 2,000 units at the January purchase cost of
$10.00 each ($20,000) and 4,000 units with the March cost of $12.00
per unit ($48,000). The $48,000 smaller ending LIFO inventory
($116,000 minus $68,000) will result in a net income before taxes which
is also $48,000 lower, and assuming a 50% tax rate, $24,000 less taxes
would be currently payable.
This last statement can be proven by assuming that our fictitious
company has annual "Sales" of $800,000 and "Expenses" other than
"Cost of Goods Sold" at $400,000:
LIFO FIFO
Sales ............... $800,000 $800,000
Cost of Goods Sold:
Purchases ..... .$453,000 $453,000
Less Ending
Inventory . . . 68,000 385,000 116,000 337,000
Gross Profit ...... $415,000 $463,000
Expenses ....... 400,000 400,000
Net Income
Before Tax ..... 15,000 63,000
Income Taxes (50%) . 7,500 31,500
Net Income ...... $ 7,500 $ 31,500
As the above illustrates, the "Net Income" before taxes and after taxes
would be lower under LIFO by $48,000 ($63,000 v. $15,000) and
$24,000 ($3-1,500 v. $7,500) respectively.
As the illustrations should make perfectly clear, LIFO will result in
a lower dollar value of ending inventory whenever the company is
experiencing a period of inflation. The minimized inventory causes an
increase in cost of -goods sold with a resulting reduction in net income
and current tax liability. If prices are declining rather than increasing the
exact opposite result will occur. LIFO only has a tax benefit during
inflationary periods and the tax effect is a delaying of the tax payment
rather than an avoidance. Ignoring the possibility of different tax rates,
over a complete cycle of proceeding from zero inventory back to zero
inventory, the total taxable income for the period would be the same
under either LIFO or FIFO. To illustrate, assume that the company
in our example for 1975 experiences "Sales" of $900,000, has other
"Expenses" of $400,000 and purchases $370,000 of merchandise during
the period, but has a zero ending inventory:
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LIFO FIFO
Sales ...... ... $900,000 $900,000
Cost of Goods Sold:
Beginning Inventory $ 68,000 $116,000
Purchases ....... 370,000 438,000 370,000 486,000
Gross Profit ...... $462,000 $414,000
Expenses ....... 400,000 400,000
Net Income
Before Tax ..... $ 62,000 $ 14,000
Income Taxes (50%) . 31,000 7,000
Net Income ...... $ 31,000 $ 7,000
The LIFO "Net Income Before Tax" for the two years would total
$77,000 ($15,000 plus $62,000), "Net Income" would be $38,500
($31,000 plus $7,500). The aggregate "Net Income" before and after tax
under the FIFO method would likewise amount to $77,000 ($63,000
plus $14,000) and $38,500 ($31,500 plus $7,000) respectively.
Thus far we have seen that the use of LIFO during periods of rising
prices will result in a reduction of current tax liability, therefore allowing
the company to hold on to the related tax dollars longer. Since inflation
has in differing degrees been a fact of economic life for many years, why
haven't firms been using LIFO throughout these inflation years? The
reason is that Section 472 which specifically allows use of the method also
requires that when it is used -for tax purposes it must also be used in the
preparation of reports to shareholders and reports used for credit
purposes, in other words financial statements. Since the tax return data
also appears on the financial statements, the shareholders will be shown
a net income under LIFO that is lower than could have been shown under
FIFO (assuming constantly increasing costs). Using the figures of the
1974 comparative income statements and assuming outstanding stock is
1,000 shares, under LIFO the $7,500 net income would result in an
earnings per share (EPS) of 75 cents, and under FIFO, a net income
of $31,500 would result in an EPS of $3.15. Considering the strong
correlation between EPS and the market price of a share, it is
understandable why the managers of a company were reluctant to change.
Another reason often cited for not using LIFO for financial statement
presentation is that it is theoretically unsound. Actually there is a
theoretical basis for the LIFO method, but let us briefly consider the basis
of FIFO. It is argued that FIFO results in an inventory value which
nearly reflects current costs because the inventory is recorded at its most
recent prices and the cost flow assumption more closely approximates the
physical flow of goods. LIFO considers measurement of income more
important than the valuation of assets. Since items sold are sold at the
current selling prices which reflect inflationary increases, the cost of
the goods sold that is charged against these revenues should also reflect
Winter, 1975]
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these. inflationary increases by recording inventory at the oldest costs.
LIFO in effect changes current operations with. the more recent inflated
costs. This analysis is in no way a complete discussion of the theoretical
principles underlying the methods but is merely intended to illustrate from
an accounting standpoint that either method can be .rationalized when the
major factor in deciding to change is the potential tax benefit.
We know why the changes are being made, but why now? It is a
combination of factors, none of which can be singled out as the culprit.
Certainly high on any list of factors would be that inflation became
sufficiently severe to outweigh the disadvantages of making the change.
Another contributing factor is that economic conditions have been such
that inventories in many cases are at low levels which can soften the
impact of the change on net income. Also, since many companies have
already made the change, the psychological impact on shareholders may
not be as pronounced as it would have been a few years ago. This writer
predicts that unless there is a drastic curtailment in inflationary pressures,
the trend to convert to LIFO will continue. Due to the complicated
valuation and adjustments required by the change, the area is potentially
a source of much future litigation.
10.00 Pension Reform Act
On Labor Day, 1974, President Ford signed a pension reform bill
into law. The Act, officially titled The Employee Retirement Income
Security Act of 1974,361 has been described as the most significant change
in government regulation of private pension plans in the last 30 years. As
the title of the act implies, the legislation is intended to afford pension plan
members a greater degree of security than they have previously enjoyed.
In signing the bill the President described it as "a landmark measure that
may finally give the American worker solid protection in his pension
plan." Our chief executive's comment contained a well-placed may,
because whether or not the employee receives "solid protection" is
dependent on many factors. One thing that can be said with certainty
is that in attempting to protect the worker the Act has several significant
tax effects. The most obvious of these is that the minimum vesting and
participation standards must be met if the plan is to be a qualified plan
under the Internal Revenue Code.
10.01 Participation Requirements. The general rule is that an
employee must be allowed to participate in the plan after completing one
year of service, but this can be extended to three years where the plan
provides for 100% vesting upon commencing participation. A year. of
service represents a 12-month period, typically beginning with the date
of commencing employment, in which the employee completes at least
1,000 hours of service. The Secretary of Labor can be expected to issue
regulations defining hour of service and year of service to be used in
3d Pub'. L. No. 93-406 (Sept. 2, 1974).
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unusual situations and by seasonal or special industries. Exceptions
to the general participation rule are that employees may be excluded
from the plan until they reach age 25. Those who begin employment
within five years of the normal retirement age set by the plan may
be completely excluded. Exempt educational organizations with plans
that provide for 100% vesting after one year of service may have a
minimum participation age of 30.362
Where a plan sets 25 or less as the age of eligibility, service with the
employer prior to becoming eligible is not completely lost. The Act
requires that all of the years of service with the employer after attaining
age 22 be counted in determining the employee's vested rights in the
plan.363 To illustrate, assume that Able, Baker and Carr begin full-time
employment with a firm at ages 20, 22 and 24 respectively, and that the
firm's covered pension plan requires an employee to attain the age of 25
to be eligible to participate in the plan. After 10 years of continuous
full-time service both Baker and Carr would have 10 years of service
while Able would only have eight, the difference being the two years of
service he performed prior to becoming 22. A plan by its provisions could
provide that the age for counting service years be less than 22.
In counting years of service all employers who contribute to a
multi-employer plan would be considered as one employer, whether it be
a plan covered by a collective bargaining agreement, one by a controlled
group of corporations (within the meaning of Internal Revenue Code
Section 1563) or one by unincorporated businesses under common
control. Where a company is taken over by another all of the service with
the prior company will count if the successor continues the predecessor's
plan. If the plan is not continued, the amount of service credit will be
calculated under regulations to be issued by the Secretary of the Treasury.
The effect of an employee leaving and later being rehired or working
part-time then returning to full-time employment depends on the vesting
and participation provisions of the plan and whether the break constitutes
a one-year break in service. A one-year break in service means a 12-month
period designated by the plan in which the employee completed 500 or
less hours of service. If the plan requires three years of service or
attainment of age 25 prior to becoming eligible, all service prior to the
one-year break in service which occurred before the employee became
eligible to participate can be ignored. When an employee leaves prior to
attaining any vested benefits as to his employer's contributions and is later
rehired, if the amount of his years of service prior to the break in service,
but subsequent to a previous break, is less than or equal to the aggregate
of the consecutive one-year breaks, they also may be ignored. 36 Assume
s62 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 410(a).
36 Id. § 411 (a) (4).
3641d. § 410(a) (5),
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that Ralph works four years under a plan whose provisions meet the
minimum requirements of the Act, leaves without any vested benefits
derived from his employer's contributions and is rehired five years later.
All of his prior service could be ignored in determining his participation,
vesting and benefits. A plan may also provide that the employee work one
year before applicable years of prior service be counted.
36 5
Once an employee has satisfied the service and/or age requirements,
he must become a participant on the earlier of the first day of the plan
year beginning after the date he satisfies the requirements or the day
six months after the date of satisfying the requirements. The Act provides
that this participation provision must be specifically provided for in the
trust if it is to maintain or acquire qualified status.
3 66
The Act tends to closely follow the rules of the prior law as to
antidiscrimination. In addition to the foregoing requirements, a trust
and/or annuity plan will be qualified only if it
a. benefits either 70% or more of all employees, or 80% of all
eligible employees, if at least 70% of the employees are eligible,
and
b. the plan is found by the Secretary of the Treasury not to
discriminate in favor of officers, shareholders or highly compen-
sated employees.36 7
Prior law included supervisory employees in its enumeration of those
people in whose favor the plan could not discriminate. This omission is
probably of little significance in that supervisory personnel will most likely
be included in the term "highly compensated employees."
The Act remedies a problem that occasionally existed under the prior
law. The problem would arise where the company's union employees
would reject pension benefits in favor of increased wages, and the
Internal Revenue Service would insist on considering the voluntarily
excluded union personnel in determining whether a plan covering the
non-union employees met the percentage and nondiscrimination tests. The
Act amends prior law, providing that for purpose of these tests employees
whose retirement benefits are determined by a collective bargaining
agreement, and nonresident alien employees without earned income from
sources within the United States, may be excluded.
368
10.02 Vesting Requirements. The Act establishes minimum vesting
standards which must be followed by a qualified plan. This is accomplished
by adding Section 411 to the Internal Revenue Code. The most obvious
requirement is that the plan must provide that the accrued benefits derived
365 Id. § 410(a) (5) (C).
366 Id. § 410(a) (4).
367 Id. § 410(b) (1).
368 Id. § 410(b) (2).
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from the employee's contributions be completely vested.369 The intent of
this provision is clearly stated in the House Floor Explanation, "to grant
covered employees nonforfeitable rights with respect to their own contri-
butions." The section as enacted refers to "accrued benefits derived from
his own contributions," rather than merely his "own contributions" as used
in the committee report. This reference to accrued benefits may confuse
some into believing they have a right in more than merely their contribu-
tions, prior to the time of complete vesting. I believe the extent of accrued
benefits attributable to the employee's contributions will depend on the
vesting provisions of the plan and in most cases this will mean that
the employee's accrued benefits for at least the first five years of employ-
ment will be limited to his contributions. The determination of the definite
effect of the wording will have to await issuance of a Treasury Regulation.
The new section also requires that the employee's normal retirement
benefits vest once he has reached normal retirement age.3 70 The plan must
provide for the eventual complete vesting of all accrued benefits arising
from the employer's contributions. The Act provides a choice of three
methods that can be used to accomplish the eventual complete vesting.3 7
The simplest procedure that will satisfy the requirement is to have 100%
vesting after 10 years of service. A second possibility is a graduated
system of vesting whereby the employee after five years of service has a
vested right in at least 25% of the accrued benefits derived from his
employer's contributions. The vested percentage must then increase by five
percentage points for each of the sixth through tenth years of service (a
minimum of 50% vested at the end of the tenth year of service) and 10
percentage points for each of the l1th through 15th years of service,
attaining 100% vesting after the 15th year of service. The third method
requires that the employee with at least five years of service have a vested
right in at least 50% of the accrued benefits derived from the employer's
contribution when the sum of his age and his total years of service equal
45. For each succeeding year the required minimum percentage of vesting
must increase by 10 percentage points until the employee has a completely
vested interest in the accrued benefits. Notwithstanding the provisions of
this last alternative, an employee after 10 years of service must have a
right to at least 50% of his accrued benefits derived from his employer's
contributions and this vested percentage must increase by at least 10
percentage points for each additional year of service.
To illustrate the last option, assume that Carr, Dowd, and Estes begin
full-time employment with a firm at ages 24, 31 and 35 respectively. After
five years of continuous service, Carr would be 29 years old and have
an age/service total of 34, Dowd would be 36 years old and have an
age/service total of 41, while Estes would be 40, and have an age/service
369 Id. § 411 (a) (1).
s'tO Id. § 411 (a).
371 Id. § 411 (a) (2).
Winter, 1975]
74
Akron Law Review, Vol. 8 [1975], Iss. 2, Art. 2
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol8/iss2/2
AKRON LAw Rvmw
combination of 45. At this point neither Carr nor Dowd need have any
vested rights as to the accrued benefits derived from the employer's
contribution, but Estes must have a 50% vested right as to these accrued
benefits. Estes' percentage of vested right must increase by at least 10
percentage points for each of the next five years becoming completely
vested after 10 years of service and at an age of 45. After another five
years of continuous service, Carr would be 34 and have an age/service
total of 44; Dowd would be 41 with an age/ service total of 51. Dowd at
this time must have at least an 80% vested interest in the accrued benefits
derived from his employer's contribution, calculated as follows: at age.38
Dowd would have attained an age/service total of 45 having completed
seven years of service, therefore qualifying for a 50% vested interest in
the accrued benefits derived from the employer's contribution, for each
of the next three years of service his percentage of vested rights would
increase by 10 percentage points, totaling 80% at the end of the 10th year
of service. Even though Carr would not currently have an age/service
total of 45 he would have a vested right to 50% of the accrued benefits
derived from the employer's contribution because he has completed 10
years of service. For each succeeding year of service his share in such
benefits would increase by 10 percentage points until completion of his
15th year of service, at which time his rights to accrued benefits would be
completely vested, even though Carr would only be 39 years old.
Each of the methods that can be used to provide complete vesting
are minimum standards. If the 10-year 100% vesting method is used, the
only requirement is that the employee's rights to accrued benefits be 100%
vested after 10 years' service, he need not have any right to the accrued
benefits derived from the employer's contribution prior to that time.
Similarly under the 15-year graduated vesting method the employee's
rights in the accrued benefits derived from the employer's contribution
may be zero until five years of service are completed. Under the "Rule of
45," the vested rights related to the employer's contribution can also be
nonexistent until the magic age/service total is reached, with the exception
of the required provision for 50% vesting after 10 years and the related
increments in such vested rights through the 15th year of service.
The plan must present a vesting schedule which meets the minimum
standards of one of three statutory options for accomplishing eventual
complete vesting.3 72 An employer may change the vesting schedule,
provided that the new schedule does not reduce the nonforfeitable
percentage of the accrued benefit derived from employer contribution of
any participant in the plan as compared to such nonforfeitable percentage
that would have been computed under the original vesting schedule.
373
Any participant in the plan who has at least five years of service may,
M2 Id. § 411 (a).
373 Id. § 411 (a) (10) (A).
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within a reasonable period of time after the adoption of the new vesting
schedule, elect to have his nonforfeitable percentage computed under
the schedule existing prior to the change.3 74
An exception to the vesting requirements is provided for so-called
"class year plans." The vesting requirements are considered met if the
plan provides that the employee's right to the employer's contribution or
benefits derived from such contribution are completely vested not later
than the end of the fifth plan year following the plan year for which the
contribution was made.3 75 "The term class year plan means a profit-sharing,
stock bonus, or money purchase plan which provides for the separate
nonforfeitability of employees' rights to or derived from the contributions
for each plan year."3 76 Under this provision a profit-sharing plan will meet
the vesting requirements if it provides that the contribution for each
employee for a particular plan year is 100% vested within five years. To
illustrate, if the employee's rights to an employer's contribution to a
profit-sharing plan for calendar (or fiscal) year 1975 is completely vested
by the end of calendar (or fiscal) year 1980 the vesting requirements are
met. The requirements will be met whether the employee's rights vest at
the rate of 20% per year, 25% per year beginning in the second
year, vests 100% at the end of the fifth year or any other combination
so long as their right to the employer's contribution is completely vested
by the end of the fifth year.
The term nonforfeitable benefits is somewhat a misnomer, at least as
applied to the accrued benefits derived -from the employer's contribution.
A plan may of course provide that benefits derived from the employer's
contribution cease upon the death of the participant, even though the
former employee did not receive substantial benefits as a result of his
untimely death.377 Death, though, cannot result in a forfeiture of qualified
joint and survivor annuities provided by the plan.378 A retiree's benefits
may also be suspended during the period that he is reemployed by the
employer who maintains the plan under which he was receiving benefits. If
the plan is a multi-employer plan, his return as an employee to the same
industry, trade or craft which the plan covers will also result in
suspension of benefits. The Secretary of Labor can be expected to issue
regulations (including a definition of the term "employed") for the
implementation of this provision.3 79
Certain retroactive plan amendments with respect to funding made
within two and one-half months of the close of the plan year (two years
for multi-employer plans), which do not result in a reduction of the
374 Id. § 411 (a) (10) (B).
Id. § 411(d) (4).
376 Id.
3 tId. § 411 (a) (3) (A).
378 Id. § 401(a) (11).
37ld. § 411 (a) (3) (B).
Wmter, 1975]
76
Akron Law Review, Vol. 8 [1975], Iss. 2, Art. 2
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol8/iss2/2
AKRoN LAw REvIEW
employee's accrued benefits determined on the first day of the plan year
to which the amendment applies, are not to be considered a forfeiture. An
amendment which results in a reduction of the accrued benefits of
participants may take effect if the plan administrator obtains the timely
agreement of the Secretary of Labor that the result of not allowing the
amendment would result in a substantial business hardship, and that waiver
of funding requirements would not be an adequate remedy.
380 The
Secretary of Labor in ruling on a proposed retroactive amendment that
will adversely affect participants' accrued benefits must consider (though
other factors may also be considered) whether the employer is operating
at an economic loss, the relative unemployment, underemployment, sales
and profits in the particular industry and the likelihood that the plan will
be discontinued if the amendment is not granted.
381
It is acceptable for a plan to provide that an employee who does not
have a nonforfeitable right to at least 50% of the accrued 'benefits derived
from his employer's contribution, to forfeit such benefits upon the with-
drawal of his (the employee's) mandatory contributions. A plan may not
contain such forfeiture provision unless it also provides for the restoration
of the forfeited benefits upon the repayment by the employee of the full
amount withdrawn (plus interest in the case of a defined benefit plan). The
plan may restrict the repayment provision by requiring the employee to
make such repayment before he has a one-year break in service.
38s
A possible exception to the above is that accrued benefits derived
from employer contributions which accrued prior to the enactment of
the Employee Retirement Income Act of 1974 may be forfeited because
of withdrawal by the employee of mandatory contributions (or benefits
derived therefrom) which he made prior to enactment, providing the
amount thus forfeited is proportional to the amount withdrawn.
383
Each full-time year of employment for the employer which the
employee performed after attaining the age of 22 is considered in
determining his nonforfeitable percentage of vested rights to benefits
derived from employer contributions. Years of service prior to age 22
must 'be considered where the plan provides a "Rule of 45" vesting
schedule and the employee was a participant prior to his 22nd birthday.
384
To illustrate we will again assume that Able begins employment with a
firm which has a qualified pension plan. If the plan provides that the
minimum age of participation is 25 (the maximum acceptable age), at
age 30, after 10 years of continuous full-time service, Able would have
eight years of service (years of employment since age 22) for purposes
Ss8 Id. § 411(a) (3) (C), § 412(c) (8) a (d) (1).
sn Id. § 412(d) (2).
382 Id. §411 (a) (3) (D).
383 Id.
34 Id. §411 (a) (4).
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of determining his vested rights to benefits derived from employer
contributions, regardless of the vesting schedule provided in the plan. The
results would have been the same had the plan provided for a minimum
participation age of 22. But had the plan provided that an employee
become a participant after one year of service regardless of age the results
could have been different. Where the plan's vesting schedule was of either
the 10- or 15-year vesting type, Able would again have eight years of
service for purposes of the calculation. If the plan used the "Rule of 45"
to meet the minimum vesting requirements, Able would have nine years of
service for purposes of determining his vested rights to accrued benefits
derived from his employer's contributions, because under the "Rule of
45" the plan may not disregard any year of service during which the
employee was a participant. After completing one year of employment
Able would have become a participant, this would have occurred when
he was 21, therefore at age 30 Able would have been a participant
in the plan for nine years.
There are further exceptions to the general rule that all years of
service with the employer after the employee reaches age 22 are counted
in determining his vested rights. Years for which the employee declined
to make a mandatory contribution and years for which the employer did
not maintain the plan (or a predecessor plan) need not be considered.3
It also might be possible to ignore certain years of service which occurred
prior to breaks in service if they fit within the statutory provisions; even
if the service prior to the break is to be considered it need not be taken
into account until the returning employee has completed an additional
year of service.386 When an employee does not complete three years of
service after 1970, years of service previously completed may be ignored.
Years lost due to breaks in service before the effective date of the Act
need not be reinstated.387
The plan's vesting schedule tells us what percentage of the accrued
benefits an employee has at a particular time. What those accrued benefits
in fact are depend on the type of plan and who made the contributions.
The plan could be a profit-sharing, money-purchase or defined benefit
plan. Under a profit-sharing plan each employee would contribute an
annual amount based on an agreed formula and the employer contributes
a portion of the profits for the year. The profits are then divided among
participating employees in a manner which does not discriminate in favor
of highly compensated employees. Under a purchase-money type of plan
the employer agrees to contribute a fixed amount each year for each
employee. At retirement all the money thus contributed is used to
purchase the employee an annuity. Defined Benefit plans promise the
385 Id.
386 See discussion of participation requirements supra, and INT. REV. CODE OF 1954,
§ 411(a) (6) at % 10.01.
387 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 411 (a) (4) (E) & (F).
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employee a fixed pension upon retirement. If the plan is any type other
than the defined benefit (fixed pension) plan the employee's accrued
benefit is merely the balance of his account.318
The defined benefit plan must provide a method of accruing benefits
which meets one of three tests.3 9 A plan would be acceptable if it provides
that each employee's accrual is at least 3% of the maximum benefit he
would have received had he become a participant at the earliest possible
age and continued in the plan until age 65.390 A plan will also qualify if
the accrual rate, expressed in dollars or in a percentage, for any later year
is not more than one-third greater than the rate for the current year.391
The third possible way of qualifying is to provide that the accrued benefit
payable on leaving the employment is a ratable portion of what he would
have received at normal retirement age had he continued at his present
salary until that date.392 In practice the calculation may be much more
complicated than the above indicates. A few examples of complicating
factors are the valuation of ancillary benefits, the effect of employee
withdrawals and consideration of social security benefits in determining
plan retirement benefits.
Since 'benefit attributable to the employee's contribution is always
completely vested, it is necessary to allocate the accrued benefit between
the employer and employee contributions. In plans other than defined
benefit plans which require mandatory employee contributions, the
accrued benefit attributable to the employee's contributions is the balance
in the separate account maintained for the employee's contribution. If
both employer and employee contributions are accumulated in a single
account, then a pro rata portion of the account determined on the basis
of relative net contributions would be the accrued benefits applicable to
each. To illustrate, assume that an employee has made a total net
contribution of $2,000 to a profit-sharing plan while his employer has
contributed $18,000 and the account balance is currently $30,000. The
employee's contribution would represent 10% of the total contribution,
therefore $3,000 (10% of the account balance) would represent the
accrued benefits derived from the employee's contribution. 93
A defined benefit plan which provides for mandatory employee
contributions requires a rather technical and confusing calculation to
determine the accrued benefits applicable to these contributions. The
accrued benefit derived from an employee's contribution at a particular
date is the employee's accumulated contribution multiplied by the
3W Id. § 411 (a) (7).
M9 1d. § 411 (b) (1).
390 Id. § 411(b) (1) (A).
mlId. § 411 (b) (1) (B).
392 Id. § 411 (b) (1) (C).
3M Id. § 411 (c) (2) (A).
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conversion factor appropriate for the plan's normal retirement age. 39 4
The conversion factor for a normal retirement age of 65 years is 10%,
factors for other normal retirement ages will be prescribed in regulations
to be issued. The accumulated contribution for an employee is the
aggregate of his mandatory contribution and interest (if any) under
the plan for the years prior to the effective date of the Act plus interest
at a rate of 5% compounded annually from the first plan year covered
by the Act to the normal retirement age.3 95 To illustrate assume that
an employee is a participant in a defined benefit plan which has a normal
retirement age of 65 and his accrued benefits are currently $3,000. If his
accumulated contributions total $9,000 the application of the 10%
conversion factor would result in $900 of the accrued benefits derived
from the employee's contribution. Therefore, of the total $3,000 of
accrued benefits, $2,100 would be applicable to the employer's
contributions. If we assume further that the employee in our illustration
is 50% vested, his total vested accrued benefits would be $1,950 ($1,050
applicable to employer contributions plus his own $900).
10.03 Funding Requirements. Under prior law the employer was
only required to make annual contributions sufficient to cover normal
pension costs (amounts earned during the year by the participants) and
interest on unfunded past service costs. The new law, with certain
exceptions, requires the employer to contribute, in addition to the normal
cost, an amount sufficient to amortize the past service cost over a 40-year
period (30 years for plans created after January 1, 1974). The funding
requirements do not apply to profit-sharing or stock bonus plans and
certain plans which are funded exclusively by the purchase of individual
insurance contracts.3 96 Technically money purchase pension plans are
included in the funding requirements, but as long as the employer makes
the contribution as required by the plan's formula, the minimum is met.
The most difficult funding situation is where the plan is of the fixed
benefit type, in which eligible employees are promised a fixed pension at
retirement. In such a situation the employer must make sufficient annual
contributions to allow the trustee to pay the promised pensions. The
factors that must enter into such a calculation are too numerous and
complex for the scope of this article. Such a calculation is also beyond
the expertise of most attorneys, accountants and even plan administrators,
therefore requiring the use of a professional actuary. In determining the
dollar contribution in the year that is required to assure that the plan is
adequately funded, the actuary must consider the probable number of
employees that will leave without vested rights, the number that will
retire, the average age of retirement, the life expectancy of a retiree,
the expected future yield on plan assets and the current value of those
assets, to mention only a few factors.
994 Id. § 411 (c) (2) (B). 395 Id. § 411 (c) (2) (C). 896 Id. § 412(h) & (i)..
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Most of the factors that the actuary considers must be estimated.
These estimates are termed actuarial assumptions. If the results of the
assumptions are to be acceptable they must be reasonable taking into
account the plan's past experience and reasonable future expectations.
3 7
No matter how carefully the actuarial assumptions are made the actual
experience can be different. If the actuary underestimated a cost factor or
overestimated an income factor an actuarial loss will be experienced. On
the other hand, if the actuary is too conservative, in that he has over-
estimated cost factors or underestimated income factors, the plan will
experience an actuarial gain. The determination of these experience gains
or losses is made by comparing the actual current value of the plan assets
with value of the desired value of the assets. Such valuation must be made
every three years, though it can be done more frequently. 98
The existence of significant experience gains or losses will probably
require the actuary to revise his assumptions and change the method of
funding. Any change in funding method or plan year requires prior
approval of the Secretary of the Treasury. 399 When an experience gain is
determined the employer is not allowed to take the full benefit of it in the
year of determination, nor is he required to absorb the full impact of
experience losses in a single year. Gains and losses are instead spread
(amortized) over the next 15 years (20 years for multi-employer plans). 4°°
This amortization procedure could result in a complicated series of gain
and/or loss amortization accounts. To limit the potential confusion,
combining and/or offsetting of accounts will be allowed, though the
mechanics of the combining/ offsetting procedure will be prescribed by
regulations to be issued. 401
The new law requires qualified plans to maintain a device for
detecting underfunding; it is called the funding standard account.40 2 The
account is charged (debited) annually with normal cost for the plan year
and amounts sufficient to amortize in equal installments the following: 40,
1. Past service costs (over 30-40 years);
2. Experience losses over 15 years (20 years if multi-employer plan);
3. Losses resulting from changes in actuarial assumptions over
30 years;
4. Any waived funding deficiency over 15 years;
5. Any excess debit arising from the plan having switched from the
alternate funding method back to the basic method, over 5 years.
Mt Id. § 412(c) (3).
398 Id. § 412(c) (9).
a9 Id. § 412(c) (5).
4W Id. § 412(b) (2)& (3).
401 Id. § 412(b) (4).
42Id. § 412(b) (1).
40 Id. § 412(b) (2).
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The account is credited each year with the amount the employer
contributed to or under the plan for the plan year and an amount
sufficient to amortize in equal installments the following: 40 4
1. Experience gains over 15 years (20 years if multi-employer plan);
2. Gains resulting from changes in actuarial assumptions over
30 years;
3. Net decreases in unfunded past service costs arising from plan
amendments over 30 years (40 years if a multi-employer plan);
4. The amount of any waived funding deficiency for the plan year;
5. Any excess credit arising from the plan having switched from the
alternate funding method back to the basic method, over 5 years.
If the account balances or shows a net credit balance the minimum
funding requirements for the year have been met. When the account
shows a net debit balance the minimum requirements have not been met;
the employer has an accumulated funding deficiency. Where underfunding
exists and a waiver is not obtained the employer will be subject to a 5%
penalty on the accumulated funding deficiency. If the employer does not
correct the deficiency within 90 days (with possibility of extension for
cause) of the mailing of a notice of deficiency by the Internal Revenue
Service he will be assessed a penalty equal to the accumulated funding
deficiency. 405 As if the taxes alone were not a sufficient deterrent to
underfunding, neither the initial nor additional tax is deductible. 406 The
deficiency can be avoided if the employer can make a sufficient additional
contribution within two and one-half months of the close of the plan year.4- 1
Where an employer can convince the Secretary of the Treasury that
application of the minimum 'funding standards in a particular year would
cause him substantial business hardships, he can have the requirements
waived for such year, but such waiver is only available during five of any
consecutive 15 years.408 Employers may also obtain permission to extend
the prescribed amortization periods by as much as 10 years, if such
extension would not be contrary to the purpose of the Act or adversely
affect the interests of plan participants in the aggregate. 409
An alternate minimum funding standard is also available. If it is used
the plan must maintain an alternate minimum funding standard account.410
This account is debited for normal cost, the excess of the present value of
accrued benefits under the plan over the fair market value of the assets
of the plan and any excess of credits to the account for all prior years
404 Id. § 412(b) (3).
405 Id. § 4971.
406 Id. § 275.
4o Id. § 404(a) (6).
408 Id. § 412(d).
4091d. § 412(e).
410 Id. § 412(g) (1).
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over changes to the account for those prior years. The alternate account
is credited for the amount of the employer's contribution for the year. 
U
Election of the alternate standard is an attempt to reduce the required
employer contribution. Whether the attempt will be successful depends
on the relative fair market value of the plan assets. If the value of
the plan assets substantially decline the basic standard will prove
to be the least expensive. A plan using the alternate standard must
continue to maintain a basic funding standard account and when (and
if) the plan elects to switch back to the basic standard, the difference
is amortized over a five-year period.
There is a possible exception to the minimum funding rules. If
market conditions were such that the current fair market value of the
plan's assets exceeded the total accrued liability of plan under the basic
funding standard, the plan would be considered fully funded and
the employer would not have to make any contributions for that year. The
employer could continue to meet the minimum funding requirements
without making a contribution in each succeeding year that the condition
persisted. The fair market value of plan assets may not exceed the
accrued plan liabilities, but if the difference is less than the minimum
funding requirement under the basic standard, the employer can pay
the lesser of the two. 4m
Thus far we have only discussed the minimum contribution an
employer must make. Is there a maximum? The simple answer is that
there is no limitation on what can be contributed, but the size of an
annual deduction for tax purposes is limited. For all practical purposes all
deduction limitations existing under the old law are left undisturbed.
4
The change is that when the minimum funding requirement exceeds the
deduction limitation the latter becomes inoperative. 41
4 Therefore the
employer may contribute and deduct the higher of the minimum funding
requirement or deduction limitation. Even if his contribution exceeds both,
the excess can be carried forward and deducted in future years.
10.04 Plans for the Self-Employed. The most obvious change is
that the deductible contribution to plans for the self-employed (often
referred to as HR 10 or Keogh plans) has been increased from 10% of
the earned income derived -from the trade or business to 15%. The former
maximum deduction of $2,500 has also been increased to $7,500. 1
5
Possibly more significant is the creation of a minimum deduction repre-
senting the lesser of $750 or 100% of the earned income derived from
the trade or business.41 6 The new provision would appear to allow persons
41 Id. § 412(g) (2).
U2Id. § 412(c) (7) & (8).
41Id. § 415.
4Id. § 404(a) (7).
415 Id. § 404 (e) (1).
46 Id. § 404(e) (4).
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who are self-employed on a part-time basis, such as corporate directors
and moonlighting professionals (i.e., attorneys and CPAs who are employed
by a firm) to avoid paying taxes on at least the first $750 of their
"self-employment" income. The opportunity would exist whether or not
the moonlighter was covered by an employer plan. The minimum deduc-
tion is a desirable addition to tax law, but seems somewhat incompatible
with Individual Retirement Savings plans (discussed infra) which require
that the individual employee not be a participant in an employer plan.
The plan must cover all employees of the self-employed person,
who have three or more years of service, though certain nonresident
aliens and employees covered by collective bargaining agreements may be
excluded. 4 7 Regardless of the number of plans to which the self-employed
person contributes, he is allowed only to deduct in total the lesser of
$7,500 or 15% of the earned income in any one taxable year.4 8 To further
complicate matters only a single $100,000 contribution base can be used.
The maximum contribution base coupled with mandatory employee
coverage will mean that an owner-employee whose earned income exceeds
$100,000 would be required, in order to take the maximum deduction, to
make a contribution of 71/2 % of his eligible employee's wages.
A person may be able to exceed the $7,500 limit where his plan is of
the defined benefit type. The law now provides a formula for the amount
of a straight-life annuity that can be accrued each year beginning with
his participation in the plan determined by the age at which the person
commences participation. The amount of benefit that may be accrued is
determined by multiplying his earned income, not in excess of $50,000, by
the applicable percentage for the age at which his current participation
in the plan began. The percentages currently provided are: 4 9
Age at Participation Percentage
30 or less ............. 6.5
35 .................. 5.4
40 .................. 4.4
45 .................. 3.6
50 .................. 3.0
55 .................. 2.5
60 or over ............. 2.0
Regulations to be issued will provide percentages for ages not currently
prescribed and for the adjustment of the percentages in the case of
plans providing other than a basic benefit. The amount of the
contribution required to finance an annuity benefit, not exceeding
417 Id. § 401 (d) (3).
418 Id. § 404(e) (2).
419 Id. § 401 Q),
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one determined by the above formula, would be deductible even if
it exceeded the $7,500 limitation.
To illustrate, we assume we have two physicians, Drs. Jeckel and
Hyde, who commence participation in a plan at ages 45 and 55
respectively. Assuming each meet or exceed the $50,000 limitation and
can be expected to maintain these earnings, Dr. Jeckel would be allowed
to accrue a right to a life annuity at age 65 of $1,800 ($50,000 times
.036) for each year, while Dr. Hyde could accrue only $1,250 ($50,000
times 0.25) for each year, or life annuity incomes at age 65 of $36,000
($1,800 times 20 years) and $12,500 ($1,250 times 10 years) respectively.
The cost to provide Dr. Jeckel's annuity would be nearly $10,000 per
year. Even though this amount exceeds the $7,500 limitation, the doctor
would be allowed to deduct the whole amount in determining his taxable
income for the year. If the annual amount required to provide Dr. Hyde
with a $12,500 annuity income at age 65 was less than the $7,500 limit,
he of course would still be allowed to make a deductible contribution to
a qualified plan of up to the $7,500 limit. Any increase in the rate of
accrual or compensation base is considered a new period of participation
in the plan as to the increase. 420 For example, if the plan is amended so as
to cover the first $40,000 of earned income, rather than $30,000
as previously provided in the plan, and this change is made when the
participant is 60 years old, the percentage applicable to this $10,000
increase in compensation base would be 2% and whatever percentage had
been applicable to the original $30,000 would continue to be applicable.
The extent to which (if any) the new provision benefits self-employed
individuals will depend on the age at which they began participation in
the plan. Regardless of the result under the accrued benefit formula, the
annual benefit under a defined benefit plan upon retirement may not
exceed the lesser of $75,000 per year or the average of the participant's
average earned income for the three highest years.Y' We will have to await
the issuance of regulations to answer many questions raised by this
provision. For example, must the self-employed individual use the same
percentage for his eligible employees as he uses for himself or must he use
a percentage determined with respect to the employee's age, if this is
how the employer determined his own percentage? Since the maximum
for purposes of the calculation is earned income of $50,000, can an
employer whose earned income exceeds the maximum proportionately
reduce the employee's percentage?
The old law required that excess contributions to Subchapter S plans
and plans for the self-employed be returned. Now, excess contributions to
self-employed plans are subject to a non-deductible 6% penalty on the
excess. The penalty is assessed for each year that the excess is
420 Id. § 401 (j) (3) (B) (iii);
i'n-/d. § 415(b).
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outstanding. 4 2 Excess contribution made on behalf of more than 5%
shareholders of a Subchapter S corporation are not subject to the
penalty tax. Instead the excess is added back to the income of these
shareholders. 43 A penalty is also provided for premature distribution
from a self-employed plan. The individual is subject to an additional
tax equal to 10% of the premature distribution that is includable in
his gross income for the year. A premature distribution is one which
is made before the individual attains age 59 , made for any reason
other than the individual becoming disabled.424
10.05 Individual Retirement Savings Plans. Previously if a person
was not self-employed or covered by a union or employer-sponsored
retirement plan, any amount which he attempted to save for his retirement
was by necessity done with after tax dollars. An employee not covered by
a plan can now deduct from his gross income up to 15% of the first
$10,000 of gross income. This maximum deduction of $1,500 can be
taken each year until he reaches age 70 , and can 'be taken whether or
not the taxpayer itemizes. Married taxpayers are not penalized. If both
have earned income each can set up his or her own plan. The only
requirement is that the amount of the deduction be actually paid
in cash during the taxable year by or on behalf of the taxpayer to
an individual retirement account, for an individual retirement annuity or
individual retirement bonds. Not only may an employer contribute to an
employee's plan, he may be the one who set it up. 42
The maximum applies whether only the employer, only the employee
or both contribute to the individual retirement plan. All that is important
is that the combined contribution does not exceed the greater of 15% of
the individual's gross income for the tax year or $1,500. Therefore if an
employer were to contribute $1,000 for an employee earning more than$10,000, the employee could contribute an additional $500. If the
employee for whom the $1,000 contribution was made earned only $8,000
exclusive of the employer's contribution, he could contribute only an
additional $350. In the preceding example the employee's gross income
would be $9,000 ($8,000 plus $1,000 of employer contribution), the
maximum contribution would therefore be $1,350 ($9,000 times 15%)
which would allow an additional contribution by the employee of $350($1,350 minus $1,000). As the example illustrates, the employer's
contribution is included in the employee's gross income and he takes
the applicable deduction in full on his own tax return. Even though
a deduction is allowed for income tax purposes, the amount of the
aggregate contribution remains subject to social security taxes.
422 Id. § 4972.
423 Id. § 1379.
424 Id. § 72(m) (5),
425 id, § 219,
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If contributions are made to an individual retirement plan in excess
of those for which a deduction is allowed, a 6% excise tax is imposed on
such excess, unless it is repaid to the employee by the due date for filing
his return. The excise tax is assessed for each year that the excess exists.N
An excess is corrected by merely making a contribution in latter years
which is less than that which is allowed. To illustrate, Jones earns $10,000
in 1975 and contributes $2,000 to his individual retirement plan, since his
maximum deduction is $1,500 he has made an excess contribution of
$500 and is subject to a penalty of $30 ($500 times 6%). If in 1976 his
maximum deduction is again $1,500, but he only contributes $1,000, he
will have removed the excess and not be subject to the penalty. However,
if Jones makes the maximum contribution in 1976 of $1,500 he will again
be required to pay the $30 penalty on the excess $500. An interesting
situation would occur where a person who previously made an excess
contribution becomes ineligible to contribute to an individual retirement
plan by virtue of becoming a participant in a qualified employer plan.
Since he cannot remove the excess by making contributions which are less
than maximum, his only alternative would be to make a withdrawal
from the plan, and if he is less than 59 pay the 10% penalty on
premature distributions.4
The individual retirement plan may use one of three funding
vehicles. Individual retirement accounts (IRA) are domestic nonforfeitable
trusts created exclusively for the benefit of an individual. With the
exception of tax-free rollovers (discussed infra) the trustee cannot accept
a contribution of more than $1,500 per year. Such contribution must be
made in cash and distributions of or from the account must begin no later
than the end of the year in which the individual reaches 701/2. In the
event the individual dies prior to exhausting the account, its balance must
be paid out within five years, or used to purchase an annuity for the
named beneficiaries. The only commingling of the account assets allowed
is with those of a common trust fund, and for purposes of diversifying
investments the assets may be pooled with assets of a qualified trust. A
bank is usually the trustee,' though other persons can qualify. The assets
of the IRA can generally be invested in any assets that would be acceptable
investments for a qualified plan, including but not limited to savings
accounts with credit unions and savings and loan associations, mutual fund
shares and insurance annuity contracts. The assets may not be used to
purchase life insurance contracts, though annuity contracts purchased with
these assets may contain nominal life insurance features. The cost of the
life insurance element of annuity contracts is not deductible. Trustee of
the IRA and insurance companies issuing such annuity contracts are
required to make annual reports to the Secretary of the Treasury.
428
428 Id. § 4973.
42V Id. § 72(m) (5).
42 Id. § 408 (a).
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Rather than use the IRA the deductible contribution may be made
directly to an insurance company for the purchase of nonforfeitable
individual retirement annuities which contain no more than an incidental
life insurance feature. As stated previously the cost of such feature is not
deductible. All refunds must either be applied toward future premiums or
the purchase of additional -benefits and as with the IRA the requirements
applicable to premature death and commencement of distributions
apply.4 9 The third possibility is to invest in special U.S. bonds. The bonds
can only be purchased in the name of the individual. The bonds must
cease to bear interest or otherwise provide an investment yield once the
individual attains age 70 or five years after the date the individual
dies, but not later than the date the decedent would have attained age
70 . Bonds must be held for at least 12 months after they are issued and
if they are redeemed before the individual reaches 59 or becomes
disabled, the premature distribution will be subject to the 10% penalty. 4A30
IRAs may be established by employers for the exclusive benefit of
their employees or by unions for the exclusive benefit of their members.
Separate accounts may be set up for each individual or one account may
be created to cover all participants, with separate accounting for each
individual's interest. The assets may be commingled for investment
purposes. The employer-created accounts may not be used to avoid the
nondiscrimination provisions applicable to qualified plans. 4- Proceeds
from individual retirement savings plans are taxed when received. Due to
deductions being limited to the contribution and the contribution being
limited to the deduction, the individual's basis will be zero resulting in the
full amount received being taxed when received. Unfortunately the
proceeds are not eligible for capital gains treatment or the special 10-year
average provision applicable to lump sum distributions (discussed infra). 432
10.06 Tax-Free RoUovers. Portability was a much-discussed and
very desirable concept that did not find its way into the Employment
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974. In essence it would have
allowed an employee who left one employer to bring with him and
deposit into the retirement plan of his new employer the vested interest
he had earned under his previous employer's plan. Considering the
various types of plans and funding vehicles, compulsory portability
proved unfeasible. Congress provided for a limited degree of portability by
virtue of the Act allowing certain tax-free rollovers. If an employee
withdraws his entire interest from an individual retirement savings plan
or receives a lump sum distribution of his vested interest in a qualified
plan upon separation, he may avoid immediate taxation on the sum by
depositing it within 60 days, into either an individual retirement savings
429 Id. § 408 (b).
430 Id. § 409.
431 ld. § 408 (c).
432Id. § 408(d), § 409(b).
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plan or the funding vehicle of another qualified plan. 43 The effect of these
provisions has been referred to as a system of "voluntary portability."434
The Act does not limit the number of tax-free rollovers a person can
have during his lifetime, nor is there a particular sequence for the
rollovers. The rolover can be made from one plan to either an employee
plan, a plan for the self-employed, or an individual retirement
savings plan. For example if an employee receives a lump sum distribution
of $10,000 from his employer's qualified plan he can avoid immediate
taxation by placing it into an IRA and then later withdraw the balance of
the account and invest it tax free in either a new employer's plan
(with the employer's consent) or possibly in a plan for the self-employed.
The only significant limitation on rollovers is that tax avoidance is not
allowed for rollover of amounts which were received by an individual
from an IRA or individual retirement annuity, if within the prior three
years there has been a tax-free rollover of amounts received from an
IRA, individual retirement annuity or retirement bonds. 43 There exists
a danger that amounts rolled over to an individual retirement plan that
would have received the favorable lump sum treatment (discussed infra)
had it been distributed from the original plan, will not receive the benefit
of the favored treatment when distributed from the individual plan.
However, the regular five-year averages provisions would be applicable.
436
10.07 Lump-Sum Distributions. Under the new law the portion of
a lump-sum distribution (LSD) from a qualified plan attributable to years
of participation prior to 1974 is to be considered a capital gain. Amounts
considered accumulated after 1973 are treated as ordinary income. To
soften the impact of the new rules, a special elective 10-year forward-
averaging method has been provided for the calculation of tax on the
LSD. The new law also provides -for an exclusion of 50% of the first
$20,000, but unfortunately limited to $10,000 reduced by 20% of the
amount by which the LSD exceeds $20,000. 437 To illustrate this minimum
allowance, assume an employee receives an LSD at retirement at age 65
of $40,000, he would be able to exclude from income $6,000 calculated as
follows: basic exclusion of $10,000 (50% of first $20,000) reduced by
$4,000 [($40,000 minus $20,000) times 20%], representing 20% of the
amount by which the LSD exceeds $20,000. The minimum distribution
allowance would be subtracted from the gross LSD to arrive at a taxable
LSD of $34,000 ($40,000 minus $6,000).
To further illustrate the mechanics of the new provisions, assume
that employee Smith retires at the end of 1978 upon attaining the age of
433 Id. § 402(c) (5), § 403 (c) (4), § 408(d) (3), § 409(b) (3) (C).
434 120 CONG. REc. 15739 (1974) (remarks of Senator Williams).
435 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 408 (d) (3) (B).
436 Id. § 1301.
437 Id. § 402(a) (1), § 403 (a).
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66. Smith elects to receive at retirement, according to the provisions of his
employer's pension plan, an LSD in lieu of a life annuity. The LSD
amounts to $90,000. Smith became a participant in the plan at the begin-
ning of 1964 and remained a participant in good standing until his retire-
ment. Smith expects to file a joint tax return with his wife who is also 66
years old. During 1978 the Smiths had salary and other income amounting
to $23,000, their itemized deductions for the period total $5,000.
The first step in calculating Mr. and Mrs. Smith's tax liability is to
consider whether a minimum distribution allowance is applicable to their
situation. Unfortunately the allowance is not applicable, since 20% of the
amount by which the LSD exceeds $20,000 [($90,000 minus $20,000)
times 20% equals $14,000] exceeds the basic allowance (20% of first
$20,000 equals $10,000). Having determined that all of the LSD is
subject to tax our next concern is to determine the tax on the ordinary
income portion of the LSD.
The total taxable LSD ($90,000) including ordinary income and
capital gains portion is divided by 10, the tax on the resulting $9,000
is calculated using rates for single persons even though the taxpayer is
married. The tax using current rates would be $1,840. This is then
multiplied by 10 resulting in a total tax of $18,400. This is the amount
that would be due if the distribution was all ordinary income, but since
Smith's 15 years of participation involved five post-1973 years, only 5/15
or one-third the LSD represents ordinary income. Since one-third of the
distribution is ordinary income, only one-third of the $18,400, or $6,133,
is added by the taxpayer to the ordinary tax shown on his return.
Obviously if one-third the LSD was ordinary income the other
two-thirds is taxable as capital gains. The capital gains of $60,000($90,000 times two-thirds) are reduced by one-half. One-half the capital
gains or $30,000 is added to Smith's salary and other income ($23,000)
for a total of $53,000. After allowance for the itemized deductions
($5,000) and four exemptions ($3,000) their taxable income would be
$45,000. At current joint return tax rates the tax on this amount would
be $14,560. The Smiths' tax bill for 1978 would be $20,693 ($14,560
plus $6,133 applicable to the ordinary income portion of the LSD). In
addition, if the Smiths' taxable income of $45,000 was sufficiently higher
than their average income for the four years immediately preceding the
current year they also would be eligible for general income averaging. To
illustrate, assume that the regular taxes on the $45,000 under the general
income averaging provisions is $13,500, the tax bill for 1978 would
be $19,633 ($13,500 plus the $6,133 applicable to the ordinary income
portion of the LSD).
Had Smith's LSD been from a profit-sharing plan and contained
securities of the employer (including its parent and/or subsidiaries) any
unrealized appreciation (excess of market over cost to 'the plan) would
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not be considered in calculating the minimum deduction allowance and
applying the special 10-year averaging provisions.43 To illustrate, assume
Smith's LSD consisted of $40,000 in cash and $50,000 in his employer's
securities which cost the plan $30,000. The $20,0000 unrealized apprecia-
tion in the stock would not be considered for purposes of calculating the
special averaging and the minimum deduction allowance. For those purposes
the LSD would be $70,000 ($90,000 minus $20,000). The unrealized appre-
ciation is taxed at capital gain rates when (and if) the securities are sold.
The calculations are further complicated when the employee receives
an annuity in addition to the LSD. Of course the annuity payments are
not taxed until they are received, but the present value of a currently
received annuity or an annuity received in the five years preceding the
LSD must be taken into consideration in calculating the minimum
deduction allowance and special 10-year averaging.4 9 To illustrate, if
Smith had received an annuity with a present value of $10,000 in addition
to the $90,000 LSD, $100,000 would be used to make the computations.
The minimum deduction allowance again would not be applicable,
therefore the tax would initially be calculated at single rates on one-tenth
of $100,000. The resulting tax would be multiplied by 10 for a total of
$20,900. From this is subtracted the portion applicable to the annuity,
$2,090, because the value of the annuity represents 10% of the $100,000
used to calculate the total tax, resulting in $18,810 ($20,900 minus
$2,090 or 90% of $20,900). Recalling that only one-third of Smith's
participation occurred after 1973, $6,270 (one-third of $18,810) is the
tax on the ordinary income portion of the LSD.
To elect special averaging the individual must have participated in
the plan from which he receives the LSD for at least five years. An
individual can only make one such selection for LSDs received after he
attains age 59 .440 Therefore a person receiving three LSDs during his
lifetime, but all after attaining age 59 could only make the election
as to one of them. However if two or more of them were received before
he reached 59 , all of them would qualify for the election.
10.08 Other Provisions. The Act has set up minimum vesting and
funding standards for defined benefit plans. These standards would be
meaningless, however, without provisions to assure that the ultimate
benefits were paid. To provide this protection, plans with more than 25
participants and not otherwise excluded are required to purchase plan
termination insurance.4'4 The insurance applies to vested benefits only and
liability is currently limited to $750 a month or 100% of average monthly
wages during the highest-paid five consecutive years of participation. The
438Id. § 402(a).
43Id. § 402(e).
440 ld. § 402(a).
$4129 U.S.C. § 1301 (1970).
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Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC), a public corporation,
has been formed within the Department of Labor to administer the
insurance provisions. The corporation will set premium rates payable by
the plans to finance the coverage. The premiums are currently set at one
dollar ($1.00) per plan participant for single employer plans and 50 cents
($ .50) per participant for multi-employer plans. The insurance is unique
and also controversial in that employers are liable to the PBGC for benefits
paid by it because of plan termination. The liability is limited to 30% of
the employer's net work measured within 120 days prior to termination
of the plan.4 2 There is some argument that the limit is not absolute, but
on a per-plan basis. Consequently under certain circumstances 100% of a
multi-plan employer's net worth could be subject to the PBGC's lien."'
Regulations to be issued will hopefully answer this question.
The Act also adds various reporting requirements. Within 120 days
of a plan becoming subject to the Act, the Secretary of Labor must receive
a description of the plan which is to be updated every five years. Plan
participants and beneficiaries must also receive a plan description, though
not as comprehensive as the Secretary's copy, and it also must be updated
at 60-month intervals. Both the Secretary of Labor, participants and
beneficiaries must be informed of material modifications within 210 days
of the close of the affected plan year. The Secretary of Labor is also to
receive a comprehensive annual report and the plan is required to annually
provide participants with audited financial statements. The Act also places
fiduciary responsibility on plan managers/ administrators, defines liabilities
for the breach of this responsibility, generally prescribes many adminis-
trative procedures and specifically prohibits certain transactions.
11.00 Corporations
11.01 Casualty Loss Prior to Adoption of Section 337 Liquidation
Plan. Section 337, which provides for the nonrecognition of gain or loss
at the corporate level when corporate assets are sold or exchanged
subsequent to the adoption of a plan of liquidation and all assets are
distributed to the shareholders within 12 months after the adoption of the
plan, was enacted to resolve the confusion arising from the Supreme Court
decisions in Commissioner v. Court Holding Co."4 and United States
v. Cumberland Public Service Co.445 It is now recognized that an involun-
tary conversion due to a fire is a sale or exchange under Section 337. 446
In United States v. Morton,447 the Eighth Circuit dealt with the other
aspect of Section 337(a), that is, when does the "sale or exchange" by
442 Id. § 1362 (1970).
443 See, Lindquist, The Pension Remodeling Act of 1974, 52 TAXES 873, 866 (1974).
4" 324 U.S. 331 (1945).
44 338 U.S. 451 (1950).44 6Towanda Textiles, Inc. v. United States, 180 F. Supp. 373 (Ct. Cl. 1960); Rev.
Rul. 64-100, 1964-1 CUM. BULL. 130.
447 387 F.2d 441 (Sth Cir. 1968).
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fire take place. The fire involved in Morton occurred before the adoption
of the liquidation plan. But the court held that the involuntary conversion
was not completed until the policy proceeds were received, a settlement
figure agreed on, or judgment obtained. The Sixth Circuit in Central
Tablet Mfg. Co. v. United States,448 held that an involuntary conversion
due to a fire before the adoption of a liquidation plan was not shielded
under Section 337. The Supreme Court, in a five-to-four decision,
affirmed the Sixth Circuit.
The majority of the Supreme Court held that the obligation to pay
for a fire loss arises when the fire occurs and thus is unlike an executory
contract, which would fall under Section 337 even though the sale had
been negotiated by the corporation prior to the plan, but not finalized
until after the plan was adopted. Executory contracts may be rescinded,
while a casualty cannot. Although the amount of the liability and the
question of liability have not been answered, the obligation itself is present
and it is the point in time when the property is valued that is critical.
The majority found that a casualty loss is similar to a condemnation.
Generally, when title has passed by condemnation before the plan of
liquidation is adopted, the corporation does not escape taxation under
Section 337.449 The Supreme Court held the date of the casualty is
analogous to the passing of title in a condemnation proceedings.
The dissenting judges, relying on the casualty loss deduction
procedures 450 and the taxpayer's accrual method of accounting, found
that the taxpayer had no clear right to the income and that the "quantum
of the income" must be ascertainable within reasonable limits.
4 5 1 They
held the cash amount of the loss was not reasonably ascertainable until
after the plan of liquidation-about seven months after the casualty. The
rule in condemnation cases is not at odds with their dissent, because
the recognition of income must be at the time of the transfer of title
in a condemnation proceeding since, at that time, it creates a binding
obligation in the condemning authority to pay just compensation which
the condemnee is certain to recover. However, until the amount is
reasonably ascertainable 452 in a casualty loss situation, there is no need
to recognize a gain using the normal rules of accrual accounting.
448 94 S. Ct. 2516 (1974).
449 Covered Wagon, Inc. v. Comm'r, 369 F.2d 629, 633-635 (8th Cir. 1966); Dwight
v. United States, 328 F.2d 973 (2d Cir. 1964).
45oSee Coastal Terminals, Inc. v. Comm'r, 25 T.C. 1053 (1956), stating where
insurance recovery is uncertain, the loss is to be taken in the year of the casualty
loss. But see Commissioner v. Harwick, 184 F.2d 835 (5th Cir. 1950), where the court
said if there is reasonable certainty that the insurance will be paid, the loss deduction
is postponed until the recovery question is resolved.
451 Taxpayer here used the accrual method of accounting unlike Morton where the
taxpayer used the cash basis of accounting. In Kinney v. United States, 31 Am. Fed.
Tax R.2d 73-528 (N.D. Cal. 1972), the taxpayer was on the accrual basis and the
court followed Morton. However, the case is pending in the Ninth Circuit.
452 See generally Rev. Rul. 59-108, 1959-1 CvM. BULL. 72,
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The majority of the Court noted that the taxpayer had a possible tax
relief after suffering a casualty loss. They can use the insurance proceeds
to replace the destroyed property and escape recognition of gain.453 Of
course, this must be completed within the 12-month liquidation period.
The dissent noted another possible way to avoid the results stated by
the majority. They stated that since the Service approves post-fire plan
adoptions if made on the same day as the conversion on sale, the taxpayer
could then have the liquidation plan begin at the time of the fire. Treasury
Regulation 1.337-1 454 provides that the sale or exchange can occur on
the same day the plan of liquidation is adopted.
While it appears that for the present time, the date of the casualty
loss will be treated as the "sale or exchange" date, the divided Court
seems to be sufficient evidence that this is not the final case to be
adjudicated under this factual situation. The effect of the taxpayer's
accounting method, cash or accrual, the intent of Congress for enacting
Section 337, whether to clean up formalistic distinctions or as a general
relief provision, and the effect of Section 1033 on future actions of this
type on the Court's decisions have not as yet been finally answered.
11.02 Deductions-Attorney's Fees in Section 337 Liquidation.
Section 337(a) was directed at correcting a definite inequity,455 the
inequity being the possible double taxation on liquidating corporations;
once when the assets are sold by the corporation and once on distribution
of the proceeds derived from the sale to the shareholders. 456 Thus,
Section 337 eliminated tax at the corporate level and imposed a single
tax on the stockholders. 45 7
But what of the attorney's fees connected with the sale of Section 337
property. Are these deductible under Section 162(a) as business expenses
or are they to be treated as capital expenditures? In Pridemark, Inc. v.
Commissioner,458 the Fourth Circuit allowed business deductions for
liquidation legal fees. The court held that profits and losses from normal
operations during a Section 337 liquidation are to be calculated for tax
purposes and as the legal fees were ordinary and necessary expenses
in a Section 337 liquidation, they are deductible.
However, in Of Course, Inc. v. Commissioner,45 9 the Fourth Circuit
reversed its prior decision. Their rationale was as follows: (1) Profits
MINT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 1033 (a) (3).
4 54 Treas. Reg. § 1.337-1.
455 See Commissioner v. McDonald, 320 F.2d 109, 112 (5th Cir. 1963); Hawaiian
Trust Co. v. United States, 291 F.2d 761, 762 (9th Cir. 1961).
456 See 65 MICH. L. Ray. 1508 (1967), discussing United States v. Mountain States
Mixed Feed Co., 365 F.2d 244 (10th Cir. 1966).
457 Any gain realized on the sale of assets by the liquidating corporation is passed to
the shareholders in the form of a reduction in basis.
458 345 F.2d 35 (4th Cir. 1965).
459 34 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 74-5347 (4th Cir. 1974).
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arising from normal operations of a Section 337 liquidation are ordinary
income; or, (2) if the liquidating corporation has expensed certain assets
purchased in earlier years and sells them during a Section 337 liquidation,
the proceeds of this sale do not qualify for capital gains treatment but are
taxable as ordinary income in the year of liquidation; 460 but, (3) attorney's
fees directly incurred during disposition or acquisition of a capital asset
are considered capital expenditures, to offset the selling price, and not
deductible as a business expense46' or an expense under Section 212.462
The court noted that Section 337 does not intend to give expenditures
which are consistently treated as capital expenditure offsets against selling
price, the same treatment as ordinary income derived from sources
unrelated to the liquidation.463 If this were not the effect, the liquidating
corporation and its shareholders would obtain an unintended tax benefit,
that being the right to deduct expenses related to the liquidation from
unrelated income.
The petitioner argued that the reasoning in United States v.
Mountain States Mixed Feed Co. 4 should be controlling. The court
accepted the argument that if the costs of distribution in kind are
deductible as ordinary expenses, the legal costs of the sale of assets
should likewise be deductible because this was all part of the liquidation-
dissolution of the corporate entity.
The court in Of Course rejected this argument,465 stating the reason
for allowing a deduction on the normal costs of liquidation as business
expenses, has as a corollary, the disallowance of a business expense
deduction for an expense qualifying as a capital expenditure. The court
noted any other rule would give irrational results. For example, if the
rule did not apply, money spent in repairing a capital asset could be
deducted as a business expense incident to liquidating the asset.
Finally, the court refused to use this rule prospectively, because
petitioner had not relied on the court's decision in Pridemark, and knew
that as to its liquidation procedure, the Commissioner did not acquiesce.
11.03 Partial Liquidations. The removal of funds from a closely
held corporation is a transaction which may trigger disastrous conse-
460 See, e.g., Citizens Acceptance Corporation v. United States, 462 F.2d 751, 756
(3d Cir. 1972); Commissioner v. Anders, 414 F.2d 1283, 1287 (10th Cir. 1969).
461 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 162(a).
462 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 212, allowing deductions for management, conservation,
or maintenance of property held for the collection of income. See Woodward v.
Comm'r, 397 U.S. 572, 574 (1970); Sprickels v. Comm'r, 315 U.S. 626, 627-628 (1942).
463 See United States v. Cumberland Pub. Serv. Co., 338 U.S. 451, 452 (1950).
464 365 F.2d 244 (10th Cir. 1966).
465 The court held the argument in Mountain States to be "sui generis," and cited
Lanrao, Inc. v. United States, 422 F.2d 481, 484 (6th Cir. 1970), which held that
although the dissolution costs of a corporation can be rationalized as business
expenses, it did not follow that capital selling expenses are business expenses under
either Section 162 or 212, if they occur during a corporate dissolution.
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quences for the shareholder, since the Treasury may characterize the
distribution as a dividend, hence creating ordinary income. Section 346
provides an avenue for distributing funds from an operating company if
there is a partial liquidation. Under Section 346 the receipt of funds by
a shareholder from his closely held corporation will be treated as both a
return of capital to the extent of capital and capital gains income to the
extent that the proceeds exceed his basis in the stock. A distribution will
be treated as a partial liquidation of a corporation if: (1) it is one of a
series of distributions in redemption of all of the stock of the corporation;
(2) it is a distribution in redemption of part of the stock of the
corporation which is "not essentially equivalent to a dividend," or (3) it
is a distribution which terminates one of several businesses which has
been engaged in by the distributing corporation.4 6
To qualify under Section 346(a) (2) as a distribution "not essentially
equivalent to a dividend" the test is whether or not there has been a
"contraction" of a corporate business. 467 Regulation 1.346-1 (a) (2) (iii)
illustrates the concept of a "genuine corporate contraction" as being a
distribution of unused insurance proceeds which were recovered as the
result of a fire which destroyed a portion of the business premises and, as
a result, that portion of the business was discontinued. This same
illustration was upheld as a corporate contraction in Joseph W. Imler,468
in which fire proceeds were permitted to be distributed to shareholders
under the theory of a partial liquidation. This Regulation also points out
that a distribution of funds which were accumulated for an expansion
program, which has now been abandoned, will not qualify as a corporate
contraction. Revenue Ruling 60-322 held that a partial liquidation did not
result where a corporation, due to a steady decline in demand for its
products, distributed cash to its shareholders in redemption for a
portion of their stock.469 The source of the cash for the distribution
resulted from the sale of the corporation's bonds and excess inventories.
No change was made in its activities other than a reduction of inventory
reflecting the decreased demand.
In 1974 the Commissioner issued Revenue Ruling 74-296470 distin-
guishing Revenue Ruling 60-322. Here a department store's business was
adversely affected by the construction of two shopping centers in the
vicinity of their location. The department store changed its method of
operation from a general department store to a small discount apparel
store operation by eliminating 33 of its 40 departments, changing the
type of merchandise sold, and eliminating credit. As a result of this
46 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 346(a) (1), § 346(a) (2), § 346(b).
467 Baflenger v. United States, 301 F.2d 192, 195 (4th Cir. 1962); Treas. Reg. §
1.346-1 (a).
48 11 T.C. 836 (1948), acquiesced in 1949-1 CuM. BULL. 2.
469 Rev. Rul. 60-322, 1960-2 CUM. BULL. 118.
470 Rev. Rul. 74-296, 1974 INT. REv. BULL. No. 25, at 15.
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contraction the floor space was reduced by 85%, accounts receivable was
reduced from 570x to lOx dollars, employees were reduced from 275 to
20 and sales declined from 4000x to 600x dollars per year. Fixed assets
such as display counters and cash registers and excess inventory were sold
thereby generating approximately 800x dollars in cash after the payment
of all liabilities. Of this amount 600x dollars was paid to its shareholders
pro rata in redemption of a portion of their outstanding common
stock. This was treated to be a general contraction of the corporate
business, thereby qualifying as a partial liquidation.
Mains v. United States471 held that distributions by a Columbus,
Ohio-based amusement company engaged in the carnival business providing
rides, entertainment, and concession to fairs and expositions did not
qualify for a partial liquidation. Here the company had 10 units operating
in different parts of the country at the same time. The southern route
which generated 38.65% of the corporation's gross receipts was sold to
another corporation for $350,000. The court found that while a large
proportion of the corporation's revenues were generated as a result of
the southern route, only 5.19% of the corporation's total assets were
involved. The court also noted that the selling corporation had
undistributed profits of $1,335,000 and that in the year of the sale an
additional $ 100,000 was invested in new equipment.
11.04 Gift of Closely Held Corporate Stock Followed by a
Redemption. The year 1974 continued to be an excellent year for
taxpayers who have caused their stock in a controlled corporation to be
donated to a charitable organization (thereby obtaining a charitable
contribution deduction) which later redeems the stock or resells the stock
to the taxpayer's controlled corporation. 472 These cases point out that the
courts are not concerned with what the donee of stock does with it once
he has received it if at the time the donation is made the plan of
redemption has not been entered into by the corporation or there
is no agreement between the donee and the control corporation as to
repurchasing the stock.
In Dewitt v. United States, 473 the taxpayer, Dewitt, owned 100%
of the stock of Mortgage Company, which in turn held two-thirds of the
shares of Service, Inc., with the remaining one-third of Service, Inc.
shares being held personally by Dewitt. When business reasons dictated
that the two companies should be consolidated, Dewitt learned that he
would be unable to obtain a step-up-in basis of Service, Inc.'s assets under
471372 F. Supp. 1093, 1101 (S.D. Ohio 1974).
472Dewitt v. United States, 33 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 74-1121 (Ct. Cl. 1974); Daniel
D. Palmer, 62 T.C. No. 75 (Aug. 27, 1974). For additional decisions rendered in
favor of the taxpayer, see Grove v. Comm'r, 490 F.2d 241 (2d Cir. 1973); Carrington
v. Comm'r, 476 F.2d 704 (5th Cir. 1973); Behrend v. United States, 31 Am. Fed.
Tax R.2d 73-406 (4th Cir. 1972).
473 33 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 74-1121 (Ct. Cl. 1974).
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Section 334(b), since he was the sole owner of the stock, and therefore
a "related person." To obtain the benefits of the step-up-in basis under
Section 334(b) (2) it would be necessary for Mortgage Company to
purchase 80% of the stock of Service, Inc., within a one-year period.
Since Dewitt was a related taxpayer, the purchase by Mortgage of the
additional shares to meet the 80% requirement from him would not be
sufficient. Therefore it was necessary to find some way that another
individual or entity could own at least 131/3 % of the Service, Inc., stock
which in turn could be purchased by Mortgage Company. After consulting
with his attorneys, Dewitt decided to make a gift of eight shares or
133 % of the outstanding stock to a qualified Section 170(c) charitable
organization, thus entitling Dewitt a charitable deduction as set forth in
Section 170(a). In October of 1964, four shares were donated to the
San Rafael Military Academy and again in early 1965, an additional four
shares were donated. These shares were accepted by the board of trustees
of the academy with no strings attached or any conditions set forth as to
whether or not these shares had to be retained pending repurchase by
Dewitt's controlled corporation. In April of 1965 Mortgage Company
offered to purchase the eight shares for $25,800 per share or a total price
of $206,400 and to give in return a promissory note bearing interest at
the rate of 4% per annum. The principal was to be paid between the
20th and 30th years in monthly installments. The academy, desiring to
obtain cash since it was not receiving dividends from the closely held
corporation stock, accepted Mortgage Company's offer. Seventeen months
later, a corporation which had acquired the assets and assumed the liability
of Mortgage Company, repurchased the note from the academy for
the sum of $206,400.
Hence, the question arose, was there a valid gift of the property
which would permit the taxpayer to take a charitable deduction in the
years 1964 and 1965? The government contended that there was an
unwritten agreement between the academy and the shareholder, Dewitt,
that the stock would be retained until such time as Dewitt's controlled
corporation could repurchase the gift stock. Unable to substantiate the
government's contention, the court of claims found that the taxpayer had
both delivered the stock with donative intent and relinquished all control
over the stock, and also that the decision to repurchase had been made
after the donation. The court also found that the academy and their
board of trustees was under no obligation to repurchase this stock nor
were they obligated to sell it only to the taxpayer or his controlled
corporation, Mortgage Company. Therefore, the element of risk involved
with this donation was sufficient to support the view that a bona fide
gift was made.474
In Daniel D. Palmer,475 the Palmer College of Chiropractic was owned
474 Id. at 74-1127-74-1128.
475 62 T.C. No. 75 (Aug. 27, 1974).
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and operated by a profit-making corporation. Seventy-two percent of the
corporation stock was owned by a trust and the remaining 28% was
owned by the taxpayer Daniel Palmer. In order to obtain donations from
alumni and to participate in federal funding programs, Palmer sought to
establish a tax-exempt, non-profit foundation to operate the college. Of
the corporation's combined assets of $2,500,000, the assets of the college
accounted for $2,000,000. Following the establishment of a tax-exempt
foundation and a favorable ruling from the Internal Revenue Service
qualifying it as an exempt Section 501 (c) (3) organization, the foundation
acquired the corporation stock from the trust in return for a note payable
in annual installments over a 35-year period. The taxpayer then made a
contribution to the foundation of corporation stock sufficient so that the
foundation owned 80% of the stock of the corporation. On the following
day, the corporation's board of directors voted to redeem the shares of
stock which were held by the foundation and to pay for the shares by
transferring to the foundation all of the assets of the college.
The Commissioner challenged the charitable contribution deduction,
contending that the taxpayer had received a distribution essentially
equivalent to a dividend. In Humacid Co. v. Commissioner4 6 the Tax
Court held: "The law, with respect to gifts of appreciated property is
well established. A gift of appreciated property does not result in income
to the donor so long as he gives the property away absolutely and parts
with title thereto before the property gives rise to income by way of sale."
Relying on Blair v. Commissioner,477 the Tax Court in Palmer held that
as long as the entire interest had been assigned and no incidence of
control was retained, then any tax on the income accrued to the donee,
not to the donor. The result would be different if the redemption had been
arranged prior to the time of making the donation.
478
11.05 Accumulated Earnings Tax. Sections 531 through 537 provide
for the taxation of unreasonable earnings that have been accumulated by
a corporation. Each corporation is permitted to accumulate $100,000 of
earnings during its lifetime. The accumulated earnings tax, per Section
532, applies to every corporation formed or availed of for the purpose of
avoiding income with respect to its shareholders or the shareholders
of any other corporation, by permitting earnings and profits to accumulate
instead of being distributed. The penalty tax is in addition to the ordinary
corporate income tax, and is 27 h % of the accumulated taxable income not
in excess of $100,000, plus 38V2% of the accumulated taxable income in
excess of $100,000. Note that this tax is not upon the total accumulated
earnings, but upon the income earned during the year or years in question
which has not been distributed or divided. Section 533 (a) provides that
for the purposes of the penalty tax the fact that earnings and profits of a
476 42 T.C. 894, 913 (1964).
477 300 U.S. 5 (1937).
478 Hudspeth v. United States, 471 F.2d 275 (8th Cir. 1972).
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corporation are permitted to accumulate beyond the reasonable needs of
the business shall be determinative of the purpose to avoid the income tax
with respect to shareholders, unless the corporation is able to prove by the
preponderance of the evidence to the contrary. Section 533(b) also states
that it is prima facie evidence of a purpose to avoid income with respect to
shareholders if the corporation is a holding company or investment company.
In United States v. D. Donruss Co. 479 the Supreme Court finally
resolved the conflict of decisions as to whether or not tax avoidance was
to be one of the motives, or the primary motive. In agreeing with the
government, the Supreme Court held that the penalty tax was applicable
if tax avoidance of the shareholders was "one" of the purposes for
accumulating the earnings. We should note at this point that the accumu-
lated earnings tax is a tax which is applied primarily against the closely
held corporation, not the large corporations with vastly held stock. The
purpose of the tax is to force corporations to pay dividends to their
shareholders which will again be subject to a tax, and to prevent buildups
of earnings and profits in a corporation which could be passed out to
shareholders at capital gain rates at a liquidation, or a sale, or perhaps even
obtaining a stepped-up basis through the death of the primary shareholder.
Section 537, however, provides that income may be accumulated for
the reasonable needs of business. Hence, we are confronted with the most
difficult factual situation in the accumulated earnings area. What are the
reasonable needs of the business?
In Starks Building Co. 480 the taxpayer corporation owned a large
office building which had been constructed in 1913 in Louisville,
Kentucky. By 1963 the directors of the corporation realized that if they
were to continue to attract the type of tenants which they had in the
past, being in one of the prestige locations of Louisville, they were going
to have to build a new building to compete with other new construction
in the area. Discussions with financing institutions indicated that a strong
anchor tenant was a prerequisite to obtaining the requisite financing.
From 1963 until 1967 the court found that the taxpayer conducted serious
negotiations with two different banks, neither of which resulted in leases
due to the taxpayer's inability to obtain the necessary financing for a
building which would be as large as the banks required. The corporate
directors established in 1948 a capital items reserve fund, whereby during
the years in question an amount of cash was deposited equal to the
amount of the depreciation amortization deducted by the taxpayer on
the federal income tax return. This fund grew from $1.8 million in 1962
to $3.3 million in 1967, hence the basis for the government's attack that
earnings were being accumulated beyond the reasonably anticipated
business needs of the corporation. Looking to Treasury Regulation
479 393 U.S. 297 (1969).
48 42 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 1154 (1973).
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1.537-1 which requires that the corporation's plans must be specific,
definite, and feasible, the court noted that it would not have been practical
for the corporation to have had actual plans drawn until such time that
a lease was entered into with the anchor tenant.
Evidence presented by one of the banks indicated that any building
they would lease would have to be constructed to their specific require-
ments. Faber Cement Block Co.481 had previously held that specific,
definite, and feasible plans do not demand that taxpayer produce
meticulously drawn blueprints for the action, but merely that the
contemplated expansion appears to have been of real consideration during
the tax years in question. The court determined that the reasonable,
anticipated future need to construct a new business did exist, and the
taxpayer had exerted a sufficient effort to find a tenant, although such
search had not yet been successful. The court did not say as to how
many years would be able to pass before finding a tenant and to have
the court arrive at the same holding.
In Ivan Allen Company v. United States482 the issue arose as to how
appreciated securities should be valued for the purposes of determining
whether or not earnings and profits had been accumulated unreasonably.
The court held that they should be valued not at their original cost but at
their fair market value at the date in question, less the cost of converting
the securities into cash. In 1938, the Supreme Court held in Helvering
v. National Grocery Company 48 that the depreciation decreased the
value of a corporation's assets and should be taken into consideration in
determining whether or not earnings in excess of reasonable needs had
been retained. Here the Court determined that the very liquid nature of
the assets in question should be determined by their fair market value, and
not cost, since they were readily convertible into cash for use in the
business if so required. In reaching this result they relied upon
the Battelstein Investment Co. v. United States,4s4 whereby a corporation
which had sold a very valuable piece of land and had received a note
secured by the land was allowed to have the discounted value of this land
treated as an asset, due to its highly liquid nature. The Tax Court takes
the same position as noted in Starks Building Co. 485 wherein they held
that the value of investment securities which are readily marketable must
be included in the computation of total quick assets of petitioner and that
their value should be determined by fair market value as of the end
of the year in question.
Inland Terminals, Inc. v. United States,45 a 1973 case, held that a
481 50 T.C. 317 (1968).
482 493 F.2d 426 (6th Cir. 1974).
48w 304 U.S. 282 (1938).
484 442 F.2d 87 (5th Cir. 1971).
4W5 42 P-H Tax Ct. Mere. 1154 (1973).
4W 477 F.2d 836 (4th Cir. 1973).
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subsidiary which was. wholly owned could accumulate earnings for the
business needs of a parent. Regulation 1.537-3(b) specifically permits a
controlling corporation to accumulate earnings for its controlled subsidiary.
In Alice Brown, Inc. v. Commissioner,487 the Sixth Circuit affirmed
the holding of the Tax Court that a corporation which sold its operating
assets during the year, and then conducted no further business activity
during the last five months of the year, became a holding or investment
company and therefore the tax was imposed, since no showing of any
plans or activities to enter a new business were presented.
11.06 Disallowance of Post-Acquisition Losses. Section 269 provides
for the disallowance of deductions and losses if the principal purpose of
the acquisition was to evade or avoid income taxes. The section was
enacted in 1943 to prevent the acquisition of loss corporations to offset
high profits which were subject to the "excess profits" tax. The offset was
usually accomplished through tax loss carryovers and selling at a loss
acquired assets with a high tax basis and a low market value.48 8
Originally the disallowance was thought to apply only to benefits
accruing to the acquiring corporation. 489 Later the Fourth Circuit rejected
this distinction in Commissioner v. Coastal Oil Storage Co. 490 holding the
disallowance applicable to the acquired as well as the acquiring
corporation. In James Realty Co. v. United States49' the application of
Section 269 was extended to newly formed corporations which were
attempting to benefit from the corporate multiple surtax exemption.
The problem next arose as to whether or not Section 269 applies
to post-acquisition losses and decreases in asset value. The deduction of
post-acquisition losses was disallowed in three of the five circuits which
considered the issue prior to 1973.492 During 1973 the Fifth Circuit, in
Hall Paving Co. v. United States, 493 joined the majority when they
concurred with the analysis of the Second Circuit. The Second Circuit
looked to the legislative intent of Section 269 and determined the
application of Section 269 was not limited to the disallowance of losses
occurring prior to acquisition.494
487 496 F.2d 621 (6th Cir. 1974).
488 BITTKER AND EUSTICE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND SHARE-
HOLDERS 16.21 (3d ed. 1971).
489 Alprose Watch Corp., 11 T.C. 240 (1948).
490 242 F.2d 396 (4th Cir. 1957).
491 280 F.2d 394 (8th Cir. 1960).49 2 Borge v. Comm'r, 405 F.2d 673 (2d Cir. 1968); Luke v. Comm'r, 351 F.2d 568(7th Cir. 1965); R. P. Collins & Co. v. United States, 303 F.2d 142 (1st Cir. 1962).The deduction was allowed in the following two circuits: Herculite Protective Fabrics
Corp. v. Conn'r, 387 F.2d 475 (3d Cir. 1968); Zanesville Invest. Co. v. Cormn'r, 335
F.2d 207 (6th Cir. 1964).
493 471 F.2d 261 (5th Cir. 1973).
,94 Borge v. Comm'r, 405 F.2d 673 (2d Cir. 1968).
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After the holding by the Fifth Circuit in Hall Paving Co. that
Section 269 was applicable to post-acquisition losses, that court remanded
the case for a determination of whether or not the prohibited purposes
were present. On remand the district court found that Hall Paving
Company had prior to the end of its fiscal year in 1963 acquired five
bowling alleys which had cumulative losses which exceeded the profit
from the Paving Company.495 The Hall Paving Company filed a single
consolidated income tax retutrn offsetting the profit from the principal
business with the losses from the bowling alleys. The jury determined
that the principal purpose for the acquisition was tax avoidance
purposes and therefore the Commissioner's disallowance of the losses
from the bowling alleys was correct.
Your Host, Inc. v. Commissioner4 96 presents a situation where the
Commissioner used both Section 482 to reallocate income and also
Section 269 to disallow multiple surtax exemptions. This case involved an
organization that commenced partnership in 1944 and grew by the mid-60's
to a 16-corporation organization operating restaurants, commissaries, a
bakery, and a vending machine and leasehold operation. The finding of
the Commissioner, as related to Section 482 allocations, will not be
set aside unless they are found to be "arbitrary, unreasonable or
capricious."07 As related to Section 269, a denial of the multiple surtax
exemption will be set aside only if the Commissioner's finding is clearly
erroneous.
498 In Your Host, Inc., the Second Circuit affirmed the
Tax Court's determination that there are different standards for
applying Section 269 and Section 482. The Second Circuit determined
that while four of the restaurant-operating corporations should be denied
their surtax exemption because their acquisition was for the principal
purpose of tax avoidance, there were sound business reasons for their
separate corporate existence, so that no allocation of income was
permissible under Section 482. The reason for this apparent inconsistency
is that while a corporation may have originated out of the evil motive of
tax avoidance, it may be operating on a day-to-day basis as a business,
thereby not justifying any reallocation of income. Citing Dorba Homes,
Inc. v. Commissioner,4" the court cautioned against:
[C]onfusing a purpose, the continued existence of which may be
thought to eliminate an adverse determination under [Section] 482,
with the principal purpose to evade or avoid the federal income
tax, the initial presence of which governs [Section] 269 and which
may exist along side other secondary reasons for the formation
of the corporation.5°°
495 Hall Paving Co. v. United States, 33 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 74-989 (N.D. Ga. 1974).
496 33 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 74-385 (2d Cir. 1974).
497 Wisconsin Big Boy v. Comm'r, 452 F.2d 137, 140 (7th Cir. 1971).
498 Dorba Homes, Inc. v. Comm'r, 403 F.2d 502, 505 (2d Cir. 1964).
499 Id. at 506.
50 33 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d at 74-389.
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In upholding the allocation of the profit derived from the bakery
subsidiary to the parent corporation which sold the baked goods to the
restaurants, the court held that if the taxpayer disputes the Commissioner's
allocation of 100% of the income from one corporation to another,
contending it should be a lesser percentage, the issue should be raised at
the trial and not at the appellate level.
Canaveral International Corp.50 was contemplating the purchase of
a 152-foot yacht for the purposes of leasing the yacht for oceanographic
research and marine exploration. Further discussions with the owner
indicated that the yacht was owned by a corporation and that the
corporate basis of the yacht was $769,000. At this point Canaveral
changed their intention to acquire the asset itself and negotiated an
agreement whereby the stock of the corporation owning the yacht was to
be acquired in exchange for 949 shares of no-dividend-bearing non-voting
preferred stock which could be converted to 20,878 shares of common
stock of Canaveral at a future date. At the date the transaction was
concluded the Canaveral stock had a value of $177,500. The Commissioner
determined the principal purpose of the acquisition of the stock of the
corporation owning the yacht, rather than acquiring the asset itself, was
for the avoidance of federal income tax. Hence when Canaveral later sold
the yacht for $250,000 and deducted $519,632 as a Section 1231 loss
(deduction against ordinary income), the loss was disallowed. In rebutting
the taxpayer's argument that the yacht was acquired for a valid business
purpose, the court relying on Treasury Regulation 1.269-3(a), stated
that the presence of a valid business purpose in acquiring an asset will
not override the absence of a tax avoidance motive. The only advantage
which Canaveral could derive from acquiring the stock was the acquisition
of the potential half-million-dollar loss.
11.07 Net Operating Loss Carrybacks and Carryovers. By enacting
Section 172, Congress has attempted to ameliorate the tax consequences
in those businesses and industries in which income tends to fluctuate from
one year to another by permitting the profit years to be reduced by loss
years. Net operating losses may be carried back to each of the three
preceding years and carried forward to each of the five succeeding years,
or until the loss is consumed. To illustrate this principle, let us assume
that in 1974 the business incurred a $40,000 loss while in each year,
1971, 1972, 1973, and 1975 through 1979 the business incurred a $5,000
profit. The $40,000 loss from 1974 would be carried back to the earliest
of the three preceding years, 1971, and the $5,000 loss would be wiped
out, thereby leaving $35,000 of net operating loss to be carried to 1972,
thereby wiping out that $5,000 profit and leaving $30,000 to be carried
to 1973, thereby eliminating that $5,000 profit. The $15,000 of profit
which will have been eliminated entitles the taxpayer to file for a refund
50161 T.C. No. 58 (Jan. 29, 1974).
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of the income tax paid in the years 1971 through 1973. The remaining
$25,000 of loss may be carried forward to each of the succeeding five years.
Section 172(b) (2) provides:
[Elxcept as provided in subsections (i) and (j) [inapplicable here],
the entire amount of the net operating loss for any tax year (here-
inafter in this section to be referred to as the "loss year") shall be
carried to the earliest of the taxable years to which (by reason of
paragraph [1]) such loss may be carried. The portion of such loss
which shall be carried to each of the other taxable years shall be
the excess, if any, of the amount of such loss over the sum of the
taxable income for each of the prior taxable years to which such
loss may be carried.
Section 1201 (a) provides two methods of calculating the income tax for
any year in which a corporation has a capital gain which is the lesser of:
(1) the regular tax on all income, or (2) the regular tax on all income
reduced by the amount of capital gain plus 30% of the capital gain. The
latter is known as the alternative tax calculation. Since the corporation tax
is 22% on the first $25,000 of taxable income, the regular method of
calculation will, when income is below $36,000, be more beneficial than
the alternative tax calculation. The alternative calculation is beneficial to a
taxpayer with income in excess of approximately $36,000. Weil v.
Commissioner °  held that where a taxpayer's ordinary operating
deductions exceed his ordinary income, the excess of deductions over
income does not reduce the amount of capital gain subject to the
alternative capital gain calculation.
With these statutes and the Weil case as background, the stage is now
set for one of the most important controversies to develop during the year
1974. At stake are over 100 pending cases involving 20 million dollars in
taxes. Although the taxpayer has been successful in the First, 50 3 Eighth, 50 4
and Ninth 53 Circuits, the Commissioner has recently been successful in
the Fourth Circuit case of Mutual Assurance Society of Virginia Corp. v.
Commissioner. 50 During the year 1969 Mutual Assurance Society
incurred a loss of $83,059.04. To obtain benefit from this loss Mutual
would be required to carry this back to the earliest of the three preceding
years or 1966. However, since the taxpayer incurred a loss in 1966, the
$83,000 loss would be carried back to the year 1967. Next, the tax is
calculated for the corporation under both the regular and alternative tax
calculation methods. Under the regular method using Section 11, the
taxable income of $281,828.70 for the year 1967 is reduced by the 1969
50 229 F.2d 593 (6th Cir. 1956).
50M Chartier Real Estate Co., 428 F.2d 474 (1st Cir. 1970), affg per curiam 52 T.C.
346 (1969).
504 Foster Lumber Co. v. United States, 500 F.2d 1230 (8th Cir. 1974).
505 Olympic Foundry Co. v. United States, 493 F.2d 1247 (9th Cir. 1974), affg per
curiam 29 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 72-759 (D. Wash. 1972).
5W 34 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 74-6022 (4th Cir. 1974).
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loss carry-back of $83,059.04, leaving a recomputed taxable income of
$198,769.66 or $8,909.44 in tax liability.
Under the alternative calculation of Section 1201(a) the ordinary
income for the year 1967 of $72,575.10 is added to the capital gains of$209,253.60 for the total taxable income of $281,828.70. From this figure
is deducted the capital gains of $209,253.60, thereby leaving a negative
balance, which when multiplied by the corporation tax rate leaves a zero
tax. The next step is to calculate the alternative tax on the capital gain by
multiplying the capital gain by the alternative tax rate of 25%107 This
results in a tax of only $52,303.40.
Now to the essence of the problem. How much of taxpayer's 1969
loss of $83,059.04 was consumed in recalculating the income for the year
1967? The taxpayer argues that only $72,575.10, the amount of the
ordinary income was used in 1967, thereby leaving $10,483.94 to be used
to reduce the tax for the year 1968. The Commission's position is that
since there was still taxable income of $198,769.66 after the deduction
of the 1969 loss, there is no loss to be carried to 1968.
The crux of this situation is the interpretation of Section 172(b) (2)
which states: "The portion of such loss which shall be carried to each of
the other taxable years shall be the excess, if any, of the amount of such
loss over the sum of the taxable income for each of the prior taxable years
to which such loss may be carried." We would note that this problem
arises when two conditions are present: (1) the amount of the loss carried
back or carried forward exceeds the amount of the ordinary income for
the year to which the loss is being carried; and (2) the alternative tax
calculation is being used to determine the tax on the capital gain.
Although Axelrod v. Commissioner5O8 involved the application of the
loss carryback and alternative capital gains calculation for an individual,
the Sixth Circuit held the net operating loss carryback was fully consumed
in the carryback year as the loss did not exceed the total of the ordinary
income plus capital gains, thereby upholding the validity of Treasury
Regulations 1.72-4(b)(ii) and 1.172-5.
In Chartier Real Estate Co., Inc.,50 9 the Tax Court looked to the
legislative purpose of the net operating loss carryback and carryover
provisions which, as they found, were intended "... to ameliorate
somewhat the arbitrary nature of the annual accounting period, especially
in the case of businesses with great fluctuations in income from year to
year," thereby offsetting profit years with losses from other years. The Tax
Court also determined that the taxable income meant ".... taxable income
to which the loss is actually applied in computing the actual tax
liability." 510 Therefore they arrived at the conclusion that a net operating
507 The current alternative tax rate is 30%.
508 75 USTC 9115.
50952 T.C. 346, 357 (1969).
Po Id. at 358,
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loss, which exceeded ordinary income for the year to which it was carried
back, could be again carried forward to a succeeding year since no tax
benefit accrued to the taxpayer when the alternative capital gains
tax calculation was utilized. The First Circuit in a brief per curiam
opinion affirmed the Tax Court's decision with the now memorable
quotation: "No useful purpose would be served by further elaboration on
these unimportant and seldom-occurring questions."
51
' Courts which have
subsequently dealt with this issue have uniformly followed the Tax
Court's decision in Chartier.
51
The Eighth Circuit in Foster Lumber Co. v. United States,su while
affirming the opinion of the Tax Court primarily based on the weight of
the previous decisions, noted that both the Commissioner's and the
taxpayer's interpretation of the wording "taxable income" present plausible
meanings of Section 172(b) (2). In answer to the arguments of both
litigants that the plain meaning of the statute should be applied, the court
came up with another memorable qoutation: "As one would probably
expect in the case involving the Internal Revenue Code, it is impossible to
find any plain meaning in the statutory language that would dispose of this
controversy. ' 514 The Fourth Circuit in Mutual Assurance Society of
Virginia Corporation v. Commissioner515 reasoned that since the phrase
"taxable income" is not defined in Section 172, it should therefore be
given the meaning as set forth in Section 63(a) which is "gross income
minus the deductions allowed by this chapter." The Fourth Circuit, in a
lengthy analysis of the meaning of the phrase "taxable income" found that
the phrase could only have the meaning as set forth in Section 63(a).
Therefore when a corporate taxpayer utilizes the alternative tax
calculation, there can be no carryover to a succeeding year of a net
operating loss until the loss exceeds both the capital gain and the ordinary
income. In conclusion, the Fourth Circuit pointed out that nothing in the
legislative history requires that a tax benefit be derived from every dollar
of net operating loss which is carried back or carried forward, and if the
congressional intent has not been fully implemented by these statutes
it is up to Congress to change the wording of the statute to realize the
full benefit of a net operating loss.518
It is submitted by the writer that the Fourth Circuit's interpretation
of Section 172(b) (2) is the better reasoned decision, although it probably
does not give the result which Congress originally intended.
5n 428 F.2d at 475.
512 See, e g., Foster Lumber Co. v. United States, 500 F.2d 1230 (8th Cir. 1974);
Olympic Foundry Co. v. United States, 29 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 72-759 (Dist. Ct.
Wash. 1972), aff'd per curiam, 493 F.2d 1247 (9th Cir. 1974); Continental Equities,
Inc., 43 P-H TAx CT. MEM. 74, 755 (July 25, 1974).
513 500 F.2d 1230 (Sth Cir. 1974).
514 Id. at 1232.
515 34 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d at 74-6025.
516 Id. at 74-6029.
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